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Abstract 
Universal coverage is a core health system goal which can be met through a 
variety of health financing mechanisms. The focus of this PhD is on one of 
these mechanisms, community-based health insurance (CBHI). CBHI aims to 
provide financial protection from the cost of seeking health care through 
voluntary prepayment by community members; typically it is not-for-profit and 
aims to be community owned and controlled. Despite its popularity with 
international policymakers and donors, CBHI has performed poorly in most 
low and middle income countries. The overarching objective of this PhD is 
therefore to understand the determinants of low enrolment and high drop-out in 
CBHI. The PhD builds on the existing literature, which employs mainly 
economic and health system frameworks, by critically applying social capital 
theory to the analysis of CBHI. A mixed-methods multiple case study research 
design is used to investigate the relationship between CBHI, bonding and 
bridging social capital at micro and macro levels and active community 
participation. The study focuses on Senegal, where CBHI is a component of 
national health financing policy. The results suggest that CBHI enrolment is 
determined by having broader social networks which provide solidarity, risk 
pooling, financial protection and financial credit. Active participation in CBHI 
may prevent drop-out and increase levels of social capital. Overall, it seems 
CBHI is likely to favour individuals who already possess social, economic, 
cultural and other forms of capital and social power. At the macro level, values 
(such as voluntarism, trust and solidarity) and power relations inhering in 
social networks of CBHI stakeholders are also found to help explain low levels 
of CBHI enrolment at the micro level. The results imply the need for a 
fundamental overhaul of the current CBHI model. It is possible that the needed 
reforms would require local institutions to develop new capacities and 
resources that are so demanding that alternative public sector policies such as 
national social health insurance might emerge as a preferable alternative.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Research motivation, research questions and hypothesis  
Community-based health insurance (CBHI) is a health financing mechanism 
which aims to provide financial protection from the cost of seeking health care 
through voluntary prepayment by community members; it is not-for-profit and 
aims to be community owned and controlled (Hsiao 2001). Senegal has 
witnessed a rapid increase in the number of CBHI schemes, reaching  129 in 
2007 (CAFSP 2010). The current government elected in 2012 views CBHI as a 
key mechanism for achieving universal coverage (Ministère de la Santé 2012), 
a continuation of the previous government’s policy (Ministère de la Santé 
2004). However, as in most low- and middle-income countries (LMIC), overall 
population coverage in Senegal remains low, with 4% or less of the population 
enrolled in CBHI (Soors et al. 2010). Another major problem for CBHI 
schemes is retaining enrolees; it is estimated that in Senegal in 2004, 47% of 
people who had ever enrolled in CBHI had ceased paying the monthly 
premium and therefore lost access to the benefits of CBHI (Hygea 2004).  
There have been numerous studies on the determinants of enrolment in CBHI 
in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (Defourny and Faillon 2011). In light of the 
findings, the literature proposes various strategies to address low population 
coverage of CBHI (Mills et al. 2012, Ndiaye, Soors, and Criel 2007, Soors et 
al. 2010). However, continued low population coverage suggest these strategies 
have not been successfully implemented, raising the possibility that some 
important determinants of low enrolment may have been overlooked. In 
contrast, while drop-out from CBHI is frequently reported as a problem, it has 
rarely been analysed in depth (De Allegri et al. 2009). In light of the apparently 
poor performance of CBHI and the aforementioned gaps in knowledge, the 
overarching research question addressed by this PhD is: what are the 
determinants of low enrolment and high drop-out in CBHI?   
In the PhD is it argued that the literature on CBHI coverage is primarily 
underpinned by two conceptual frameworks: an “economic framework”, 
focusing on features of market transactions such as willingness-to-pay, 
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information, price and quality (Dror 2001, Preker 2004, Pauly 2004, Zweifel 
2004); and a “health system framework” which typically sets financial 
transactions into the broader institutional context of interactions between 
insureds, insurance schemes, health service providers and the state (World 
Health Organization 2000, Bennett 2004, Bennett, Kelley, and Silvers 2004, 
Criel et al. 2004, ILO 2002). However, very few studies have employed 
sociological perspectives to analyse enrolment. Addressing this gap is the 
primary objective of this PhD. Specifically, the PhD poses the following 
second research question: can a critical engagement with social capital theory 
contribute to understanding why CBHI schemes do not appear on course to 
develop significant levels of population coverage in a sustainable way? 
The PhD elaborates a conceptual framework for analysing CBHI through the 
lens of bonding and bridging social capital (Chapter 2). This informs the 
hypothesis tested by the PhD: increased bridging social capital at all levels of 
CBHI helps to increase enrolment in CBHI, but the benefits of this dynamic are 
likely to be unequally distributed and to favour individuals and groups who 
already hold other forms of capital and social power. 
Understanding these issues is important for Senegal and other countries which 
have made CBHI central to health financing policy. It is also important for 
other countries which have experimented with CBHI and abandoned it in 
favour of alternative methods of financing health care, as there is a need to 
understand causes of failure so that mistakes are not repeated in the future. 
Hence, while the main objective of the PhD is not to develop CBHI policy, 
some specific policy recommendations flowing from the research conducted on 
social capital are proposed in Chapter 6. 
The remainder of this chapter provides further background on: CBHI; social 
capital theories and their application to research on international development; 
and Senegal, the national context in which the PhD research took place. The 
chapter then briefly outlines the research methods employed in the PhD; 
describes the research project in which the PhD was nested; and provides a 
summary of the four PhD papers.      
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1.2 Community-based health insurance (CBHI)1  
Background: financing health care in low and middle income countries 
Financing health care has become an increasingly important policy issue in 
national and international efforts to improve health and health care in low- and 
middle-income countries (LMIC). The increased attention can partly be 
explained by the realisation that due to the widespread use of user charges, 
high levels of out-of-pocket (OOP) expenditure on health reduce access to 
health care, especially among the poorest (Hjortsberg 2003, Preker, 
Langenbrunner, and Jakab 2002), and increase the financial risks of ill health to 
households due to selling of assets, indebtedness, impoverishment, reduction of 
essential expenditure on food, education and so on, in addition to the costs of 
being unable to carry out normal income generating activities due to ill-health 
(van Doorslaer et al. 2006, Xu et al. 2003, Wagstaff 2009, McIntyre et al. 
2006, Pannarunothai and Mills 1997, McPake 1993, Ridde and Girard 2004, 
Shaw and Ainsworth 1996). This particularly affects SSA which has very low 
levels of public expenditure on health compared to other regions (Fig 1.1). 
Insurance mechanisms such as CBHI are needed to reduce the burden of user 
charges by increasing risk pooling and prepayment. Another driving factor for 
the focus on health financing is the further realisation that international 
development mechanisms aiming to support public health such as aid, loans, 
debt reduction and global health initiatives are unlikely to succeed without the 
presence of strong health systems, which include strong health financing 
systems (Travis et al. 2004). 
                                                 
1
 Parts of this sub-section are based on (Mladovsky 2012) 
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Figure 1.1: Public expenditure on health as a percentage of total health 
expenditure, by region, 2011 
 
Source: (World Health Organization 2013) 
 
The World Health Organization (WHO) has outlined a set of objectives for 
health financing policy in the Resolution on ‘Sustainable health financing, 
universal coverage and social health insurance’ (World Health Assembly 2005) 
as well as in two world health reports (World Health Organization 2000, 2010) 
and other policy documents (Kutzin 2008, Carrin et al. 2008). According to 
WHO universal coverage, defined as securing access for all to appropriate 
promotive, preventive, curative and rehabilitative services at an affordable cost, 
is a key goal for any health system. National health financing policies aiming 
for universal coverage need to incorporate three complementary dimensions of 
protection against the financial risk of ill health: breadth of coverage (the 
extent of the population covered), scope of coverage (the range of benefits) and 
depth of coverage (the share of service cost covered by the third party, i.e. user 
charges). The further goal of social health protection is related to and includes 
the goal of universal coverage, but more explicitly defines the values that a 
health financing system should embody, namely equity, solidarity and social 
justice (International Labour Office 2007). 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
P
u
b
li
c 
e
x
p
e
n
d
it
u
re
 (
%
)
Region
 19
The broad goals of universal coverage and social health protection incorporate 
a series of specific objectives which are commonly accepted as fundamental to 
the development and reform of health financing policy (World Health 
Organization 2000). These are: 
• Sufficient, equitable and efficient revenue collection 
• Risk pooling in order to ensure equitable financial access to health care 
• Efficiency and equity in the purchasing and provision of quality health care 
 
It is recognised that the goals of universal coverage and social health protection 
can be, and usually are, met through a mix of health financing mechanisms 
(International Labour Office 2007, World Health Assembly 2005). These may 
include:  
• tax-funded national health insurance  
• contribution-based mandatory regulated social health insurance  
financed by employers and workers 
• mandated or regulated private health insurance   
• mutual and community non-profit health financing schemes such as 
community-based health insurance (CBHI) or subsidised vouchers.   
The role and impact of community-based health insurance 
The focus of this PhD is on one of these mechanisms, CBHI. As explained in 
Section 1.1, CBHI aims to provide financial protection from the cost of seeking 
health care through voluntary prepayment by community members; typically it 
is not-for-profit and aims to be community owned and controlled (Hsiao 2001, 
Atim 1998). In practice CBHI can take many forms: insurance schemes may be 
implemented at the village or district level or based on membership to a 
distinct social or cultural group; schemes can be linked to a church group, 
association or agricultural cooperative, or they can be initiated and managed by 
a local hospital, for example; and members may pay the premium monthly, or 
annually, or just after the harvest when households have more resources. For 
the last 15 years or so CBHI has been of interest to international funders and 
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policymakers (Soors et al. 2010). For example, the G8 summit at Saint 
Petersburg in 2006 encouraged: 
“stepped-up discussion at the international level on practical 
approaches to the expansion of public, private and community-
based health insurance coverage in developing countries.” (G8 
Russia 2006) 
Potential advantages of CBHI in relation to reducing the negative impact of 
user charges include: increased prepayment; spreading the cost of ill-health 
over time; increased risk pooling, spreading the cost of ill-health across the 
community; increased equity in health financing; reduced catastrophic 
expenditures; increased health service utilization; increased revenues for health 
services; and improved quality, efficiency and sustainability of health services 
through strategic purchasing, if there is purchaser / provider separation.  
Another reason for promoting CBHI has been the perceived weaknesses of 
public health financing arrangements in LMIC such as tax funded schemes and 
social health insurance which are argued to include: limited public resources; 
corruption; ineffective tax systems; inefficiency due to bureaucracy; inability 
to respond to diversified consumer demand resulting from economic growth; 
and a lack of trust in public entities (Drechsler and Jutting 2005, Pauly et al. 
2006). CBHI is also thought to have the potential to overcome problems 
associated with private for-profit voluntary health insurance in LMIC such as 
adverse selection, moral hazard and low demand due to the smallness of 
community financing schemes which may provide informal safeguards such as 
full information, social sanctions, trust and increased solidarity (Davies and 
Carrin 2001, Zweifel 2004, Pauly 2007, Zhang et al. 2006). These advantages 
are argued to potentially offset the main perceived disadvantage of CBHI, 
namely the small size of risk pools, which may threaten the viability of 
schemes by reducing the potential to: spread risk, actuarially correctly assess 
the probability of loss occurring, maintain solvency, cross-subsidise and lower 
transaction costs (Schieber and Maeda 1997). 
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However, ultimately, because of the voluntary nature of CBHI, it is hard to 
envisage that it alone could promote universal coverage for health care for the 
population. As such, international development agencies rather construe CBHI 
as a transitional mechanism to achieving universal coverage for health care in 
low-income countries (World Health Organization 2000, Arhin-Tenkorang 
2001, Davies and Carrin 2001, Gottret and Schieber 2006). It is argued that in 
countries where there is an absence of financial protection and where OOP 
expenditure is high, CBHI could be introduced, in combination with other 
types of voluntary health insurance, SHI for specific professional groups and 
some tax-based financing, to move towards a greater promotion of equity in the 
health system until eventually compulsory forms of health financing are fully 
implemented. The increased policy attention on CBHI has resulted in a sharp 
increase in the number of schemes: for example, in 11 francophone countries in 
west Africa, there was nearly an 10 fold increase in the number of schemes in 
10 years, from 76 schemes in 1997 to 626 schemes in 2006 (estimated 
projection) (La Concertation 2004) (Table 1.1). However, in most LMIC 
population coverage remains low and rarely exceeds a few percent (Soors et al. 
2010). 
  
 22
Table 1.1: Growth in number of CBHI schemes in West Africa, 1997 - 2006 
 Year 
Countries 1997 2000 2003 
2006  
(estimate) 
Bénin 11  23  42 120 
Burkina Faso   6  26  35 60 
Cameroun 18  20  22 30 
Côte d'Ivoire   0  29  36 47 
Guinée   6  27  55 90 
Mali   7  22  51 102 
Mauritanie   0    0   3 5 
Niger   6  12   9 19 
Senegal 19  29  79 130 
Tchad   3    4    7 11 
Togo   0     7    9 12 
Total 76 199 348 626 
Source: (La Concertation 2004) 
Reviews of the literature on CBHI (Ekman 2004, Jakab and Krishnan 2001, 
Spaan et al. 2012, Soors et al. 2010) suggest mixed results in various 
dimensions of performance. There is evidence of market failure in the form of 
adverse selection (De Allegri, Kouyate, et al. 2006, Jütting 2003, Chankova, 
Sulzbach, and Diop 2008, Zhang et al. 2006) and moral hazard (Criel et al. 
1998, Musau 1999). While some CBHI schemes seem to enrol relatively 
poorer population groups (Ranson, Sinha, Chatterjee, et al. 2006), a study of 
CBHI in Senegal, Ghana and Mali found individuals from the richest quintile 
are more likely to be enrolled compared with those from the poorest quintile 
(Chankova, Sulzbach, and Diop 2008), indicating inequitable coverage. The 
same study found that in some contexts, members had lower out-of-pocket 
payments compared with non-members, suggesting CBHI can increase 
financial protection. For example, for members who benefited from CBHI 
coverage in Ghana, hospital out-of-pocket expenditures averaged US$2, 
compared with US$44 for non-beneficiaries. However in Mali and Senegal, 
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CBHI coverage did not have a significant protective effect on OOP 
expenditures for outpatient curative care, as CBHI schemes in both study sites 
had co-payments for outpatient care ranging from 25 to 50%, mitigating 
protective effect of CBHI membership on OOP expenditures. Evidence from 
India suggests SEWA and ACCORD, two major CBHI schemes, halved the 
number of households that would have experienced catastrophic health 
expenditure (spending >10% of annual household income) by covering hospital 
costs. However, 4% and 23% of households with admissions still experienced 
catastrophic expenditure at ACCORD and SEWA respectively, due to high co-
payments (Devadasan et al. 2006). In terms of health care utilization, in 
Senegal the likelihood of hospitalization was positively associated with CBHI 
coverage, although CBHI coverage did not seem to contribute significantly to 
seeking outpatient care from the modern health sector, probably due to co-
payments (Chankova, Sulzbach, and Diop 2008). Studies from Bangladesh, 
Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and India on the impact of 
CBHI on resource mobilization for health showed an overall positive effect, 
while studies from Rwanda and Uganda show weak financial sustainability 
(Spaan et al. 2012).   
Another obstacle to community health financing is the poor quality of health 
services (Criel and Waelkens 2003). CBHI can potentially contribute to 
improving quality efficiency and sustainability of health services through 
strategic purchasing (World Health Organization 2000, Hsiao 2001), if the 
health service provider is separate from the purchaser (i.e. the CBHI scheme). 
However, for strategic purchasing there must be an enabling environment: 
information about the quality and quantity of services must be provided; there 
needs to be investment in new skills in contracting on the part of both the 
purchaser and provider (Bennett, McPake, and Mills 1997); and a revision of 
the balance of power between purchaser and provider must be accepted 
(Desmet, Chowdhury, and Islam 1999, Meessen, Criel, and Kegels 2002, 
Carrin, Waelkens, and Criel 2005, Criel et al. 2005). In light of these numerous 
preconditions, it is not surprising that in a study of 258 CBHI schemes in low-
income countries only 16% conducted strategic purchasing (ILO 2002). 
 24
However, more recently, a review found that CBHI schemes in Kenya, Uganda 
and Tanzania improved service quality (Spaan et al. 2012). 
At the national level, a review of CBHI policies and their implementation 
found that Rwanda and Ghana are the only countries in SSA in which CBHI 
has contributed significantly to progress towards universal coverage by 
forming part of a comprehensive national strategy (Soors et al. 2010, Letourmy 
2010). However, a closer look at the evolution of coverage in these countries 
suggests the role of CBHI is questionable. In both countries, achieving high 
levels of population coverage seems to have been achieved in large part thanks 
to government provision of insurance rather than community-owned CBHI 
initiatives. Population coverage of CBHI schemes in Rwanda reached 85% in 
2008 (at which point enrolment became mandatory)  (Soors et al. 2010), but it 
has been pointed out that these schemes were managed largely by civil servants 
(Kalk 2008). Prior to the state-driven approach introduced in 1999, population 
coverage by CBHI in Rwanda had only been around 1.2% (Soors et al. 2010). 
In Ghana, the number of CBHI schemes rose rapidly from 47 in 2001 to 168 in 
2003 when CBHI was effectively superseded by the mandatory National 
Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS), but less than 40% of these CBHI schemes 
were functional at that time and the combined total coverage they extended to 
the population was just 1% (Sulzbach, Garshong, and Banahene 2005). 
Following the introduction of the public NHIS scheme, population coverage in 
Ghana reached 62% by 2009 (National Health Insurance 2011). This suggests 
that while countries which have achieved high levels of health insurance 
coverage have a history of CBHI, in SSA there is no evidence that CBHI can 
cover large parts of the population in its pure form (i.e. voluntary and 
community controlled (Hsiao 2001)).  
Despite the various challenges experienced by CBHI it is present in at least 16 
countries in SSA and forms a key component of national health financing 
policy in at least eight of these2 (Soors et al. 2010). Senegal, the focus of this 
PhD, is among the countries in which CBHI is part of national policy 
                                                 
2
 Senegal, Mali, Cameroon, Niger, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic 
of Congo. 
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(Ministère de la Santé 2012, 2004). If the Senegalese government is to be 
successful in its decision to continue pursuing CBHI, it is essential to 
understand the underlying reasons for barriers to CBHI development, 
especially the causes of low enrolment and high drop-out, and to identify 
policies which build on CBHI as a step in the path to universal coverage.   
1.3 Social capital theories and their application to research on 
international development 
As stated in section 1.1, this PhD aims to address gaps in the existing literature 
on CBHI by asking whether a critical engagement with social capital theories 
can contribute to understanding why most CBHI schemes do not appear on 
course to develop significant levels of population coverage in a sustainable 
way. 
This section provides background on social capital theories and their 
application to research in international development in order to elaborate the 
PhD hypothesis.   
Defining social capital 
The general definition of social capital employed in this PhD is “the 
information, trust and norms of reciprocity inhering in one’s social network” 
(Woolcock 1998, p. 153). As several further types of social capital can be 
distinguished within this broad definition, and as theories of social capital are 
contested, it is important to explain why this definition is used.  
 
There are three main authors who have explicitly developed theories of social 
capital. The French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu distinguishes between four 
types of capital: economic, cultural, symbolic and social. He defines social 
capital as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to 
possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships 
of mutual acquaintance and recognition” (Bourdieu 1986, p. 248). Economic 
capital is defined as money or property rights, cultural capital as cultivated 
knowledge or culturally valued items, and symbolic capital as any type of 
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capital that is represented (i.e. apprehended through knowledge or 
(mis)recognition). Bourdieu’s distinctive argument is that the four types of 
capital can be converted or transformed into one another, with economic 
capital being the ultimate outcome. Those who already hold capital are 
strategically more adept at transforming and accumulating it and may 
consciously and unconsciously do so. Thus economic accumulation becomes 
part of a general process of accumulating social connections, education, titles, 
or even “dispositions of the mind or body” (Bourdieu 1986, p. 243) which all 
reinforce each other. Bourdieu’s analysis is based on his own sociological and 
anthropological studies in France and in non-Western societies. His concept of 
capital has predominantly been seen as a theory of reproduction, more 
precisely of how a mode of domination reproduces itself (Calhoun 1993).  It is 
important to note that Ben Fine, the main detractor of social capital theory, 
directs most of his criticism not at Bourdieu, but at subsequent academics who 
elaborated alternative social capital theories (Fine 1999).  
James Coleman (Coleman 1988, 1990) is an American sociologist and rational 
choice theorist (Scott 2000). For Coleman, “social capital inheres in the 
structure of relations between actors and among actors” (Coleman 1988, p. 
S98). Coleman states that social capital “is productive, making possible the 
achievement of certain ends that in its absence would not be possible” 
(Coleman 1988, p. S98), but for him it is individual choice rather than 
domination that is the cause of unequal outcomes. He argues the most 
important outcome of social capital is the production of human capital through 
education. The characteristics of social relations that constitute this 
productivity are: obligations, expectations, and trustworthiness of structures; 
information channels; and norms and effective sanctions. Coleman develops a 
quantitative methodology for measuring social capital and its effect on social 
phenomena. The more ‘closure’ a social structure achieves (where not only is 
actor A linked to actors B and C, but actors B and C are also linked, “closing” 
the triangle), the “stronger” the social capital. Coleman finds that social capital 
is mostly a public good, meaning that rationally acting individuals are unlikely 
to invest in it to socially optimal levels. He argues that for this reason social 
capital is declining in each successive generation and that as a result it is 
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necessary to compensate with formal organization of social capital production. 
Fine accuses Coleman of employing a simplistic conceptual framework of 
methodological individualism which, “Whilst explicitly seeking to generalize 
beyond the physical, to distinguish social from economic and even human 
capital…primarily remains tied to an understanding of the social as the 
informational or other cultural externalities between individuals” (Fine 1999, p. 
7). He contrasts Coleman’s approach of studying social capital as the physical 
“logistics of networks” in an abstract manner to Bourdieu’s construct of social 
capital which, although designed to measure individual levels of capital 
through surveys, is, he argues, used by Bourdieu in terms of its content and 
meaning and therefore does not fall victim to the limitations of methodological 
individualism. This PhD attempts to draw upon Bourdieu’s theory of social 
capital.  An individualistic approach is used to quantitatively measure social 
capital, but by grounding the analysis in a culturally and contextually relevant 
setting, partly achieved by also using qualitative research, the PhD seeks to 
elucidate how different levels of social capital determine not only differential 
access to resources in a given context, but also the reproduction of social 
power.  
More recently, Robert Putnam (Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993, Putnam 
1995, 2000) popularized the concept of social capital to such an extent that he 
has been accused by critics of contributing to the “McDonaldisation” of social 
theory (Fine 2010). Putnam made a theoretical diversion from Bourdieu and 
Coleman by conceiving of social capital as a “stock” that can be the property of 
a group or community, district or even nation rather than of an individual. By 
conceiving of social capital as a “stock” Putnam has attracted criticism for 
over-simplification (Fischer 2005, Harriss 2002, Portes 2000, Fine 2001). 
Putnam writes that ““social capital” refers to features of social organizations 
such as “networks, norms, and social ties that facilitate coordination and 
cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam 1995, p. 67). Putnam uses the 
example of successful regional governments in Italy to argue that historical 
informal networks of civic engagement constitute social capital which in turn 
facilitates improved governance (Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993). This 
argument has been accused of being circular, but Putnam’s later work (Putnam 
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2000) in part addresses this problem by distinguishing between “bonding” 
social capital and “bridging” social capital. This forms an important 
contribution to social capital theory. Bonding social capital reinforces 
exclusive identities and homogenous groups through ethnic fraternal 
associations or country clubs, provides a specific reciprocity and mobilizes 
solidarity. Bridging social capital is outward looking and links people across 
social cleavages as in the civil rights movement, for example. Bonding and 
bridging social capital are key concepts in social capital theory which have 
been further elaborated by other academics (Woolcock 2001, 1998, Woolcock 
and Narayan 2006, Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993) and are employed in this 
PhD. Both Putnam’s and Coleman’s views of social capital have been 
criticized for overlooking the ways in which high levels social capital can 
result in negative outcomes (Portes 1998). Several subsequent studies of social 
capital, including this PhD, have sought to address this critique by exploring 
the negative effects of social capital and the relationship between social capital 
and domination. These themes are further elaborated in the next sub-section. 
The application of social capital theories to the field of international 
development 
Numerous studies have found that higher levels of social capital are positively 
correlated with improved development outcomes in areas such as agriculture, 
water and sanitation and microcredit in LMIC (Brown and Ashman 1996, 
Narayan and Pritchett 1997, van Bastelaer and Leathers 2006, Grootaert and 
Narayan 2004, Anderson, Locker, and Nugent 2002, Krishna 2001, Uphoff and 
Wijayaratna 2000, Lyon 2000, Weijland 1999, Bebbington 2006, Evans 1996). 
The sociologist Michael Woolcock (Woolcock 2001, 1998, Woolcock and 
Narayan 2006) has synthesized and categorized the various strands of social 
capital theory and studies of social capital and development into a conceptual 
framework. This conceptual framework underpins the PhD and is explained 
and applied to CBHI in chapter 2. As such it is described only briefly here. The 
framework incorporates four dimensions of social capital (Box 1.1). 
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Box 1.1: Four dimensions of social capital  
Micro level: 
(i) Relations within local communities  
Bonding social capital characterized by horizontal ties, as well as 
individual informal social relations and transactions. 
(ii) Relations between local communities and external civil society groups 
Bridging social capital characterized by vertical ties and formal 
relations.  
Macro level: 
(iii) Relations between civil society and macro-level state institutions 
Bridging social capital characterized by vertical ties, state institutions 
embedded in community relations, and community level relations 
facilitated by macro level state structures. 
(iv) Relations within corporate sector institutions 
Bonding social capital characterized by horizontal ties within institutions 
and a professional ethos committed to pursuing collective goals, fostered 
by a social relations between individual representatives of institutions. 
Source: Adapted from (Woolcock 1998) 
Woolcock (1998, p. 186) argues that “All four dimensions must be present for 
optimal developmental outcomes. This successful interaction within and 
between bottom-up and top-down initiatives is the cumulative product of an 
ongoing process that entails “getting the social relations right””. This PhD 
analyses CBHI from the perspective of the first three types of social capital in 
the framework, the fourth being beyond the scope of the research conducted. 
Of particular importance for the PhD is Woolcock’s argument that in some 
contexts, the first dimension (bonding social capital at the micro level) may be 
unproductive, as it may for example permit free-riding on communal resources 
by less diligent members of the group or cut off important sources of 
information  (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993). He characterizes this as the 
"negative" effect of social capital. The second dimension (micro level bridging 
social capital) holds a particularly important role in the framework as it is 
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argued to counterbalance the potentially “negative” effect of bonding social 
capital at the micro level. 
In the development literature, some have suggested that social capital might 
also be an outcome of development projects and programmes which aim for 
participatory approaches (Turner 1999). Creating social capital through 
development is said to be potentially beneficial for the sustainability of 
interventions (Turner 1999).  
The application of social capital theory to international development has been 
critiqued for: promoting a rationale for social engineering by development 
agencies; broadening the scope of justifiable intervention from the economic to 
the social in order to rectify market imperfections in order, in turn, to ensure 
that market-oriented policies are successful whilst obscuring a critique of those 
policies; ignoring the effect of class and other structural social inequalities on 
economic action; and reinforcing a conservative, neo-liberal development 
agenda (Harriss 2002, Harriss and De Renzio 1997, Fine 2001, Navarro 2002, 
Fine 2010, Labonte 1999). 
However, these accusations cannot be applied to all studies of social capital 
and development, particularly in cases where Bourdieu’s theories are 
employed. Several studies have used social capital theory to point to the 
reproduction of patterns of domination in the context of development 
programmes. As such, in these studies social capital theory is used to mount a 
critique of policy, not obscure it. For example, Campbell (2003) describes how 
an HIV/AIDS prevention project in South Africa with strong technical and 
financial external support failed to mobilize intended beneficiary groups and to 
effect behaviour change. Drawing on Bourdieu her analysis concludes that 
unequal distributions of economic, cultural, symbolic and social capital 
empowered project staff rather than the community, so that all the emphasis on 
change and learning was placed on community and none on project staff. 
Rather than taking the social causes of the spread of HIV/AIDS seriously, 
project staffs' approach favoured traditional biomedical interventions such as 
STD control, and as a result did not address the root causes of the problem. 
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Similarly another qualitative study from Uganda (Titeca and Vervisch 2008) 
employs social capital theory to explore power dynamics of community 
organisations and finds that organisations can become vulnerable to an 
undemocratic distribution of power and legitimacy in the absence of both 
bonding and bridging social capital. A mixed-methods study (Adhikari and 
Goldey 2010) also finds that social capital at the village level in Nepal can be 
both positive and negative in the process of inducing community based 
organizations. The main downside of social capital was rule breaking with 
impunity and elite capture of resources during the transition from external to 
internal management. In an ethnographic study in Tanzania (Cleaver 2005) it is 
also concluded that development projects seeking to increase community 
participation and collective action are likely to reproduce the exclusion of the 
poorest. These studies and other commentators (Williams 2004) conclude that 
development projects seeking to build on or induce social capital of the poor 
must acknowledge that if they adopt a politically neutral approach which does 
not consider local dynamics of power and domination they are unlikely to 
result in social inclusion or poverty alleviation. The PhD builds on this 
literature by critically applying social capital theory to the analysis of CBHI. 
CBHI and health financing more broadly have not been studied from this 
perspective before. Another innovative dimension of the PhD is to employ 
mixed-methods to critically investigate positive and negative effects of 
bonding and bridging social capital in a SSA context. 
Based on the literature, as stated earlier, the overall hypothesis to be tested in 
the PhD is that: increased bridging social capital at all levels of CBHI helps to 
increase enrolment in CBHI, but the benefits of this dynamic are likely to be 
unequally distributed and to favour individuals and groups who already hold 
other forms of capital and social power. As such, the focus of the PhD is on the 
positive and negative effects of social capital. In this sense, inspiration is taken 
from Bourdieu’s theory of social capital, through Woolcock’s framework. 
Further elaboration of the concepts underpinning the PhD is provided in 
chapter 2.  
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1.4 Senegal3 
Demographic, economic, political, social and cultural overview  
The PhD fieldwork was conducted in Senegal. Senegal is located in West 
Africa and is bordered by Mauritania, Mali, Guinea, Guinea Bissau and 
Gambia and by the Atlantic Ocean. At the time of the fieldwork it had 12 
regions (these have since become 14). Senegal's population was estimated at 
12,855,153 in 2011. The average annual growth rate of the population was 
4.1% in 2010, which indicates rapid population growth. 45% of the population 
is under 15, 65% under 25, while only 3.9% is 65 years and older. It is 
estimated that in 2010, 42% of total population resided in urban areas. Dakar, 
the capital, had an estimated population of 2.78 million in 2009 (Agence 
Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie 2011).  
Senegal is classified as a low-income country (World Bank 2013). In 2011 
Senegal had a GDP (PPP) of $ 25,115 million, ranking 112th out of 180 
countries and a per capita GDP (PPP) of $ 1,967 (World Bank 2013). In the 
Human development Index, Senegal ranks 155th out of 187 countries (UNDP 
2011). Based on the Senegalese Household Survey, the prevalence of poverty 
was estimated at 57% in 2004. 72% of the poor live in rural areas (ESAM 
2004). The global economic crisis, reflected by rising food and oil prices, has 
exacerbated poverty in Senegal (Fall, Salmon, and Wodon 2010). 97% of jobs 
in Senegal are informal sector (ESAM 2004). In terms of education, around six 
in ten women and four in ten men have received no formal education 
(République du Sénégal 2006).   
Senegal is noted in Africa for its stability and tradition of democracy. Largely 
peaceful elections brought about a change of government in 2000 and in 2012. 
At the time of fieldwork the President of Senegal was Abdoulaye Wade, leader 
of the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) which considers itself Liberal in 
political leaning. The current President is Macky Sall, leader of the Alliance for 
the Republic (APR). Previously, he served as Prime Minister under Wade.  
                                                 
3
 The author is grateful to Alfred Ndiaye for providing some of the references in this sub-
section.  
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Government decentralization was introduced in Senegal in the early 1970s, 
with the transfer of responsibility for health, education, environment, urban 
planning and housing, culture and other domains to local structures known as 
Collectivités Locales.  
Senegal's population is predominantly Muslim (94%) and affiliated to Sufi 
brotherhoods (mainly Tidianiya, Mouridiya and Khadrya). 5% of the 
population is Christian (mostly Roman Catholic) and indigenous beliefs are 
reported to account for 1%. The population is composed of several ethnicities: 
Wolof (45.0%), Pulaar (25.2%), Serer (13.8%), Diola (5%) and Manding and 
Socé (3.9%). French is the official language. Wolof, Pulaar, Jola and Mandinka 
are the main indigenous African languages spoken (ESAM 2004).  
Most ethnic groups in Senegal are socially stratified according to so-called 
"castes". Castes are characterised by heredity, the practice of endogamy, and 
certain occupational groupings (Diop, 1981). Caste discrimination exists in the 
form of prohibitions against inter-caste marriage and in economic, religious 
and political spheres. However, caste is rarely discussed openly and is 
considered a taboo in Senegalese society. Although Senegal is a signatory to 
various legal instruments promoting human rights and its constitution ensures 
the equality of all its citizens, there are no specific constitutional or legislative 
mechanisms against discrimination based on caste (RADDHO and IDSN 
2012). Regrettably, the PhD research does not investigate the relationship 
between caste and enrolment in CBHI due to the powerful social taboos which 
were considered too sensitive to address in the framework of the research. This 
is a limitation of the study (see chapter 6).  
Social relations in Senegal are considered an important source of solidarity and 
instrumental support. This is acknowledged in Senegal’s Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper (République du Sénégal 2006) which seeks to incorporate 
people’s perceptions into its diagnosis of poverty in Senegal.  Based on the 
findings of various sources of research it finds that for Senegalese people, 
poverty is perceived to be strongly linked to the absence of social relations:  
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“a person who is poor lives in total, economic, and social 
destitution… Such a person is often considered a social dropout 
and lives in a state of quasi-permanent impoverishment, cut off 
from the social fabric…” (République du Sénégal 2006, p. 10) 
Development projects have sought to build on this social fabric and as a result, 
Senegalese society has experienced a proliferation of various types of 
community associations that have evolved around cultural, religious and 
economic life. For example, a study of three regions in Senegal found that in 
1982, 10% of villages had at least one village organisation; by 2002, this figure 
had risen to 65%. Disaggregating by type of organisation, in 2002 47% of the 
villages had market oriented organisations (focused on, for example, 
processing and marketing, livestock breeding and animal husbandry, 
horticulture and irrigated crop production), while 33% had at least one 
community-oriented organisation (focused on, for example, cultivation of a 
collective field, maintenance of a cereal bank, social activities, and potable 
water management) (Bernard et al. 2008). 
Another important social structure in Senegal is “privileged relationships” 
which resemble what is categorised in anthropology as “fictive kinship” 
(Carsten 2000). Common examples are “ndeye dike” (“the mother of my 
choosing or twin”), “homonyme” (a namesake - a child that is named after a 
person) or “parrain / marrain” (“godfather / godmother”). These relationships 
constitute emotional and affective ties but can also be a medium for 
instrumental financial support (Buggenhagen 2011, Gasparetti 2011, Heath 
1992).  However, there is some evidence that increasing poverty resulting from 
the global economic crisis may be weakening these traditional safety nets, with 
relatively wealthier households being less willing to take on responsibility for 
children of less affluent families than before (Fall, Salmon, and Wodon 2010). 
Health 
In Senegal in 2009 male life expectancy was 60 and female 63, compared to 
the average of 52 and 56 respectively in the African Region (World Health 
Organization 2012). Basic health indicators are presented in Table 1.2. 
Senegal’s infant and child mortality rates have improved over the last 15 years, 
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with the under-5 mortality rate falling by around 50% between 1990 and 2011 
to 65 per 1000 live births (Table 1.2). This is considerably lower than the 
average for the African Region (119 in 2010). The maternal mortality ratio is 
also lower, at 370 compared to 480 per 100,000 live births. Antenatal care 
visits are relatively high, at 93% (at least one visit) compared to 74% in the 
African Region. The percentage of children sleeping under insecticide treated 
nets (ITNs) is relatively high (35% (2007 – 2012) compared to the African 
Region average of 18% (2005 – 2009)). The measles vaccination rate is 
relatively low, at 60% compared to 76% in the African Region. Treatment of 
diarrhoea with oral rehydration salts (ORS) is also low, at 22% compared to 
41% in the African Region. 
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Table 1.2: Health indicators, Senegal 
Infant and child mortality 
 
Under-5 mortality rate (U5MR), 1990 136 
Under-5 mortality rate (U5MR), 2011 65 
Infant mortality rate (under 1), 1990 69 
Infant mortality rate (under 1), 2011 47 
Neonatal mortality rate 2011 26 
Maternal health 
 
Total fertility rate, 2011 5 
Antenatal care (%) 2007-2012*, At least one visit 93 
Antenatal care (%) 2007-2012*, At least four visits 50 
Delivery care (%) 2007-2012*, Skilled attendant at birth 65 
Delivery care (%) 2007-2012*, Institutional delivery 73 
Delivery care (%) 2007-2012*, C-section 6 
Maternal mortality ratio , 2010, Adjusted 370 
Other health indicators   
Measles vaccination (%), 2011 60 
Diarrhoea (%) 2007-2012*, Treatment with (ORS) 22 
Malaria (%) 2007-2012*, Children sleeping under ITNs 35 
Adult HIV prevalence (%) 2011 0.7 
Source: Statistics compiled by (World Health Organization 2012, UNICEF 2013)  
*Data refer to the most recent year available during the period specified in the column heading 
Health system infrastructure 
Policy in the health sector is directed towards the achievement of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the objectives of the second 
National Health Development Plan (Ministère de la Santé 2009). In 2010, 
Senegal had 32 functioning hospitals, 89 health centres, 1,035 functioning 
health posts, two mental health centres, and 1,603 functioning health huts. The 
great majority of these structures are in the public sector. Additionally there are 
76 private Catholic clinics. Another important source of health care in Senegal 
is traditional medicine (Fassin and Fassin 1988).  
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Health financing 
As in most LMIC, total expenditure on health in Senegal is low, at 6% of GDP 
in 2011 (Table 1.3). Though it has been increasing since 2005 it is still slightly 
below the SSA average of 6.5%. Private expenditure on health as a percentage 
of total health expenditure is 41.7. This is relatively low compared to the 
average for SSA (54.9%), but high compared to East Asia and Pacific (32.4%) 
and Europe and Central Asian regions (24.6%) (Fig. 1.1). 78.5% of private 
expenditure on health is spent directly OOP as user charges (Table 1.3). 
Senegal’s health system operates according to the principle of cost recovery 
through user charges, in line with the Bamako Initiative (Ridde and Girard 
2004). OOP expenditure is the main source of funding for ambulatory care and 
drugs, while government funding is focused on hospital care (Table 1.4).  
As discussed in section 1.2, high levels of OOP expenditure on health have 
been shown to be inequitable and to cause reductions in use of necessary health 
care, increased catastrophic expenditure on health and increased poverty.  In 
light of this, the Senegalese government has developed policies targeting both 
the public and private sectors in order to enhance risk pooling and protect 
vulnerable groups and the poor from the financial risk of ill health. 
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Table 1.3: Health expenditure, Senegal 
 2005 2011 
Per capita total expenditure on health (PPP int. $) 90.5 118.5 
Per capita government expenditure on health (PPP int. $) 50.1 69.1 
Total expenditure on health as a percentage of GDP 5.4 6 
General government expenditure on health as a percentage of 
total government expenditure 12.4 11.9 
General government expenditure on health as a percentage of 
total expenditure on health 55.3 58.3 
External resources for health as a percentage of total 
expenditure on health 18.3 14 
Social security expenditure on health as a percentage of 
general government expenditure on health 3.8 4 
Private expenditure on health as a percentage of total 
expenditure on health 44.7 41.7 
Out-of-pocket expenditure as a percentage of private 
expenditure on health 76.3 78.5 
Private prepaid plans as a percentage of private expenditure on 
health 19.3 17.9 
Source: (World Health Organization 2013) 
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Table 1.4: Health expenditure by function and financing agent (millions of CFA), 
Senegal, 2005 
Financing agent 
Health 
expenditure 
by function Public 
Households 
(OOP) 
Other 
private Other Total 
Curative care 
(hospitals) 24,168 17,174 5,871 1,299 48,511 
Curative care 
(ambulatory) 9,213 11,055 4,542 459 25,269 
Dental care 439 1,324 620 2,383 
Auxiliary 
services (lab, 
radiology) 735 5,882 2,577 9,193 
Medications 576 41,162 4,404 46,142 
Other 99,154 7,768 7,655 8,119 122,698 
Total health 
expenditure 134,285 84,365 25,669 9,877 254,196 
Source: (Ministère de la Santé 2005) 
There has been some success, with the share of private prepaid plans (including 
CBHI) in private health expenditure in Senegal reaching 17.9% in 2011 (Table 
1.3) (World Health Organization 2012). This is relatively high compared to 
other countries in SSA (Table 1.5). In addition to CBHI, private prepaid plans 
in Senegal include private insurance offered to formal sector employers 
(known as Instituts de Prévoyance Maladie) and other forms of complementary 
voluntary private health insurance targeting the formal sector (Ministère de la 
Santé 2005). 
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Table 1.5: Share of private health spending and prepaid insurance plans in 
private health expenditure, selected SSA countries, 2011  
Private expenditure 
on health as a % of 
THE 
Private prepaid plans as a 
percentage of private expenditure 
on health 
South Africa 52.3 81.1 
Senegal 41.7 17.9 
Kenya 60.4 9.3 
Ghana 43.9 6.2 
Nigeria 63.3 3.1 
Uganda 73.7 0.2 
Source: (World Health Organization 2013) 
 
The development of CBHI schemes (known as “mutuelles de santé” in French) 
primarily targeting the informal sector has been a policy of the Senegalese 
government since 1997 (Ministère de la Santé 2004). In 2004 a strategic plan 
for the development of CBHI was published (Ministère de la Santé 2004). A 
legal framework for CBHI was established through the 2003 Loi relative aux 
mutuelles de santé, but this law is under revision and lacks an implementation 
act (Soors et al. 2010). By 2003 there were 139 CBHI schemes and other 
voluntary private health insurance companies (this figure includes 79 
functional schemes in addition to schemes in the process of being launched and 
temporarily suspended schemes) in 10 of the 12 regions of Senegal (Table 1.6). 
However, by 2007 only 4% or less of the population were enrolled in CBHI 
(Soors et al. 2010).  
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Table 1.6: Number of CBHI schemes in Senegal by region  
Region CBHI schemes in 2003 
Dakar   44 
Thiès 39 
Kaolack 11 
Diourbel 10 
St Louis 9 
Louga 8 
Ziguinchor 8 
Tambacounda 5 
Fatick 4 
Kolda 1 
Senegal total 139 
Source: (Ministère de la Santé 2004) 
Note: Figures include complementary voluntary private health insurance companies and CBHI schemes 
 
 
Public sector contributory health insurance schemes for the formal sector are 
also in place. These constitute the Social Security Fund (la Caisse de Sécurité 
Sociale), the Social Security Retirement Institute (l’Institut de Prévoyance 
Retraite), and a scheme for civil servants (Ministère de la Santé 2005). The 
government has also pursued a policy of exemptions from user charges and 
subsidies targeting certain vulnerable population groups, diseases and services 
(MSAS 2007), specifically: 
• Free deliveries and caesarean sections; 
• Free health care for the elderly (aged 60 and over) (Plan Sesame); 
• Free access to antiretroviral drugs (ARV) 
• Free access to anti-TB drugs 
• A subsidy for lowering the cost of treatment for : malaria, diabetes 
(insulin), cancer, kidney failure, and heart disease 
• Free treatment of severe malaria in children and pregnant women and 
the subsidized price of ITNs; 
• A subsidy to support health care access for the poor 
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However all these initiatives are experiencing difficulties with implementation 
(Soors et al. 2010), as health service providers continue to charge fees to 
supposedly exempted patients or for supposedly exempted services. For 
example, a recent nationally representative study of the user fee exemption 
mechanism for elders, Plan Sesame, found that 49.3% of the Senegalese elderly 
who are eligible (i.e. those aged over 60) were not aware of its existence and 
only 10.5% of the sample had ever benefited from the services offered by the 
Plan (Ndiaye 2013). This in turn means that in practice, exemptions policies 
have not greatly diminished the need for CBHI or other forms of prepayment 
and risk pooling on the ground.      
1.5 Overview of PhD methodology 
As the PhD follows a publishable papers format, details of the methods used in 
the PhD are provided separately in each paper. A very brief overview of the 
methodology is also provided in this section.   
Data collection 
The PhD employed a mixed-methods multiple case study design. Criteria for 
selecting cases and a description of the cases are provided in chapters 3-5. For 
the quantitative data collection, a household survey was implemented, using 
stratified random sampling. The sample size is 720. Further details of the 
household survey are provided in chapters 3 and 4. For qualitative data 
collection, purposive sampling was used to select 108 interviewees from the 
household survey. These individuals were interviewed again using a semi-
structured topic guide. Snowball sampling was used to identify a further 64 
CBHI stakeholders for focused, open-ended interviews.  
The development of the research tools (household questionnaire and interview 
guides) is described in chapters 3-5 and the tools are provided in appendices 2-
4.  
Data were collected in 2009 by the PhD author, a project team and a group of 
ten Senegalese professional quantitative and qualitative interviewers. Further 
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details about the project in which the PhD is nested are provided in section 1.6 
and Appendix 1.  All data are available on request. 
Data analysis  
The household survey data were analysed using logistic regression. The models 
and results are presented in chapters 3 and 4. The stakeholder interview data 
were analysed using inductive coding. Detailed methods and results are 
presented in chapter 5. Due to the large volume of data, deductive coding of the 
108 semi-structured interviews was done by a team of research assistants using 
a coding frame. Further details are provided in chapter 3 and Appendix 1. 
 
1.6 The role of the MUCAPS project in the relation to the PhD 
The PhD was conducted within a broader research project called MUCAPS 
(“Mutuelles de santé et Capital Social” / “CBHI and social capital”). The 
project began in 2009 and is due to end with the publication of a report (lead 
authored by the PhD author) in April 2014. The partners in the project are the 
London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), the Institute of 
Tropical Medicine (ITM) in Antwerp, Belgium, and CREPOS (Centre for 
Research on Social Policies) in Dakar, Senegal. Members of the project 
research team are: the author of the PhD, Philipa Mladovsky (co-Principal 
Investigator) from the LSE; Prof. Bart Criel (co-Principal Investigator), Pascal 
Ndiaye, Dr. Werner Soors and Benjamin Lelubre from ITM; and Prof. Alfred 
Ndiaye from CREPOS. The MUCAPS project was initiated by the PhD author 
and Prof. Bart Criel. 50% of the budget for the fieldwork was funded by the 
LSE Seed Fund and the Stewart Halley Trust (the PhD author raised these 
funds) and 50% was provided by ITM. Care was taken to ensure there is a clear 
demarcation between the research conducted by the PhD author, which was 
used for both the PhD and the research project, and the research conducted by 
the rest of the project team, which was not used for the PhD or was used to 
provide raw data or as supporting or background material and is acknowledged 
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as such. Further details of the PhD author’s role in the project and the 
relationship between the PhD and the project can be found in Appendix 1.  
 
1.7 PhD papers summary  
The PhD consists of four papers. In chapter 2, a framework of social capital 
and economic development is elaborated and used to organize and interpret 
existing evidence on CBHI. This first PhD paper is an original conceptual 
paper. It elaborates the overall PhD hypothesis (increased bridging social 
capital at all levels of CBHI helps to increase enrolment in CBHI, but the 
benefits of this dynamic are likely to be unequally distributed and to favour 
individuals and groups who already hold other forms of capital and social 
power) and addresses the second PhD research question (can a critical 
engagement with social capital theory contribute to understanding why CBHI 
schemes do not appear on course to develop significant levels of population 
coverage in a sustainable way?). The paper argues that the international policy 
model linking community-based health insurance (CBHI) and universal 
coverage for health care in low-income countries is implicitly determined by 
the development of mutual health insurance in nineteenth century Europe and 
Japan and that the economic and health system frameworks employed in CBHI 
policy have not sufficiently taken into account contextual considerations. 
Having reviewed the evidence, the paper goes on to argue that social capital 
theories could contribute to understanding why generally CBHI does not 
achieve significant and sustainable levels of population coverage. Specifically, 
the paper proposes that solidarity, trust, extra-community networks, vertical 
civil society links and state-society relations affect the success of CBHI; 
aligning schemes to these social determinants of CBHI could result in a health 
financing mechanism that differs from the model of CBHI proposed by current 
analytic frameworks. The paper provides a conceptual framework which 
underpins the subsequent empirical chapters. 
Chapter 3 addresses the first PhD research question (what are the determinants 
of low enrolment and high drop-out in CBHI?) and the second PhD research 
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question. The specific hypothesis tested is that people who decide to enrol in 
CBHI have bonding and bridging social capital, while those who do not enrol 
have bonding social capital and less or no bridging social capital. Using mixed 
methods, this second paper explores this hypothesis by comparing levels of 
bonding and bridging social capital among members and non-members of three 
case studies constituting CBHI schemes in Senegal. As such, it addresses the 
first two dimensions of social capital as defined by Woolcock (Box 1.1): micro 
level relations within local communities; and relations between local 
communities and external civil society groups. The results of the logistic 
regression suggest that CBHI members had broader social networks which 
provided them with solidarity, risk pooling, financial protection and financial 
credit. Enrolment in CBHI was less common among those with less social 
power, suggesting that health financing strategies in Senegal should focus on 
removing social as well as financial barriers to financial protection from the 
cost of ill health. Qualitative interviews confirm this interpretation. 
Chapter 4 also addresses the first and second PhD research questions. It 
provides a closer look at the internal participatory dynamics of the CBHI 
schemes, disaggregating the data on CBHI members into two groups, current 
members and ex-members. In doing so, the paper focuses on the second 
dimension of social capital, relations between local communities and external 
civil society groups. It brings together two under-explored themes in CBHI: 
drop-out and active community participation. It is hypothesised that drop-out is 
negatively correlated with the experience of actively participating in CBHI and 
with increased levels of the potential intermediary benefits of active 
participation, such as trust, information and solidarity in relation to the CBHI 
scheme. The results of the logistic regression suggest that the more active the 
mode of participation in the CBHI scheme, the stronger is the statistically 
significant positive correlation with remaining enrolled. Possible intermediary 
outcomes of active participation are also significantly positively correlated 
with remaining in the scheme. Perception of poor quality of health services is, 
however, identified as the most important determinant of drop-out. It is 
suggested that through active participation, members of CBHI developed 
personal relationships with the scheme leaders, staff and with each other, 
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thereby increasing their access to information and trust in the scheme and 
ultimately reducing the likelihood of dropping out. The results suggest that 
schemes may be able to reduce drop-out by increasing active participation, 
although if those who already have higher levels of social capital are more 
likely to participate, this may further increase social inequalities in health 
coverage.   
Chapter 5 also addresses the first and second PhD research questions but it 
takes a broader perspective of the factors influencing enrolment and drop-out, 
focusing on the third dimension of social capital: relations between civil 
society and macro-level state institutions (see Box 1.1). In this paper, the 
hypothesis is proposed that values and power relations inhering in social 
networks of CBHI stakeholders can help to explain levels of CBHI coverage. 
To test this, transcripts of interviews with CBHI stakeholders are analysed 
using inductive coding. The stakeholders represent health service providers, 
staff of the CBHI schemes, local leaders (religious, traditional, political and 
community), as well as local donors and representatives of international 
organizations. The five most important and interlinked themes identified which 
affect enrolment in CBHI are voluntarism, trust, solidarity, political 
engagement and social movements. Analysis of these themes raises a number 
of policy and implementation challenges for expanding CBHI coverage. These 
relate to: remuneration of CBHI scheme staff; development of internal and 
external governance structures through CBHI and NGO federations; 
government subsidies to cover premiums; marketing strategies which are in 
line with local perceptions of solidarity; the need for increased transparency in 
policy; engagement of CBHI scheme leaders in local politics; and a social 
movement dynamic based on shared values. It is argued that systematically 
addressing all these challenges would represent a fundamental reform of the 
current CBHI model promoted in Senegal and in Africa more widely.  
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Chapter 2 A conceptual framework for community-based 
health insurance in low-income countries: social 
capital and economic development4 
Abstract 
The international policy model linking community-based health insurance 
(CBHI) and universal coverage for health care in low-income countries is 
implicitly determined by the development of mutual health insurance in 
nineteenth century Europe and Japan. The economic and health system 
frameworks employed in CBHI policy have not sufficiently taken into account 
contextual considerations. Social capital theories could contribute to 
understanding why generally CBHI does not achieve significant and 
sustainable levels of population coverage. A framework of social capital and 
economic development is used to organize and interpret existing evidence on 
CBHI. This suggests that solidarity, trust, extra-community networks, vertical 
civil society links and state-society relations affect the success of CBHI. 
Aligning schemes to ‘social determinants’ of CBHI could result in structures 
that differ from those proposed by current analytic frameworks.  
 
 
  
                                                 
4
 A version of this chapter was published in World Development (Mladovsky and Mossialos 
2008). 
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2.1 Introduction 
Community-based health insurance (CBHI) provides financial protection from 
the cost of seeking health care. It has three main features: prepayment for 
health services by community members; community control; and voluntary 
membership (Hsiao 2001)5.  Major international development agencies 
construe CBHI as a transitional mechanism to achieving universal coverage for 
health care in low-income countries (World Health Organization 2000, Arhin-
Tenkorang 2001, Davies and Carrin 2001, Gottret and Schieber 2006). The 
current international policy model linking CBHI and universal coverage is 
implicitly informed by the history of health service financing in Europe and 
Japan, where CBHI schemes in the nineteenth century eventually merged to 
form various types of national health insurance (Criel and Van Dormael 1999). 
However, several studies suggest that while there may be lessons to be learnt, 
emerging in a different socioeconomic context, under different circumstances, 
it is not safe to assume that CBHI schemes in their current form will develop 
into forms of national health financing according to the historical precedent 
(Carrin and James 2005, Criel and Van Dormael 1999, Barnighausen and 
Sauerborn 2002, Ogawa et al. 2003).  Although it is estimated that in West 
Africa there was more than a two-fold increase in the number of CBHI 
schemes in just three years, from 199 schemes in 2000 to 585 in 2003 (Bennett, 
Kelley, and Silvers 2004), this is still a small number of schemes when 
compared to the situation in Europe6. In the nineteenth century there were 
27,000 friendly societies, which operated much like CBHI schemes, in the 
United Kingdom alone (Bennett, Kelley, and Silvers 2004). Also, rather than 
being locally initiated by farmers, associations of industry workers or 
employers as in Europe and Japan, today’s CBHI schemes are mostly the result 
                                                 
5
 Following the consensus that the optimal design for CBHI is schemes that are managed 
separately from the health care provider (Bennett 2004) the discussion in this paper excludes 
studies of provider-based CBHI schemes. 
6
 In another example from West Africa, in Ghana, the number of CBHI schemes rose rapidly 
from 47 in 2001 to 168 by 2003, but less than 40 percent of schemes were functional at that 
time, and the combined total coverage they extended to the population was just 1% (Sulzbach, 
Garshong, and Banahene 2005). However, in general, national data on population coverage of 
CBHI are scarce. 
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of top-down interventions led by foreign aid agencies or national governments 
(Meessen, Criel, and Kegels 2002, Criel and Van Dormael 1999). Reviews 
have concluded that the evidence base on CBHI is limited in scope and quality 
(Ekman 2004) and that it is unclear whether CBHI schemes are actually 
sustainable in the long term (Bennett, Kelley, and Silvers 2004).  
Constraints to increasing CBHI coverage and sustainability have been 
identified primarily by a body of literature taking an economic or a health 
system perspective. In agencies such as the World Bank and WHO, analysis of 
CBHI policy is underpinned by an economic framework, with discussion 
focusing on features of market transactions such as willingness-to-pay, 
information, price and quality (Dror 2001, Preker 2004, Pauly 2004, Zweifel 
2004). Another related perspective attempts to set financial transactions into 
the broader institutional context of the health system, analyzing interactions 
between insureds, insurance schemes, health service providers and the state. 
This is described here as a “health system framework” (see for example 
(Bennett 2004, Bennett, Kelley, and Silvers 2004, Criel et al. 2004, ILO 2002)) 
and it corresponds with the model of health system analysis laid out in the 
WHO (World Health Organization 2000). Underpinning both the economic and 
health system frameworks is the behavioral model of rational utility 
maximizing homo economicus.  
This paper argues that the rational individualist model does not permit the 
systematic incorporation of social context into policy. New, complementary, 
directions in thinking on CBHI policy are needed; particularly an increased 
focus on values, goals and power relations, as has been argued in relation to 
social policy in general (Flyvbjerg 2001). Specifically, it is proposed that a 
critical engagement with social capital theories could contribute to our 
understanding of why most CBHI schemes do not appear on course to develop 
according to the 19th century precedent, achieving significant levels of 
population coverage in a sustainable way. It could also help explain the 
apparently successful implementation of CBHI in certain countries, most 
notably Rwanda, where coverage of 25.8% of the total population was 
achieved between 2000 – 2005 (Musango et al. 2006).  
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Social capital has been the subject of spirited academic debate for almost two 
decades. Since its definition remains under dispute, as a matter of convenience 
the paper employs the following as a point of departure for discussion: “the 
information, trust and norms of reciprocity inhering in one’s social network” 
(Woolcock 1998, p. 153). Further categories in the social capital taxonomy are 
considered later in the paper. For at least ten years empirical studies have 
suggested that higher levels of social capital are positively correlated with 
improved development outcomes in areas such as agriculture, water and 
sanitation and microcredit in low-income countries (Brown and Ashman 1996, 
Narayan and Pritchett 1997, van Bastelaer and Leathers 2006, Grootaert and 
Narayan 2004, Anderson, Locker, and Nugent 2002, Krishna 2001, Uphoff and 
Wijayaratna 2000, Lyon 2000, Weijland 1999). The World Bank’s ‘Social 
Capital Initiative’ even suggested that social capital could be the ‘missing link’ 
between natural, physical and human capital and economic growth and 
development (Grootaert and van Bastelaer 2001). Theories of social capital 
have also been applied widely in public health policy (see (Moore et al. 2006) 
and (Shortt 2004) for a literature review). However, although an important 
component of social capital, trust, is occasionally discussed in the CBHI 
literature, CBHI has not, for the most part, engaged with social capital theories. 
In the few cases where social capital theory is considered, it is either mentioned 
only cursorily, or the richness and complexity of the theory is overlooked.   
The specific framework of social capital adopted in this paper was developed 
by Woolcock (Woolcock 1998, 2001, Woolcock and Narayan 2006). It brings 
together several theories of social capital and draws on quantitative and 
qualitative evidence from field studies. Its particular advantage for our analysis 
is its focus on community level economic development projects in low-income 
countries, similar to CBHI7.  It offers CBHI policy a framework that 
incorporates both economic and social theory by attempting to reconcile 
debates over whether humans are rational agents or governed by norms and 
                                                 
7
 While from a policy perspective the primary purpose of CBHI is not economic development - 
rather it is to improve access to health care services – CBHI is a financial mechanism, and as 
such it is compared and contrasted within the framework with other forms economic 
development. 
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culture. In doing so, the social capital framework can be viewed as an attempt 
to pragmatically address the need for an alternative, or complement, to income-
based and purely economic approaches to development (Bebbington 2004). By 
applying this framework to CBHI analysis, this paper aims to develop a 
methodology for grounding CBHI in context-dependent considerations such as 
values, community goals and local power relations.  
Woolcock’s social capital framework is briefly outlined below. Next, the social 
capital framework is used to organize and interpret evidence and information 
on CBHI. Since an empirical study identifying the causal links between social 
capital and CBHI is beyond the scope of this paper, the paper draws on existing 
studies of CBHI. Finally, there is a discussion on the possible importance of 
social capital to the implementation of CBHI and gaps in current knowledge on 
this subject.     
2.2 Social capital: a policy framework 
The concept of social capital was popularized in social science by Robert 
Putnam (Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993, Putnam 1995, 2000). He 
conceives of social capital as a ‘stock’ that is the property of a group or 
community, district or even nation and constitutes features of social 
organization - “networks, norms, and social ties that facilitate coordination and 
cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam 1995, p. 67). He argues that informal 
networks of civic engagement build social capital which in turn facilitates 
improved governance (Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993). By conceiving of 
social capital as a ‘stock’ Putnam made a theoretical diversion from the 
principal preceding theories of social capital (Bourdieu 1986, Coleman 1990, 
1988) attracting criticism for over-simplification (Fischer 2005, Harriss 2002, 
Portes 2000, Fine 2001). Previous social capital theorists (Bourdieu 1986, 
Coleman 1988, 1990) had conceptualized social capital as a resource for 
individuals which is socially structured - see for example Coleman’s definition: 
“social capital inheres in the structure of relations between actors and among 
actors” (Coleman 1988, p. S98). It is this earlier version of social capital that is 
employed in Woolcock’s policy framework (Woolcock 2001, 1998, Woolcock 
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and Narayan 2006). The framework constitutes four types of social capital: (i) 
bonding social capital inhering in micro level intra-community ties; (ii) 
bridging social capital inhering in micro level extra-community networks; (iii) 
bridging social capital inhering in relations between communities and macro-
level state institutions; (iv) and bonding social capital inhering in macro level 
social relations within public institutions. A synthesized (and simplified) 
version of the framework is presented below. 
(a) Bonding social capital at the micro-level: relations within communities 
'Bonding social capital', the first category in Woolcock’s framework, inheres in 
dense networks within communities. It constitutes expectations between 
individuals, the trustworthiness of structures, information channels, norms and 
effective sanctions that can prevent unproductive behavior in individuals 
(Coleman 1988). As such, social capital “is productive, making possible the 
achievement of certain ends that in its absence would not be possible” 
(Coleman 1988, p. S98) (for example doing well at school). The concept of 
bonding social capital has been employed in studies to understand why some 
immigrant groups in the USA fared better than others in economic 
development (for example setting up small businesses and enterprises) (Portes 
and Sensenbrenner 1993, Portes 1998). It was found that in some contexts, 
groups characterized by high levels of bonding social capital could provide 
enterprising individuals with psychological support and high levels of trust, 
lowering the transaction costs in enterprise. This is an example of how social 
capital has been understood as a response to market imperfections8 (Fine 
2001). 
However, as well as identifying the merits of bonding social capital, research 
into US immigrant groups also revealed that the same attributes of the 
normative structure (trust, social support, sanctions etc) that made the 
                                                 
8
 This idea also corresponds with the theory in new institutional economics that in contexts 
where there is no formal third-party such as government or the judiciary to enforce constraints 
on human interaction, there is a need for informal constraints, such as common values, repeat 
dealing, cultural homogeneity and kinship, to prevent corruption and inefficiency (North 1990). 
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accumulation of human and economic capital possible were in some settings 
unproductive, for example by permitting free-riding on communal resources by 
less diligent members of the group, deriding efforts to study and work hard, or 
cutting off sources of information  (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993). In this 
paper, this is characterized as the "negative" effect of social capital. The role of 
negative social capital forms an important part of Woolcock’s framework 
(Woolcock 2001). 
(b) Bridging social capital at the micro level: relations across communities 
Research in the US found that successful (productive) immigrant groups were 
characterized by individuals who were able to draw on bridging relations 
outside the network as well as bonding relations. This was thought to be 
because extra-community business relations were free from the potentially 
overwhelming demands family and friends place on successful members of the 
group for support (the negative effect of social capital), permitting exchange to 
take place on the basis of formal rules or fair market competition. This led to 
the idea that there must be two basic dimensions of social capital at the 
community level: intra-group ties and extra-group networks. The conclusion 
was that individuals need to be able to draw on strong intra-community 
bonding ties and extra-community bridging contacts to balance them out in 
order to counter the negative effects of social capital (Portes and 
Sensenbrenner 1993).  
Bourdieu’s theory of social capital (Bourdieu 1986), which is employed in the 
American research on immigrants, elucidates why some groups are unable to 
accumulate and employ bridging networks. He argued that individuals and 
families who already hold forms of capital (of which according to Bourdieu 
there are four types - economic, social, cultural and symbolic) are strategically 
adept at accumulating and transforming it (he argues the types of capital are 
fungible) and may consciously and unconsciously do so. Bourdieu sees 
economic accumulation as part of a general process of accumulating social 
connections, education, titles or names or even dispositions of the mind or 
body which all reinforce each other. Individuals and families that do not have 
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access to the various types of capital are from the outset in a disadvantaged 
position to accumulate it.  
Woolcock and other social capital theorists have been criticized for 
overlooking Bourdieu, thereby ignoring the effect of class and other structural 
social inequalities on economic action and reinforcing a conservative, neo-
liberal development agenda (Harriss 2002, Harriss and De Renzio 1997, Fine 
2001, Navarro 2002). While in some instances this is a pertinent critique of 
social capital theory, a careful interpretation of Woolcock’s framework 
suggests that Bourdieu’s ideas do have a significant (albeit indirect) influence 
on it by way of the central position given to the negative effect of social 
capital.  This differentiates the framework from the theory of social capital as 
solely productive and a rational response to market imperfections and 
engenders an alternative definition of social capital: “those expectations for 
action within a collectivity that affect the economic goals and goal-seeking 
behavior of its members, even if these expectations are not oriented toward the 
economic sphere” (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993, p. 1323). Put this way, 
social capital theory can be employed to understand how social structures such 
as class or ethnicity promote or constrain economic action. It is this definition 
that underpins Woolcock’s model.  
(c) Bridging social capital at the macro level: relations between communities 
and state institutions 
Research into the relationship between social capital, government structures 
and development outcomes in low-income countries found that “Norms of 
cooperation and networks of civic engagement among ordinary citizens can be 
promoted by public agencies and used for developmental ends” (Evans 1996, 
p. 1119). This takes up Putnam’s theory that social capital is instrumental in 
promoting effective government (Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993) but 
reverses it. Rather than focusing on the idea that links between groups and 
public institutions ensure that public policy is a collective good that benefits 
all, the research underlines the importance of direct involvement of public 
officials in getting citizen efforts organized and sustaining citizen involvement. 
Here, the role of the state is more than providing public goods and an enabling 
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rule of law. There are, however, difficulties with this idea, addressed in the 
next subsection. 
(d) Bonding social capital at the macro level: organizational integrity within 
corporate sector institutions 
Powerful institutions which transcend the public-private divide, such as 
governments, can potentially be vehicles for corruption and nepotism. The key 
to preventing this is a competent, engaged set of public institutions (Evans 
1996). Here, social capital is a professional ethos committed to pursuing 
collective goals, fostered by social relations between individual representatives 
of institutions; it is a form of bonding social capital at the macro level and 
facilitates positive state/society bridging relations. It has been pointed out that 
since coherent robust bureaucracies rarely exist in developing countries, the 
advocacy for state/society bridging social capital is misguided (Harriss 2002), 
although this is probably an overly pessimistic view. 
Regarding the four types of social capital in the framework, Woolcock 
(Woolcock 1998, p. 186) argues that “All four dimensions must be present for 
optimal developmental outcomes. This successful interaction within and 
between bottom-up and top-down initiatives is the cumulative product of an 
ongoing process that entails “getting the social relations right””. The following 
section explores to what extent CBHI policy has been "getting social relations 
right" by analyzing CBHI through the lens of each of the four types of social 
capital in Woolcock’s framework.  
2.3 Understanding the feasibility of CBHI through the lens of the social 
capital framework 
By reviewing the CBHI literature, a core set of studies that consider the social 
context of CBHI schemes were identified (Atim 1999, Bloom and Shenglan 
1999, Criel and Waelkens 2003, Dror and Preker 2002, Franco, Mbengue, and 
Atim 2004, Hsiao 2001, Jowett 2003, Kiwanuka-Mukiibi, Derriennic, and 
Karungi 2005, Meessen, Criel, and Kegels 2002, Ron 1999, Schneider 2004, 
Zhang et al. 2006). In the remainder of the paper, the adapted, simplified 
version of Woolcock’s framework is populated with these studies. The 
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framework is used to organize the CBHI studies and extrapolate from them. 
The paper also draws on other literature on CBHI, literature on other types of 
health insurance, and social capital literature outside the health field to develop 
the analysis. From this, it is tentatively assessed whether there is value in 
applying social capital theories to the formation and evaluation of CBHI 
policies.  
(a) Micro-level bonding social capital within communities: positive and 
negative effects on CBHI 
(i) Positive bonding social capital: constraining adverse selection and 
moral hazard and increasing willingness to pay? 
The growth in interest in CBHI is linked to the failure of governments in low-
income countries to implement compulsory health insurance for all or most of 
the population. The voluntary nature of CBHI gives rise to serious obstacles, 
particularly adverse selection. Other obstacles, such as moral hazard, are 
common to all forms of health insurance. In CBHI in particular, low demand 
and willingness to pay also pose a problem (Bennett, Creese, and Monasch 
1998, Meessen, Criel, and Kegels 2002). In order to counteract adverse 
selection, it is suggested in the economic literature on CBHI that contracts are 
designed to ensure: a minimum enrollment rate in the target population; 
waiting periods so as to prevent people from joining a scheme only when they 
are ill; and enrollment not on an individual basis but rather on a family basis 
(Carrin 2003). Ex-ante moral hazard may be uncommon in low-income 
countries since the costs associated with accessing health services are sufficient 
to deter increased ‘frivolous’ utilization (World Health Organization 2000). 
However ex-post moral hazard is likely where CBHI schemes cover minor 
conditions and decisions to utilize services are driven by the client rather than 
the provider (Bennett, Creese, and Monasch 1998)9. Following the economic 
framework, this can be addressed by introducing deductibles, copayments 
                                                 
9
 Depending on the provider remuneration mechanism, provider moral hazard may also 
potentially be a problem for CBHI. Linking demand-side financing to provider outputs may be 
technically and socially challenging due to the renegotiation of power relations between 
providers and clients (Carrin, Waelkens, and Criel 2005).  
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and/or gatekeepers as part of the contract (Hsiao 1995). However,  although 
they increase a scheme’s sustainability by limiting claims, charges can harm 
vertical equity, since they disproportionately affect the poor (Ranson 2002a).  
It has been suggested that informal mechanisms depending on social norms at 
the local level may be more equitable and efficient than the formal, contract-
based ways of combating such problems.  This is recognized in the economic 
literature on CBHI when it is suggested that trust mitigates against adverse 
selection and moral hazard in CBHI (Pauly 2004, Pauly et al. 2006) and that 
CBHI covering small pools provides informal safeguards, such as full 
information and social sanctions (Davies and Carrin 2001, Zweifel 2004). 
However, in these papers, although the importance of trust is highlighted, it is 
unsupported by any kind of evidence or example from CBHI experience and it 
receives no analytical development, since there is no economic theory of trust 
(a limitation recognized by Pauly) (Pauly 2004). Therefore, while the economic 
analysis of adverse selection in CBHI is useful, it has some important 
weaknesses.     
Other studies of CBHI taking a “health system” perspective also propose that 
trust decreases the likelihood of adverse selection and moral hazard and 
increases willingness to pay, but these do provide examples from the field and 
propose strategies to increase levels of trust. These include: improving 
behavior of medical staff to patients, such as increased levels of politeness 
(Criel and Waelkens 2003); improving quality of care (through strategic 
purchasing) (Schneider 2005); transparency and accountability among those 
managing the scheme (Schneider 2005); recourse to justice to punish fraud 
(Schneider 2004, Meessen, Criel, and Kegels 2002); subsidies for the poor 
(Schneider 2005); increased community participation in the scheme 
management (Schneider et al. 2001, Hsiao 2001, Atim 1999); scheme 
meetings; a significant proportion of staff working voluntarily (Atim 1999, 
Schneider et al. 2001). However, the analysis is confined to investigating how 
trust could be produced and employed at various points in the consumer-
provider-insurance triangle. These discussions of trust do not take into account 
the broader social context and how this may affect CBHI. For example, in a 
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study of the role of trust in CBHI in Rwanda (Schneider 2005), the effect of 
solidarity among scheme members on willingness to pay is discussed without 
any mention of the specific nature and possible root of this solidarity. The 
socially determined values and norms that form the context of the CBHI and 
may influence it in practice are left largely unexamined. For example, no 
mention is made of the effect on trust of the civil war and genocide that 
occurred less than a decade before the study took place. Ethnic fragmentation 
has been associated with decreased local public good provision in Kenya 
(Miguel and Gugerty 2005), decreased levels of group participation in the US 
(Alesina and La Ferrara 2000) and increased informal sector activity and 
decreased tax compliance in 52 countries (Lassen 2003) to name but a few 
studies of the effect of ethnic diversity on trust. Experience from these studies 
suggests that CBHI may be hampered by ethnic fragmentation, but almost no 
studies of CBHI, even in contexts of great ethnic diversity, have investigated 
the effect of ethnicity on trust among potential scheme members. 
One exception is a study comparing a hospital-based scheme in Ghana with a 
scheme based in a city in Cameroon where membership was based on ethnic 
affiliation (Atim 1999). It attempts to test the theory that solidarity and the 
smallness of CBHI schemes can account for successful CBHI. It found that in 
Cameroon, the bonds of ethnic urban solidarity networks represented an effort 
to re-create or utilize rural solidarity mechanisms as an insurance against the 
risks of modern urban life, creating a “social movement dynamic”.  The paper 
concludes that while this in part explained the success of the Cameroonian 
scheme, a scheme without ethnic bonds could also incorporate elements of a 
social movement through greater community participation, accountability and 
autonomy in the course of time. Echoing this, studies outside the CBHI 
literature have suggested that the negative effects of ethnic fragmentation on 
trust could be mitigated through improved institution building (Miguel 2004, 
Easterly 2001).   
Ideas that trust and solidarity bonds in the community improve the likelihood 
of success in CBHI have parallels with the theory in Woolcock’s framework 
(Woolcock 1998, 2001, Woolcock and Narayan 2006) that bonding social 
 59
capital decreases fraud and increases economic development. However, 
research in China (Hsiao 2001, Zhang et al. 2006) is one of only two explicit 
attempts to measure the effect of social capital on CBHI (the other is a study in 
Vietnam (Jowett 2003) (see below). In the Chinese research, social capital is 
employed only in the Putnamian sense to mean a stock of “social cohesion and 
solidarity”. It was found that social capital facilitated collective action, which 
in turn facilitated willingness to pay. A statistically significant association 
between indicators of social capital (degrees of trust and reciprocity) and 
farmers’ willingness to join community financing was demonstrated, 
controlling for other socio-demographic characteristics (Zhang et al. 2006). 
The suggested pathway linking levels of trust and reciprocity to willingness to 
pay in Chinese CBHI schemes is that members with higher levels of solidarity 
are more ready to accept the cross-subsidization which is implicit in the 
insurance mechanism (Hsiao 2001). CBHI is therefore viewed as a form of 
collective action. A study in Guinea-Conarky demonstrating that scheme 
members understand and approve of the re-distributive effects of CBHI (Criel 
and Waelkens 2003) supports this view. Other studies have recognized this 
effect and suggested emphasizing the solidarity benefits of health insurance in 
information disseminated to communities (Desmet, Chowdhury, and Islam 
1999, Schneider 2005). 
There is limited evidence then, that in at least in some CBHI schemes, 
willingness to pay is increased by solidarity bonds and cannot be understood in 
neoclassical economic terms, where willingness to pay is based on individual 
expected utility. Instead, a complex interplay between rational utility 
maximizing and socio-cultural norms (such as solidarity and collective action) 
probably impacts on individuals’ decisions to join a scheme (Schneider 2004). 
This is because eventually benefiting from the scheme (by drawing on the 
insurance in times of illness) depends on need rather than the amount 
contributed. This is true of all types of insurance, but in a community setting 
the redistributive effect may be more apparent to scheme members. This may 
particularly be the case in SSA, where CBHI appears to have a different logic 
to endogenous community-based forms of risk management and income 
smoothing such as rotating credit associations, which are based on a notion of 
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reciprocity (you get out what you put in) (Criel and Waelkens 2003, Criel and 
Van Dormael 1999) (see (Sorensen 2000) for a discussion of risk management 
in rural communities in developing countries). Unfortunately, it is difficult to 
further comment on the possible links between CBHI and endogenous forms of 
risk management since these have hardly been studied (Criel and Van Dormael 
1999).  
(ii) Negative role of bonding social capital 
The hypothesis that strong intra-group ties mitigate against adverse selection 
and moral hazard echoes Putnam and Coleman by assuming that social capital 
has only a positive, normative effect on social relations. However, there is a 
second argument in the CBHI literature that turns this hypothesis on its head 
and holds that strong intra-group bonds actually prevent the emergence of 
successful CBHI (Meessen, Criel, and Kegels 2002, Atim 1999, Jowett 2003). 
An example of this comes from Ghana where, in face of conflicting loyalties 
between a CBHI scheme and their community, field assistants apparently 
connived with community members in the practice of evading the stipulation of 
family membership, a mechanism designed to prevent adverse selection (Atim 
1999).  
Also supporting the negative view of social capital, Jowett (Jowett 2003), using 
data from voluntary health insurance (which operates much like CBHI) in 
Vietnamese provinces, takes issue with the argument that social capital 
facilitates collective action and willingness to pay described above (Hsiao 
2001). The results from Jowett’s study, which controls for a range of health 
and socio-economic variables, showed that high levels of two proxies of social 
capital - perceptions of social cohesion and informal financial networks - were 
correlated with lower, not higher, rates of take-up of community-based 
voluntary health insurance, suggesting that intra-community bonding social 
capital ‘crowds out’ voluntary health insurance. In this instance strong intra-
community ties apparently favored informal financial networks such as 
borrowing money that prevented more formal and institutionalized types of 
mechanisms such as CBHI from emerging. The Ghanaian and Vietnamese 
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studies, then, fit into the section of the social capital framework that suggests 
that high levels of bonding social capital permit free-riding and prevent formal 
rules for market transactions from being enforced. 
There are therefore two countervailing (positive and negative) views of the 
effect of bonding social capital on CBHI in the literature. As discussed, this is 
consistent with the social capital framework which provides the basis for an 
alternative, third hypothesis: communities with both strong intra-community 
ties (promoting solidarity) and extra-community networks (promoting a 
willingness to invest in and draw on a larger, more generalized and formal pool 
of resources) are probably more likely to experience greater success with CBHI 
than communities with one or neither types of social capital10. Individuals in 
communities characterized by only strong intra-community ties may actually 
be disadvantaged and may benefit from investing in mechanisms to strengthen 
the other type.  
(b) Micro-level bridging social capital: the effect of vertical and horizontal 
civil society links on CBHI 
An important issue for policy makers is whether it would be possible to aid 
communities in constructing social capital to create better conditions for CBHI, 
without embarking on some form of social engineering. Affective and 
emotional relations between family and neighbors are probably not the types of 
social relations that can or should be developed through policy. However, 
bridging ties are ‘constructible’ since they constitute social links that are 
facilitated by institutional arrangements  (Bebbington and Carroll 2000, 
Krishna 2004, Putzel 1997, Fox 1996, Evans 1996).  
                                                 
10
 An interesting related question is whether the creation and functioning of CBHI has an 
impact on the development of social capital. However, a discussion of this is beyond the scope 
of this paper. 
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(i) Horizontal civil society links: facilitating the enlargement of the risk 
pool 
In the CBHI literature, enlarging the risk pool has already been interpreted as a 
case of constructing bridging social capital (Preker et al. 2002). Establishing 
and strengthening links with formal financing networks is cited as an example. 
In Rwanda federations of small CBHI schemes pool part of their funds at the 
district level to cover care in district hospitals (Schneider et al. 2001). Creating 
horizontal links through scheme mergers in this way allows schemes to expand 
the risk pool while continuing to capitalize on the positive social bonds 
fostered by small risk groups 11 (Davies and Carrin 2001).  Larger pools are 
required in order to: spread risk; actuarially correctly assess the probability of 
the loss occurring and therefore maintain solvency; cross-subsidize (Schieber 
and Maeda 1997) and lower transaction costs (Ron 1999). 
Another mechanism for facilitating the enlargement of the risk pool without 
increasing the risk of fraud is “the establishment of supervisory and audit 
bodies, and support for an independent press and for the professional groups 
involved” (Meessen, Criel, and Kegels 2002): 90-91. Such interventions are 
proposed as a method of fostering an enhanced "generalized morality" across 
CBHI schemes, or identity or loyalty within a large reference group that 
encompasses all relevant market transactions (Meessen, Criel, and Kegels 
2002) - in short, the development of bridging social capital. An example of this 
comes from a region of Senegal. The GRAIM (Groupe de Recherche et 
d’Appui aux Initiatives Mutualistes) coordinates 21 schemes, supporting 
development and building capacity and seems to have led to more interest in 
scheme membership (Bennett, Kelley, and Silvers 2004). Such interventions 
                                                 
11
 The other main method of enlarging risk pools is (social) reinsurance. This is seen an 
alternative to external subsidisation or contingency reserves as a means of protecting the 
scheme from financial instability from catastrophic events (Fairbank 2003, Dror 2001). 
However others have argued that although self-financing may be attractive, because the 
membership of schemes is usually limited to poor groups, it may be wiser to view CBHI as a 
supporting strategy to government financing rather than as an exclusive financing alternative 
(Bennett, Creese, and Monasch 1998). 
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are confined to building links between CBHI schemes and other formal 
institutions in the health system. However some studies have suggested that 
horizontal linkages between small scale community projects can be even more 
effective when they connect heterogeneous organizations, building bridges 
across different sectors.  
From the social capital literature, federations of coffee producers and other 
rural development projects in the Andes (Bebbington and Carroll 2000) may 
provide a useful model for CBHI. Federations are characterized by Bebbington 
and Carroll (Bebbington and Carroll 2000) as supra-communal organizations 
of the poor constituting a special manifestation of social capital. Federations 
were found to have the potential to foster regional and more strategic forms of 
collective action and engagement with government, civil society and markets 
and to build sustainable bridges between different types of organization. Links 
between political and economic organizations were particularly important. The 
former type of organization was often more adept at lobbying and mobilization 
to protect and promote particular concerns of its members, while the latter type 
(which would include CBHI schemes), was concerned with social enterprise 
and facilitating service delivery and was more pragmatic, but less inclusive in 
its stance. Successful federations were able to develop bridges between 
different types of organization, so that they were able to benefit from each 
other’s strengths.  
An overview of ten schemes in India has found that a crucial element of the 
development of CBHI is the ‘nesting’ of schemes in a broader development 
agenda, generating trust among scheme members (Devadasan et al. 2006). All 
the schemes studied were initiated by local NGOs. In this, the authors argue, 
Indian schemes differ from African schemes, the latter being largely initiated 
by external development agencies. In light of the likely importance of 
horizontal bridging social capital, forming strategic linkages with other 
grassroots organizations could be important for African schemes. This may 
particularly be the case in contexts where membership is drawn from poorer 
sections of society with a weak capacity for mobilization. How far it would be 
possible to build such relationships would depend greatly on the political and 
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leadership dynamics at work in the region. This conceptualization of CBHI 
entails a broader and deeper consideration of communities’ needs, goals and 
power relations than is currently evident in most of the CBHI literature.  
(ii) Vertical bridging relations: the role of NGOs and faith based 
organizations in capacity building  
Vertical linkages are employed by CBHI schemes to build capacity in technical 
areas such as financial and general management and in administration, since 
the requisite skills for implementing CBHI are often not available locally 
(Bennett, Creese, and Monasch 1998). In an exploratory study comparing a 
successful CBHI scheme in the Philippines and a less successful one in 
Guatemala (Ron 1999), one of the major success factors in the Philippines 
(where the scheme grew steadily over 3 years) may have been the support of 
bridging social capital constructed through several types of vertical links. A 
very effective administrative structure was provided by the international NGO 
Organization for Education Resources and Training (ORT). The structure was 
developed through the built-in members’ participation mechanisms of a 
cooperative, combined with the financial and moral support given by the ORT 
country office and ultimately the World ORT Union. The Guatemalan scheme, 
which failed to progress after initial registration despite receiving superior 
technical assistance from the WHO, did not develop supportive links with local 
social and political structures. In particular, the scheme lacked the support of 
the local Catholic Church. It could be argued then, that the scheme did not 
develop sufficient bridging social capital. Perhaps supporting the case for the 
importance of bridging capital is the fact that following the publication of the 
study the Guatemalan scheme was successfully re-launched, this time with the 
support of Catholic Church (Dr Aviva Ron, 2006, personal communication) . 
However, further research would be needed to understand whether bridging 
social capital actually affected the outcome of the schemes in the longer term.  
While the potential of NGOs to assist CBHI may be great, in some cases the 
provision of assistance to community development projects may actually 
prevent the accumulation of social and other forms of capital at the grassroots. 
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This occurs when vertical bridging relations cause dependency through top-
down, non-participatory interventions (Abom 2004, Fox 1996). Studies have 
indeed found that community participation in CBHI is essential to scheme 
sustainability (Kiwanuka-Mukiibi, Derriennic, and Karungi 2005, Franco, 
Mbengue, and Atim 2004). One in-depth study, focusing on Senegal, found 
that participation has a tendency to wane over time, jeopardizing the 
sustainability of schemes. Increased decentralization and training are suggested 
as potential solutions (Franco, Mbengue, and Atim 2004).  
The example of a South African HIV/AIDS prevention project which had 
exceptionally strong technical and financial external support but failed due to 
poor community participation might be instructive for addressing waning 
community participation in CBHI (Campbell 2003). In this project, 
participatory management by a multi-stakeholder committee aimed to empower 
key marginalized groups (notably sex workers) and to facilitate collective 
action. However, it failed to take into account the impact of broader social 
forces on the community (for example poverty) and social hierarchies (for 
example gender relations) and therefore did not create appropriate incentives 
for participation. Efforts to support community participation were undermined 
by experts possessing technical and scientific know-how (epidemiology and 
biomedicine). Their knowledge was given symbolic and real precedence in the 
program, so objectives articulated by them displaced the objectives of the 
intended “beneficiaries”. Drawing on Bourdieu, the analysis attributes this 
failure to unequal distributions of economic, cultural, symbolic and social 
capital in the project which favored the technical project staff and not the local 
community. Where participation has been studied in CBHI, there has been no 
significant analysis of power relations between technical experts and the 
community in defining appropriate incentives. Broad lessons for CBHI could 
be drawn from the South African project and other cases documented in the 
large literature on participatory development. Indeed, a recent study of CBHI 
found that incentives that are socially and politically relevant may be at 
variance with incentives designed using technical and scientific expertise (such 
as economic theory) (De Allegri, Sanon, et al. 2006). Defining incentives in a 
participatory, “bottom-up” fashion may result in scheme structures and 
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activities that fall outside the classic insurance model. For example, in Uganda, 
low ability to pay premiums led to interest among members in pursuing income 
generation activities to supplement premium payments, and the CBHI scheme 
becoming an income generating business, as well as an insurance house 
(Derriennic, Wolf, and Kiwanuka-Mukiibi 2005)12.  
(c) Bridging social capital at the macro level: relations between communities 
and state institutions 
There are several views on the appropriate role of the state in CBHI. Pauly et al  
(2006) have recently advocated minimal government regulation of CBHI, 
arguing that government subsidy causes cream skimming and adverse 
selection. The health system framework suggests that although CBHI is a 
private sector method of financing health care, the government can play a vital 
role in schemes’ success, should it decide that CBHI is a good strategy to 
further its objectives. Bennett et al (1998) argue that if there is government 
failure, or no clear government policy, schemes are likely to play an important 
role in the delivery of health care, but issues relating to their role in the broader 
health system are unlikely to be relevant. If government is strong, it is argued 
that CBHI relations with the government are likely to be very important. The 
following three government mechanisms for supporting community health 
financing have been identified: stewardship (for example regulation and 
monitoring); creating an enabling environment (for example the rule of law); 
and resource transfer (for example subsidies) (Ranson 2002b). The social 
capital literature complicates this picture. Evans (1996) argues that state 
agencies can aid civil society organizations to consolidate themselves through 
                                                 
12
 Another point related to the potentially negative impact of external support is that as with 
other types of local development, technical agencies and NGOs may harm the development of 
CBHI through unharmonized efforts. There are now at least four international technical and / 
or financial support mechanisms for CBHI projects: ‘Partners for Health Reformplus’, funded 
by the U.S. Agency for International Development; the ‘Health insurance Fund’ funded by the 
Dutch Ministry of Development Coordination; the ‘Centre of Health Insurance Competence’ of 
the German development agency GTZ; and the ‘Health Micro-Insurance Schemes Feasibility 
Study Guide’ of the International Labour Organization. Where these agencies are working in 
the same country, they will need to ensure their policies are coordinated. 
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the construction of state-society “synergy” and that the state plays two different 
roles in this: complementarity and embeddedness.   
(i) Complementarity 
The first is akin to the health system approach described above, namely to 
provide public goods and an enabling rule of law and while private 
organizations and institutions produce goods and services. This is termed 
“complementarity” by Evans.  
Complementarity is important in CBHI. For example, a major obstacle to 
CBHI is the poor quality of health services (Criel and Waelkens 2003). CBHI 
can potentially contribute to improving quality efficiency and sustainability of 
health services through strategic purchasing (World Health Organization 2000, 
Hsiao 2001). In health care markets CBHI can be a means of facilitating 
improved vertical integration and determining the nature and scope of the 
products supplied by health care providers (Zweifel 2004). If the provider is 
separate from the purchaser, an insurance body can improve efficiency and 
curb provider moral hazard (Atim et al. 2001) if it pursues a policy of strategic 
purchasing (World Health Organization 2000). However, for strategic 
purchasing there must be an enabling environment: information about the 
quality and quantity of services must be provided; there needs to be investment 
in new skills in contracting on the part of both the purchaser and provider 
(Bennett, McPake, and Mills 1997); and a revision of the balance of power 
between purchaser and provider must be accepted (Desmet, Chowdhury, and 
Islam 1999, Meessen, Criel, and Kegels 2002, Carrin, Waelkens, and Criel 
2005, Criel et al. 2005). In light of these numerous preconditions, it is not 
surprising then that in a study of 258 CBHI schemes in low-income countries 
only 16% conducted strategic purchasing (ILO 2002). One method of creating 
these conditions is for government to provide the function of monitoring, 
regulating and / or accrediting providers, so that schemes do not need to 
develop the technical skills to conduct these activities themselves. China’s 
rural cooperative medical system (RCMS) provides an example of 
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complementarity13. Since China’s health services have become decentralized, 
local government has less financial leverage to control the running of hospitals 
and other facilities. The role of government is increasingly to monitor and 
regulate services. RCMS schemes, on the other hand, channel financial 
resources to hospitals and local government, but do not have the technical 
skills to assess quality and cost-effectiveness. Local government and RCMS 
schemes therefore need to cooperate in order to influence providers through 
strategic purchasing (Bloom and Shenglan 1999).  
(ii) Constructing social capital through embeddedness  
The second role of the government is "embeddedness", a political process 
facilitating the construction of social capital at the local level (Evans 1996) 14. 
Central to this is the idea that in some contexts there is an informal 
permeability of boundaries between civil society and private sector 
organizations and the government that can facilitate development. It is often 
assumed that such permeability should be avoided as it can foster corruption, 
but Evans argues that embeddedness can significantly enhance development. 
An engagement with civil society or the private sector in the form of day-to-
day interactions of government officials can build its own, positive, norms and 
loyalties (Evans 1996). An example comes from the Taiwanese irrigation 
system where the water requirement per crop in Taiwan is around 50% lower 
than in other South East Asian countries. This efficiency is attributed to the 
embeddedness of the state in social structures at the local level (Lam 1996). 
Local public officials belonging to Irrigation Associations officially manage 
the irrigation system but are embedded in the day-to-day operations of the 
farming groups. Officials depend on voluntary labor and donations by farmers 
to carry out maintenance and operations, while farmers depend on officials to 
                                                 
13
 Although previously RCMS schemes were government owned, schemes are now voluntary 
and are managed by a village or township committee. Schemes are separate from providers. 
Because of these features (privately owned, purchaser/provider split) RCMS is considered in 
this discussion of CBHI schemes. 
14
 Embeddedness is a qualitatively different concept to the processes that constitute 
decentralization since it focuses on informal social relations which do not feature in 
decentralization models. 
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integrate local needs into the overall plan. Officials gauge these needs not 
through the formal mechanism of farmers’ representatives, but through 
informal conversations held while collecting water fees. Although these 
mechanisms are informal, Lam argues that they have not evolved by chance. 
Rather, they are fostered by the institutional design of the irrigation system. 
Autonomy of the various units within the irrigation bureaucracy coupled with 
back-up from higher levels of authority allows individual officials to develop 
informal rules to cope with various problems they might face, without this 
informality becoming unmanageable or corrupt. Further support for synergy 
comes from the egalitarian nature of farming in Taiwan, which has one of the 
lowest Gini indexes in the developing world. Wealthy local elites do not derive 
their power as land owners or employers, but as heads of political factions 
which compete to win votes (Lam 1996).  From this and several other case 
studies, Evans concludes that embeddedness is likely to emerge in egalitarian 
societies where institutional structures are designed to encourage a certain set 
of norms and loyalties at the intersection between civil society and government 
involvement in development projects (Evans 1996).  
Research into state-society synergy would be particularly important in 
countries intending to follow the 19th century precedent and scale up coverage 
by integrating CBHI into government-led national social health insurance 
schemes, such as Ghana (Government of Ghana 2003), since in these contexts 
issues of power between regulatory state officials and CBHI schemes will 
come to the fore. Synergy may also be important in contexts where ability to 
pay is very low. One critical weakness of CBHI is that it has not experienced 
significant and sustained success to improve access and financial protection 
among indigents because (a) the poor are excluded from CBHI schemes 
because they cannot pay the premium or (b) the poor under-utilize services 
even if they have coverage (Ranson 2002a, Atim et al. 2001). This suggests 
that if CBHI is the only form of social protection for health expenditure, it is 
unlikely to be sufficient. For CBHI to promote equitable access to health care, 
it is likely that indigents would need to be subsidized by the state, while the 
rural non-poor and informal workers are targeted to make contributions to 
CBHI (Bennett, Kelley, and Silvers 2004). In such scenarios, following the 
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social capital framework, public subsidies may work best when administrative 
structures in CBHI intersect with local political structures in order to facilitate 
bureaucrats’ loyalty and enthusiasm to become "embedded" in schemes and put 
their energy into making them work.  
A possible example of embeddedness comes from a Senegalese scheme which 
developed a successful collaboration in which rural councilors are members of 
the scheme and they support its functioning by letting the manager make 
presentations at their meetings, and by raising awareness and asking people to 
join the scheme while they are making their own visits to local communities 
(Franco, Mbengue, and Atim 2004). In Rwanda, the eventual success of a 
mutual health insurance pilot with declining membership was in part due to the 
intervention of the District Mayor who facilitated links with a micro-finance 
scheme and offered to personally ensure monitoring of the project. The 
organization of the now extensive network of CBHI schemes in Rwanda is 
adapted to the decentralized government framework, with Mayors sitting on 
mutual health insurance committees at the district level (Ministry of Health 
Republic of Rwanda 2004). However, if governments are to have a role in 
facilitating CBHI through state-society “synergy”, public institutions need to 
be competent and engaged. This is the subject if the next subsection.   
(d) Bonding social capital at the macro level: relations within institutions 
Woolcock (1998) defines organizational integrity as a type of social capital.  
He draws on neo-Weberian theory in perceiving institutional coherence, 
competence and capacity as deriving from an organizational form that 
socializes bureaucrats. This allows Woolcock to view the effectiveness of 
organizations, particularly government, as a product of social relations which 
foster a certain set of norms. 
The corporately coherent robust Weberian bureaucracy in the Taiwanese 
irrigation system (Lam 1996) ensured that embeddedness did not degenerate 
into clientalism, while at the local level the bureaucracy was open to inputs 
from farmers and local officials (Evans 1996). Evans (1996) argues that 
without a coherent Weberian bureaucracy (characterized by meritocratic 
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recruitment, good salaries, sharp sanctions against violations of organizational 
norms and solid rewards for career-long performance) state-society synergy is 
possible but it will not be a force for good and will foster corruption instead. 
On the other hand, if a Weberian bureaucracy exists without synergy, inflexible 
rules and uniform structures (a Weberian “iron cage”) will prevent synergy and 
limit the possibilities for development. In other words, both synergy and 
coherent robust bureaucracy are needed for optimal developmental results. To 
support his argument Evans points to studies demonstrating that "synergy" 
contributed to the success of East Asian countries that experienced rapid 
development in the late 20th century. Thus Evans diverges from Putnam’s view 
that a lack of prior endowments of micro level bonding social capital is the key 
constraint to effective local government (Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993), 
arguing rather that the limits in government structures cause the inability to 
scale-up (through state-society synergy) micro levels of social capital to 
generate action on a scale that is politically and economically efficacious.   
The argument that the implementation of successful market-oriented initiatives 
requires the engagement of competent government has already been 
compellingly made in regard to health sector reforms such as contracting out 
(Bennett, McPake, and Mills 1997). Specifically, this research found that in 
order to ensure private sector initiatives were efficient and equitable as 
compared to direct government provision, government would need to develop a 
broad array of new skills and capacities. The requirements for this capacity 
building were so demanding on government that in principle it put into 
question the supposed advantage of the reforms over direct provision. In 
relation to CBHI, a market-oriented initiative, it is also likely that regulating, 
expanding and promoting equity and efficiency in schemes would require 
government to develop new skills and capacities (as discussed above). Whether 
in the long run this process would be preferable to public sector health care 
financing is a question that falls beyond the scope of this article15. What is 
                                                 
15
 A direct comparison between CBHI and public sector health financing is not expounded in 
this article, since the relative merits of private health insurance as compared to tax and social 
health insurance based systems have been discussed extensively elsewhere. See for example 
(Maynard and Dixon 2002, van Doorslaer et al. 1999, Wagstaff et al. 1999).   
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apparent, from the research on health sector reforms (Bennett, McPake, and 
Mills 1997), and from Woolcock’s framework, is that this process would 
require the government to be competent and engaged. In other words, bonding 
social capital at the macro level would arguably be an important factor 
influencing the government’s ability to develop the new skills and capacities 
required to support CBHI to develop equitably, on a scale that is politically and 
economically efficacious. 
2.4 Conclusions  
CBHI has been proposed by international development agencies as a 
transitional mechanism to achieving universal coverage for health care in low-
income countries (World Health Organization 2000, Arhin-Tenkorang 2001, 
Davies and Carrin 2001, Gottret and Schieber 2006).  This policy model 
linking CBHI and universal coverage is implicitly informed by the historical 
experience of mutual health insurance in countries such as Germany and Japan 
in the nineteenth century, where the social context was dramatically different to 
that of today’s schemes (Criel and Van Dormael 1999). This paper argues that 
the analysis of CBHI in agencies such as the World Bank and WHO, broadly 
based on economic theory, has taken insufficient account of context-dependent 
policy considerations. These include values of scheme members and people in 
their communities, community goals and local and regional power relations. 
There is a need to develop an alternative framework to complement the 
economic and health system approaches to analyzing CBHI.   
An analysis of the CBHI literature suggests that a critical engagement with 
social capital theories could enhance our understanding of CBHI and help 
explain why in most low-income countries (with notable exceptions such as 
Rwanda) schemes do not appear on course to develop according to the 19th 
century precedent, achieving significant levels of population coverage in a 
sustainable way. Features of social capital such as solidarity, trust, extra-
community networks, vertical civil society links and state-society relations at 
the local level appear to affect outcomes in CBHI. To this extent, it may be 
possible to talk of “social determinants of CBHI”. However, these social 
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determinants have been insufficiently considered in CBHI policy analysis and 
development, possibly limiting understandings of failures and successes of 
CBHI. Our conclusions are not based on the findings of primary research, 
which was beyond the scope of this paper. The limitation of this is that the 
studies employed do not necessarily aim to identify the importance of social 
capital. There was therefore a need to draw additional conclusions beyond the 
objectives of the researchers, by linking their work to a new framework.  
With this caveat in place, possible social determinants of CBHI and their 
impact on CBHI are tentatively proposed here. The paper firstly argues that 
applying Woolcock’s social capital framework (Woolcock 1998, Woolcock 
and Narayan 2006, Woolcock 2001) to the CBHI data puts into question the 
idea, proposed in the CBHI literature, that schemes characterized by strong 
intra-community ties are more likely to experience success in CBHI than those 
without these ties, because of increased solidarity which may reduce adverse 
selection and moral hazard. The framework complicates the picture by 
proposing that communities characterized by only strong intra-community ties 
may actually be disadvantaged in CBHI development due to increased levels of 
corruption and clientism, or a preference for more informal financial networks.  
A broader understanding of the factors determining the effect of bonding social 
capital on CBHI is therefore needed. Bridging social capital in the form of 
more extensive professional links with NGOs, umbrella organizations or local 
government (within and beyond the health sector) is likely to be important.  
Bridging ties are ‘constructible’ since they constitute social relations that are 
facilitated by institutional arrangements rather than affective bonds 
(Bebbington and Carroll 2000, Krishna 2004, Putzel 1997, Fox 1996, Evans 
1996). They can foster more professional relations, strategic alliances, 
administrative capacity and enlarged risk pools in CBHI schemes. However, 
vertical links with NGOs, while bringing many benefits, may also foster 
dependency and may reinforce social structures that endorse and privilege the 
work of technical experts. This does little to augment the accumulation of 
capital (social, economic, human or otherwise) of intended beneficiaries of 
technical assistance – the scheme staff and scheme members. The role of 
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positive bridging social capital in CBHI therefore ought to be explored. A 
related question is whether and how the advantages of bonding social capital 
could be sustained alongside increased horizontal and vertical bridging links.   
Alongside links with NGOs and civil society, the concept of ‘embeddedness’, 
also constituent of bridging social capital, suggests that local government 
structures can foster productive informal social relations between communities 
and local government officials (Evans 1996). In CBHI, it is unclear whether 
structures that facilitate the personal engagement of local bureaucrats may also 
increase the possibility of corruption. The effect of embeddedness also needs to 
be weighed up against more conventional “complementarity” (public/private 
division of labor) and laissez faire approaches, although it is worth noting that 
the latter may not be viable in cases where CBHI is to be scaled up and 
integrated into a government program for universal coverage (such as social 
health insurance) as proposed by WHO (World Health Organization 2000). 
The process of working through the social capital framework has led us to the 
conclusion that certain types of social capital are probably a determinant of 
successful CBHI, but it has also led us to think beyond this. It may become 
apparent that CBHI schemes need to actively develop bridging relations to 
foster the types of social capital required to ensure that the schemes are aligned 
to local communities’ goals, power relations and values. For example, CBHI 
schemes could link into federations of community-based organizations with 
diverse political and economic interests, situating themselves in the broader 
regional or even national development agenda and increasing their 
inclusiveness locally. Or schemes may find they need to pursue diverse 
activities to complement insurance, such as income generation. In egalitarian 
societies, if institutional structures that foster norms and loyalties at the 
intersection between civil society and government are in place, CBHI schemes 
could systematically forge links with decentralized government structures 
(such as District Health Management Teams) or develop into quasi -non-
governmental organizations.  
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Social capital theory has been critiqued as a rationale for social engineering by 
development agencies. It is accused of broadening the scope of justifiable 
intervention from the economic to the social, in order to rectify market 
imperfections in order, in turn, to ensure that market-oriented policies are 
successful, whilst obscuring a critique of those policies (Fine 2001). CBHI, as 
a form of private, voluntary health insurance, is a market-oriented policy, but 
this paper does not aim to build a case for, or against, social interventions to 
ensure it is successful. Rather, the paper hopes to demonstrate the potential 
utility of social capital research in unpacking complex social relationships in 
CBHI and making their importance to policy and programming intelligible. 
Evidence from future studies may support social interventions to develop 
CBHI. Or, echoing critical analyses of other market-oriented health sector 
reforms (Bennett, McPake, and Mills 1997), future evidence may indicate that 
social interventions require local institutions to develop new capacities such 
that the market-oriented reforms become more demanding on these local 
institutions than alternative, public sector policies.    
So far, this discussion has not considered methodologies for primary research 
into the effects of social capital on CBHI. Indicators of social capital have 
already been developed and these could be adapted for quantitative studies 
investigating the relationship between social capital and CBHI. Such a task 
would be no small undertaking. An in-depth literature review of research on 
social capital suggests that a number of serious conceptual and statistical 
problems exist with the current use of social capital by social scientists, 
particularly in attributing causality to social capital in empirical studies 
(Durlauf and Fafchamps 2004).  
The results suggest that while applying the social capital framework to CBHI 
could indeed entail empirically testing a theory of the social conditions under 
which CBHI is successful, this is not the only possible research methodology. 
An alternative approach would be to employ the framework qualitatively, for 
example by using it to guide semi-structured interviews and anthropological 
fieldwork in order to advance CBHI policy analysis and to understand its social 
context. This would involve situating empirical or technical analyses (which 
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have already been undertaken within existing economic and health system 
frameworks for CBHI) in praxis and taking account of context-dependent 
considerations, such as values, goals and power relations (Flyvbjerg 2001). 
Such a process could result in the evolution of schemes that are structured and 
operate quite differently than those proposed under the economic and health 
system frameworks and that have quite different long term trajectories than the 
schemes emerging in the 19th century. 
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Chapter 3 Can social capital help explain enrolment (or lack 
thereof) in community-based health insurance? 
Results of an exploratory mixed methods study 
from Senegal16 
Abstract 
CBHI has achieved low population coverage in West Africa and elsewhere. 
Studies seeking to explain this point to inequitable enrolment, adverse 
selection, lack of trust in scheme management and information and low quality 
of health care. Interventions to address these problems have been proposed yet 
enrolment rates remain low.  This exploratory study proposes that an under-
researched determinant of CBHI enrolment is social capital. Fieldwork 
comprising a household survey and qualitative interviews was conducted in 
Senegal in 2009. Levels of bonding and bridging social capital among 720 
members and non-members of CBHI across three case study schemes are 
compared. The results of the logistic regression suggest that, controlling for 
age and gender, in all three case studies members were significantly more 
likely than non-members to be enrolled in another community association, to 
have borrowed money from sources other than friends and relatives and to 
report having control over all community decisions affecting daily life. In two 
case studies, having privileged social relationships was also positively 
correlated with enrolment. After controlling for additional socioeconomic and 
health variables, the results for borrowing money remained significant. 
Additionally, in two case studies, reporting having control over community 
decisions and believing that the community would cooperate in an emergency 
were significantly positively correlated with enrolment. The results suggest that 
CBHI members had greater bridging social capital which provided them with 
solidarity, risk pooling, financial protection and financial credit. Qualitative 
interviews with 108 individuals selected from the household survey confirm 
this interpretation. The results ostensibly suggest that CBHI schemes should 
build on bridging social capital to increase coverage, for example by enrolling 
households through community associations. However, this may be 
                                                 
16
 A version of this chapter was published in Social Science and Medicine (Mladovsky et al. 
2013) 
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unadvisable from an equity perspective. It is concluded that since enrolment in 
CBHI was less common not only among the poor, but also among those with 
less social capital and less power, strategies should focus on removing social as 
well as financial barriers to obtaining financial protection from the cost of ill 
health. 
3.1 Introduction 
Community-based health insurance (CBHI) is typically not-for-profit and aims 
to provide financial protection from the cost of seeking health care through 
voluntary prepayment to community owned and controlled schemes (Hsiao 
2001). Senegal has witnessed a rapid increase in the number of CBHI schemes, 
reaching 129 in 2007 (CAFSP 2010). The government elected in 2012 views 
CBHI as a mechanism for achieving universal coverage (Ministère de la Santé 
2012), a continuation of the previous government’s policy (Ministère de la 
Santé 2004). However, as in most low- and middle-income countries (LMIC), 
overall coverage in Senegal remains low, with 4% or less of the population 
enrolled in CBHI (Soors et al. 2010), echoing wider limitations of CBHI 
(Ekman 2004).  
There have been numerous studies on the determinants of enrolment in CBHI 
in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (Defourny and Faillon 2011). Demand-side 
determinants identified by quantitative studies from West Africa are: higher 
levels of wealth and education, poorer health status and being prone to the risk 
of illness (Jütting 2004, De Allegri, Kouyate, et al. 2006, Chankova, Sulzbach, 
and Diop 2008, Jütting 2003). Determinants on the supply-side include a 
perception of the inadequacy of traditional care and long distance from the 
health facility (De Allegri, Kouyate, et al. 2006). Qualitative studies suggest 
that perceptions of quality of health care, trust in CBHI scheme management 
(Criel and Waelkens 2003), availability of information on CBHI (Ridde et al. 
2010) and scheme design (De Allegri, Sanon, et al. 2006) also determine 
enrolment. A third set of determinants points to social and cultural issues, 
including low levels of socioeconomic inequality within the community , 
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membership of other community organisations (Jütting 2003) and ethnicity and 
religion (De Allegri, Kouyate, et al. 2006, Jütting 2003).  
The literature proposes the following strategies to address inequity, adverse 
selection and inadequate supply of health services and insurance: public 
funding to subsidise premiums, strategies to promote increased revenue 
collection from the “healthy and wealthy”, and improved CBHI management 
and quality of care  (Mills et al. 2012, Ndiaye, Soors, and Criel 2007, Soors et 
al. 2010). Yet continued low rates of enrolment suggest these strategies have 
not been successfully implemented. Meanwhile to date there has been no 
attempt to systematically explain how and why social and cultural determinants 
affect CBHI enrolment and understand the policy implications. This gap is 
addressed by the present study which proposes that the decision to enrol in 
CBHI is determined, in part, by levels of social capital. The hypothesis to be 
tested is that people who decide to enrol in CBHI have bonding and bridging 
social capital, while those who do not enrol have less bridging social capital or 
bonding social capital only. This is explored by comparing levels of social 
capital among members and non-members of three CBHI schemes in Senegal.   
Background: defining social capital  
The study builds on the argument that social capital can promote or constrain 
CBHI, proposed in a literature review of CBHI by Mladovsky and Mossialos 
(2008). They adopt the following definition of social capital: “the information, 
trust and norms of reciprocity inhering in one’s social network” (Woolcock 
1998):153). Tracing interconnected theories of social capital they further adopt 
the principle that social capital constitutes:  “those expectations for action 
within a collectivity that affect the economic goals and goal-seeking behavior 
of its members, even if these expectations are not oriented toward the 
economic sphere” (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993):1323).  
Bonding versus bridging social capital 
Drawing on Portes & Sensenbrenner (1993), Mladovsky and Mossialos (2008) 
argue that distinguishing between “bonding” and “bridging” social capital is 
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essential to understanding whether features of social capital (e.g. expectations 
between individuals, the trustworthiness of structures, information channels, 
norms and effective sanctions) have a productive outcome in CBHI. “Bonding 
social capital” inheres in dense networks within communities.  Research 
suggests that while bonding social capital makes the accumulation of human 
and economic capital possible in some contexts, it can be unproductive in 
others. For example in some immigrant groups in the USA high levels of 
bonding social capital lowered transaction costs in enterprise (Portes and 
Sensenbrenner 1993, Portes 1998). However, bonding social capital was 
unproductive in other groups, promoting free-riding on communal resources, 
derision of efforts to work hard and cutting off important external sources of 
information  (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993); this is hereafter termed the 
“negative effect of bonding social capital”. The differing impact of bonding 
social capital on economic action is explained by varying levels of “bridging 
social capital”, which inheres in micro level extra-community networks. 
Productive immigrant groups were characterized by individuals who were able 
to draw on bridging relations outside the network as well as bonding relations. 
This is thought to be because extra-community relations were free from the 
potentially overwhelming demands family and friends place on successful 
members of the group for support, permitting exchange to take place on the 
basis of formal rules or fair market competition (Portes and Sensenbrenner 
1993). Studies of bonding and bridging social capital from the development 
literature on SSA (Titeca and Vervisch 2008, Campbell 2003, Njuki et al. 
2008) broadly support the findings from North America. However, mixed 
methods studies differentiating between the impact of bonding and bridging 
social capital in SSA are rare, and none have focused on CBHI.  
The unequal distribution of social capital 
Another characteristic of social capital which may hinder positive 
developmental outcomes is identified by Bourdieu (1986) who argues that 
individuals who already hold forms of capital (economic, social, cultural and/or 
symbolic) are strategically more adept at accumulating and transforming it (he 
argued that these types of capital are fungible). Through the continual process 
 81
of accumulating and transforming the different forms of capital, unequal power 
relations and social hierarchies are formed and strengthened. The 
aforementioned literature on social capital in Africa also broadly supports this 
theory. As such it is important to study the distribution of social capital within 
communities and consider how this might cause unequal access to benefits 
offered by development projects. Previous studies of CBHI do not take such 
issues into account.   
3.2 Methods 
The study used a mixed methods multiple case study design which included a 
household survey and semi-structured interviews. Ethical approval for the 
research was obtained from the Senegalese Ministry of Health. 
Case study selection 
The fieldwork was conducted from March to August 2009. To enhance 
generalizability of the results of the study (Yin 1994), multiple (three) cases 
constituting CBHI schemes were selected: Soppante, Ndondol and Wer Ak 
Werle (WAW) (Table 3.1). Three regions (out of 12) were first selected for 
inclusion in the study. These were among the regions with the highest number 
of CBHI schemes in Senegal (Table 3.1), meaning the study focuses on 
contexts where CBHI development is relatively advanced. In each region, the 
federation which coordinates CBHI schemes provided information used to 
identify the three cases. The cases all fulfilled two basic criteria of success in 
order to control for the possibility that a lack of enrolment was mainly due to 
supply-side problems: the number of members17 ever enrolled in the CBHI 
scheme (including those whose policy had expired) was greater than the 
national average of 329 (Hygea 2004); and the schemes had been established 
for a minimum of eight years. At the same time, the schemes varied according 
to the following criteria, in order to study a wide range of contexts (Table 3.1): 
                                                 
17
 A “member” (termed “adherent” in French) is permitted to register 10-12 people from their 
household on the insurance policy meaning that the total number of enrollees in the insurance 
schemes was far higher than the number of “members”. The premium for each individual in the 
household is paid monthly. 
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geographic zone; type of economic sector of the target population; and tier of 
services contracted by the scheme. 
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Table 3.1: Case studies selected 
Name of 
case 
study 
Year scheme 
commenced 
Tier of 
services 
contracted 
by the 
scheme 
Region 
(total 
number 
of CBHI 
schemes 
in the 
region*) 
Geographic 
zone 
Predominant 
economic 
sector 
Other 
characteristics 
of the scheme 
Soppante 
 
1997 Health post 
Hospital 
Thies (39) Mostly rural, 
some peri-
urban and 
urban 
Informal Scheme covers a 
very large and 
diverse 
geographic zone 
Ndondol 2001 Health post 
Health hut 
Maternal and 
child health 
centre 
Diourbel 
(10) 
Rural Informal 
agricultural 
District 
predominantly 
inhabited by one 
ethnic group, the 
Serer 
Local Catholic 
missionaries 
helped establish 
the scheme 
Scheme offers 
microcredit 
exclusively to its 
member 
 
WAW 
 
2000 Health post 
Health centre 
Dakar 
(44) 
Peri-urban Informal 
traders 
Partnered with an 
association 
promoting 
income 
generation for 
women 
*Source: (CAFSP, 2010) 
Quantitative methods 
Sampling  
Since overall population enrolment rates were low, disproportionate stratified 
sampling was used. In each case study, a list of households which had ever 
purchased a CBHI policy was used as a sampling frame for the random 
selection of members (Table 3.2). All three schemes had a high rate of non-
renewal of policies (Table 3.2). This is typical for CBHI schemes in Senegal 
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(Hygea 2004) and SSA more generally (De Allegri et al. 2009). Because this 
study is concerned with the decision to ever enrol in CBHI, and since expired 
policies (i.e. the most recent monthly premium had not been paid) could be 
renewed by paying the outstanding premium payments and a penalty charge, 
both households with active and expired policies are referred to as “members” 
and are included in the analysis. Each group was sampled separately (Table 
3.2). The household questionnaire was administered to the named member.  
The control sample was selected using the “random route” method to select 
non-member households living in close proximity to the members 
interviewed18. In the control households, the household head and/or spouse 
were asked who in the household would in theory be responsible for CBHI 
membership and this person was interviewed.   
Table 3.2: Household survey sample 
Scheme Total number of 
members ever 
enrolled (active and 
expired policies)  
Total number of 
member households 
selected (active and 
expired policies) 
Target number of 
non-members  
Soppante 985 (166 + 819) 161 (70 + 91) 100 
Ndondol 463 (136 + 327) 156 (58 + 98) 120 
WAW 678 (281 + 397) 170 (85 + 85) 100 
Questionnaire design 
A questionnaire was developed with six core components: socioeconomic and 
demographic characteristics; household roster; economic characteristics; social 
capital; membership of CBHI; and health and utilisation of health services. For 
the social capital component, most questions were adapted from the SOCAT 
questionnaire (World Bank). The questionnaire used for the WAW case study 
is provided in Appendix 2.    
                                                 
18
 This is similar to the methodology used in a UNDP study of at risk populations (UNDP 
2006) 
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Variables  
The dependent variable is membership of CBHI. Among the independent 
variables, eight measure different facets of social capital. These were the main 
variables on which information related to social capital was collected. 
Individual/household rather than community level variables were used. Two 
social capital variables measure the structure of social networks: number of 
memberships of associations and privileged relations. The remaining variables 
measure tangible and perceived assets that may be transmitted by social 
networks:  information; belief that everybody in the community would 
cooperate (a proxy for solidarity); trust; financial credit; perceptions of control 
over local decision-making (a proxy for social power); and voting (a proxy for 
political participation).  
Membership of associations was used as a proxy for bridging social capital, 
since it implied having social links beyond kin, friendship, or intra-community 
groups. Furthermore, associations typically had a productive function, even if 
this was not their primary goal (Niang 2000). Examples of associations 
included Muslim prayer groups (“dahiras”), rotating credit and savings 
associations (ROSCAs) (“tontines”), microcredit groups, sports clubs and 
CBHI itself. The variable is based on the question “How many associations do 
you and members of your household belong to in total (not including the CBHI 
scheme)?”. In the case of Soppante, a dummy variable was created to 
categorise households according to whether they belonged to no associations or 
to one or more associations. For Ndondol and WAW, the questionnaire asked 
for the specific number of associations to which a household belonged and 
dummies measure membership of no, one, two, three, or more than three 
associations. This was because in these case studies, another association had 
partnered with CBHI, meaning that some CBHI members were de facto 
members of two associations. It was hypothesised that, as in previous studies 
(Jütting 2003), enrolment in CBHI would be positively correlated with 
membership of other associations, since people with existing social capital are 
likely to be more adept at further accumulating it.  
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In order to measure bonding social capital a dummy variable based on the 
question “Do you have privileged relationships?” was used. In Senegal 
“privileged relationships” are a form of “fictive kinship”(Carsten 2000). 
Common examples are “ndeye dike” (“the mother of my choosing or twin”), 
“homonyme” (a namesake - a child that is named after a person) or “parrain / 
marrain” (“godfather / godmother”). These relationships constitute emotional 
and affective ties but can also be a medium for instrumental financial support 
(Buggenhagen 2011).  It was hypothesised that enrolment in CBHI may be 
either negatively or positively correlated with having privileged social 
relations, depending on levels of bridging social capital.    
The issue of information channels was explored by a question asking where 
respondents obtained information on community matters or politics, with a set 
of 14 possible responses (multiple responses were permitted). A dummy 
variable distinguishes between receiving information from relatives, friends 
and neighbours only (a proxy for bonding social capital only), or receiving 
information from relatives, friends and neighbours and / or another source (e.g. 
the local market, traditional forums, or associations) (a proxy for bonding plus 
bridging, or only bridging, social capital). Assuming the information on CBHI 
was positive (i.e. it promoted enrolment), it was hypothesised that people who 
received information from relatives, friends and neighbours only were less 
likely to enrol in CBHI due to the “negative” effect of bonding social capital.  
A set of variables was included on perceptions of solidarity within the 
community and was derived from the question “Do you think it is likely that 
everybody in the community would cooperate to solve a common problem such 
as a lack of water?”. It was hypothesised that enrolment would be positively 
correlated with high levels of solidarity if, as per the discourse around CBHI in 
Senegal (Ministère de la Santé 2004), solidarity was seen as characteristic of 
CBHI.  
Another variable measures generalised trust. Bonding social capital was 
measured by trusting in one’s friends, family and most people in one’s 
community, while bridging social capital was measured by trusting: people 
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from other ethnic or linguistic groups; foreigners; people of other religions / 
brotherhoods / confessions; local government; imams and priests; traditional 
leaders; teachers; medical staff; security forces; justice; and persons of other 
castes. Responses were given on a Likert scale. Indices were constructed by 
performing a principal component analysis. It was hypothesised that a lack of 
trust at any level could prevent enrolment due to fears of moral hazard and / or 
corruption in CBHI (Pauly et al. 2006). This hypothesis is supported by a study 
which found that higher degrees of generalised trust were correlated with 
Chinese farmers’ willingness to join community financing (Zhang et al. 2006). 
A further set of variables focused on sources of financial credit, following 
Bourdieu’s theory that the various forms of capital are fungible. A set of 
dummies was created from the following questions: “Did you borrow money in 
the last 12 months?” and “From whom did you borrow the money?”. The latter 
question was followed by a set of eight options (multiple responses were 
permitted). The dummies divide respondents into three groups: those who had 
not borrowed money; those who had borrowed money from family, relatives or 
friends only (a proxy for bonding social capital); and those who had borrowed 
money from family, relatives, friends and / or another source, such as an 
association (a proxy for having bonding plus bridging, or only bridging, social 
capital). It was hypothesised that people who had not borrowed money or 
borrowed money from immediate family, relatives or friends only were less 
likely to enrol in CBHI due to the “negative” effects of bonding social capital. 
This is supported by a study on voluntary health insurance in Vietnam (Jowett 
2003) which showed that borrowing money from informal financial networks 
(family and friends) was correlated with lower rates of enrolment. 
Another variable focused on control over local decision-making, following 
Bourdieu’s theory that social capital increases social power. One set of 
dummies was based on the question “How many of the decisions made in the 
community or by neighbours which affect your daily life do you have control 
over?”. Five possible responses were offered, ranging from “control over no 
decisions” to “control over all decisions”.  
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Finally, a dummy variable was based on a question asking respondents whether 
they voted in the most recent local elections. This was used as a proxy for 
bridging social capital since voting in Africa has been found to be positively 
associated with increased membership of civil society groups and political 
mobilization (Kuenzi and Lambright 2005). It was hypothesised that voting 
would be positively correlated with CBHI enrolment. 
The main potential confounders that are commonly included in quantitative 
studies on CBHI enrolment and on social capital and health (Harpham, Grant, 
and Thomas 2002) are included in this study. In addition to age and gender of 
the respondent, the socio-economic characteristics considered were level of 
education, household expenditure and wealth. The expenditure variable is 
based on reported monthly household expenditure on 14 different categories. 
Expenditure was adjusted using the OECD scale (weighting 1 for the first 
adult, 0.7 for other adults and 0.5 for each child) (OECD , Forster 1994). To 
proxy household wealth, an asset index was constructed by performing a 
principal component analysis using variables of household possession of goods 
(Howe et al. 2009). The health variables used are: disability, chronic illness, 
recent illness or accident in last 15 days and self-assessed health. For the latter 
variable three dummies were created, the first combining “very good” and 
“good”, and the third combining “poor” and “very poor”.  Given that Senegal 
is ethnically and religiously diverse (Smith 2013), ethnicity (whether or not the 
respondent is Wolof (the majority ethnicity)) and religion, (whether or not the 
respondent is Muslim (the predominant religion)) were included.  In the third 
case study, WAW, the religion variable was dropped since almost 100% of 
respondents reported being Muslim.  
Model 
A logit model was used to analyse the probability of enrolling in CBHI; the 
dependent variable was equal to 1 if the household was enrolled in CBHI and 0 
if not. Each of the eight social capital variables were analysed separately. Two 
regressions were run for each social capital variable. The first regression was a 
restricted model which includes only age and sex as control variables (Model 
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1). The second regression was an unrestricted model where an additional range 
of socioeconomic and cultural control variables was included (Model 2). Since, 
according to Bourdieu, the different forms of capital are fungible, one might 
expect any correlation between social capital and CBHI enrolment observed in 
Model 1 to disappear in Model 2.  
A model of the following form was estimated: 
Logit [ (y = 1)] = log    = α + β 1X1,i + …+ β12X12,i 
where Y is being a member of CBHI or not,  X1-12 are dummies indicating 
whether the individual has or does not have a specific characteristic, p is the 
probability of enrolment in CBHI, α is the constant and βs are the model 
parameters. For each regression, c statistics were used to measure the goodness 
of fit of the model. The likelihood-ratio test was used to compare the fit of 
Model 1 and Model 2. All models are case study specific and were estimated 
using STATA 10.0. 
Qualitative methods 
A total of 108 individuals from member and non-member households of the 
three CBHI schemes (Table 3.3) were purposively selected to include a variety 
of characteristics (age, gender, position in the household) from the household 
survey and interviewed again by the same interviewer, using semi-structured 
topic guides. The guides covered: decision-making on CBHI enrolment, 
comparison of CBHI to other associations, impact of CBHI on social capital, 
perceptions about management of the scheme and health care utilisation. The 
topic guide is provided in Appendix 3. Sample size was determined by the data 
obtained and data collection continued until saturation. All interviews were 
recorded and transcribed using verbatim transcription. All transcripts were 
analysed in Nvivo8 by a team of coders using deductive coding with an a 
priori coding frame (Miles and Huberman 1994). The interview guides, 
background literature and hypotheses were used to develop the coding frame. 
All members of the coding team were trained to ensure a common 
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understanding of the codes. The coding frame was piloted and revised with 
extra codes before application to the full dataset. Throughout the coding 
process, the coders periodically cross-checked each other’s coding to maintain 
consistency. Results of the qualitative analysis were used for triangulation and 
to expand the interpretation of the quantitative results (Collins, Onwuegbuzie, 
and Sutton 2006). As such, codes pertaining to the variables included in the 
quantitative analysis were selected for further analysis in this paper. The 
broader results of the qualitative analysis will be published elsewhere.  
Table 3.3: Semi-structured interviews sample 
Scheme Member households  
Non-member 
households 
Soppante 27 10 
Ndondol 18 13 
WAW 28 12 
Total 73 35 
3.3 Results 
The sample consists of 720 individuals across the three case studies. 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3.4.  
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Table 3.4: Descriptive statistics of study sample and t-tests for significance 
 Soppante Ndondol WAW 
  
Non  
member Member 
Difference 
(t-test) All 
Non  
member Member 
Difference 
(t-test) All 
Non 
member Member 
Difference 
(t-test) All 
Household 
characteristics             
Expenditure quintile 
(%)             
Ex q1 (lowest) 28.2 14.5 13.7** 20.3 20.8 19.8 1.0 20.3 22.5 18.4 4.1 20.3 
Ex q2 23.3 17.4 5.9 19.9 15.2 25.0 9.8 19.9 21.6 19.2 2.4 20.3 
Ex q3 22.3 18.1 4.2 19.9 24.8 14.7 10.1* 19.9 20.7 18.4 2.3 19.5 
Ex q4 14.6 23.9 9.3 19.9 19.2 20.7 1.5 19.9 20.7 19.2 1.5 19.9 
Ex q5 (highest) 11.7 26.1 14.4** 19.9 20.0 19.8 0.2 19.9 14.4 24.8 10.4* 19.9 
Asset quintile (%)             
Ass q1 (lowest) 44.6 24.0 20.6** 32.2 38.2 24.3 13.9* 31.5 19.8 21.6 1.8 20.8 
Ass q2 8.4 9.6 1.2 9.1 13.8 10.4 3.4 12.2 17.0 21.6 4.6 19.5 
Ass q3 16.9 23.2 6.3 20.7 13.8 24.3 10.5* 18.9 38.7 24.8 13.9* 31.2 
Ass q4 16.9 19.2 2.3 18.3 19.5 15.7 3.9 17.6 19.8 25.6 5.8 22.9 
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 Soppante Ndondol WAW 
  
Non  
member Member 
Difference 
(t-test) All 
Non  
member Member 
Difference 
(t-test) All 
Non 
member Member 
Difference 
(t-test) All 
Ass q5 (highest) 13.3 24.0 10.7 19.7 14.6 25.2 10.6* 19.7 4.7 6.4 1.7 5.6 
Member of 
associations other than 
CBHI (%)       
0 14.1 4.4 9.7** 8.5 8.9 5.2 3.7 7.1 21.8 5.7 16.1*** 13.3 
One or more 85.9 95.6 9.7** 91.5     
1.0   23.4 18.1 5.3 20.8 26.4 20.3 6.0 23.2 
2.0   25.8 19.0 6.8 22.5 17.3 30.1 12.8* 24.0 
3.0   12.1 27.6 15.5** 19.6 21.8 22.0 0.1 21.9 
> 3    29.8 30.2 -0.3 30.0 12.7 22.0 9.2 17.6 
Individual 
characteristics       
Age years (%)             
< 36 11.8 26.9 15.1** 20.3 19.7 20.2 0.5 19.9 23.6 23.8 0.1 23.7 
36 - 45 23.5 26.9 3.3 25.4 26.2 25.4 0.8 25.8 32.7 33.6 0.9 33.2 
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 Soppante Ndondol WAW 
  
Non  
member Member 
Difference 
(t-test) All 
Non  
member Member 
Difference 
(t-test) All 
Non 
member Member 
Difference 
(t-test) All 
46 - 55 22.5 24.6 2.1 23.7 22.1 26.3 4.2 24.2 24.5 27.0 2.5 25.9 
56 - 65 20.6 9.7 10.9* 14.4 18.9 14.9 3.9 16.9 14.5 11.5 3.1 12.9 
>65 21.6 11.9 9.6* 16.1 13.1 13.2 0.0 13.1 4.5 4.1 0.4 4.3 
Gender (%)             
Male 61.8 60.1 1.6 60.8 64.8 45.6 19.1** 55.5 20.7 22.1 1.4 21.5 
Education (%)             
None  52.0 39.9 12.1 45.0 76.2 69.3 6.9 72.9 55.0 52.0 2.9 53.4 
Literate 24.5 31.9 7.4 28.8 10.7 11.4 0.7 11.0 11.7 8.1 3.6 9.8 
Primary 17.6 13.8 3.9 15.4 12.3 14.0 1.7 13.1 19.8 21.1 1.3 20.5 
Secondary or higher 5.9 14.5 8.6 10.8 0.8 5.3 4.4* 3.0 13.5 18.7 5.2 16.2 
Ill health (%)             
Handicapped 4.9 7.2 2.3 6.3 1.6 2.6 1.0 2.1 1.8 1.6 0.2 1.7 
Chronic illness 18.6 20.3 1.7 19.6 17.2 15.8 1.4 16.5 32.4 20.5 11.9 26.2 
Recent illness 12.7 18.1 5.4 15.8 9.0 8.8 0.2 8.9 7.2 10.7 3.4 9.0 
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 Soppante Ndondol WAW 
  
Non  
member Member 
Difference 
(t-test) All 
Non  
member Member 
Difference 
(t-test) All 
Non 
member Member 
Difference 
(t-test) All 
Self-assessed health 
(%)               
Very good or good 65.7 73.7 8.0 70.3 76.0 80.2 4.2 78.0 40.5 42.3 1.7 41.5 
Fair 28.4 18.2 10.2 22.6 20.7 16.2 4.4 18.5 45.0 40.7 4.4 42.7 
Bad or very bad 5.9 8.0 2.1 7.1 3.3 3.6 0.3 3.4 14.4 17.1 2.7 15.8 
Religion (%)           0.0   
Muslim 94.2 92.7 1.5 93.3 94.3 85.3 9* 90.0 98.2 100.0 1.8 99.2 
Ethnicity           0.0   
Wolof 72.8 73.7 0.9 73.3 7.2 11.2 4.0 9.1 55.0 58.7 3.8 57.0 
Privileged 
relationships       
Privileged relationships 91.3 95.7 4.4 93.8 89.7 96.2 6.5 92.7 87.0 89.4 2.5 88.3 
Sources of information         
From 
friends/relatives/neighb
ours only 9.7 2.9 6.8* 5.8 12.0 12.9 0.9 12.4 9.0 8.0 1.0 8.5 
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 Soppante Ndondol WAW 
  
Non  
member Member 
Difference 
(t-test) All 
Non  
member Member 
Difference 
(t-test) All 
Non 
member Member 
Difference 
(t-test) All 
Likelihood of 
community 
cooperation          
Not at all likely or very 
unlikely 11.9 4.4 7.5* 7.6 12.0 8.7 3.3 10.4 23.9 15.3 8.5 19.3 
Likely 19.8 22.6 2.8 21.4 41.6 40.0 1.6 40.8 39.4 41.1 1.7 40.3 
Highly likely 68.3 73.0 4.7 71.0 46.4 51.3 4.9 48.8 36.7 43.5 6.9 40.3 
Borrowed money in 
last 12 months         
None  60.4 42.2 18.2** 50.0 47.6 34.5 13.1* 41.3 60.4 40.0 20.4* 49.6 
From friends/relatives 
only 26.7 28.9 2.2 28.0 32.3 24.1 8.1 28.3 9.0 12.8 3.8 11.0 
From friends/relatives 
and/or other sources 12.9 28.9 16.0** 22.0 20.2 41.4 21.2*** 30.4 30.6 47.2 16.6** 39.4 
Trust         
Principal component 1 5.8 -4.4 10.2 0.0 -18.5 20.0 -38.5 0.0 -24.3 21.7 -46.0 0.0 
Principal component 2 -16.7 12.5 -29.2 0.0 0.7 -0.8 1.5 0.0 -1.2 1.1 -2.3 0.0 
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 Soppante Ndondol WAW 
  
Non  
member Member 
Difference 
(t-test) All 
Non  
member Member 
Difference 
(t-test) All 
Non 
member Member 
Difference 
(t-test) All 
Principal component 3 -6.0 4.5 -10.5 0.0 3.8 -4.1 7.9 0.0 15.3 -13.7 29.0* 0.0 
Control over 
community decisions 
affecting daily life         
None  24.5 17.4 7.1 20.4 24.0 13.9 10.1* 19.2 33.6 18.5 15.1** 25.6 
Very few decisions 24.5 24.6 0.1 24.6 27.2 28.7 1.5 27.9 25.5 21.0 4.5 23.1 
Some decisions 13.7 15.2 1.5 14.6 8.8 14.8 6.0 11.7 14.5 19.4 4.8 17.1 
Most decisions 25.5 21.7 3.8 23.3 28.8 28.7 0.1 28.8 18.2 26.6 8.4 22.6 
All decisions 11.8 21.0 9.2 17.1 11.2 13.9 2.7 12.5 8.2 14.5 6.3 11.5 
Voted in last local 
elections         
Voted   77.8 75.4 2.4 76.4 64.2 73.0 8.8 68.5 72.3 79.2 6.9 75.9 
Total number of 
respondents  103 138   241 125 116   241 112 126   238 
Notes: *P<0.10; **P<0.05; ***P<0.01 
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In terms of bridging social capital, across the three case studies over 85 per cent of 
households contained at least one individual who was a member of at least one 
association other than CBHI (Table 3.4). Households enrolled in CBHI were 
significantly more likely to be members of other associations compared to non-CBHI 
households, controlling for age and gender only (Model 1, Table 3.5). In Ndondol 
and WAW, CBHI households were more likely to be members of several other 
associations, suggesting these were not only associations that were de facto linked to 
CBHI. The results are strongest and most consistent in WAW where membership of 
other associations rather than the socio-economic variables was statistically 
significant (Model 2, Table 3.6).  
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Table 3.5: Determinants of enrolment in CBHI (logistic regression results), Model 1 
Odds ratios 
  S N W S N W S N W S N W 
Age years (base: <36)                 
36 - 45 0.48* 1.04 0.92 0.42* 0.96 0.77 0.45* 1.09 1.03 0.46* 1.06 0.92 
46 - 55 0.42* 1.34 1.11 0.41* 1.18 1.2 0.40** 1.37 1.07 0.39** 1.39 1.1 
56 - 65 0.20*** 0.9 0.85 0.17*** 0.82 0.52 0.19*** 0.99 0.8 0.16*** 1.03 0.84 
>65 0.22*** 1.37 0.69 0.20*** 1.54 0.74 0.21*** 1.43 1.08 0.19*** 1.4 0.85 
Gender (base: female)             
Male 1.47 0.50** 1.14 1.58 0.40*** 1.04 1.36 0.43*** 1.12 1.45 0.43*** 1.04 
Member of associations 
other than CBHI (base: 
none)                 
1 or more 3.66**               
1   1.22 2.84**             
2   1.15 6.89***             
3   3.36* 3.79**             
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Odds ratios 
  S N W S N W S N W S N W 
>3    1.46 6.13***             
Privileged relationships 
(base: none)                 
Privileged relationships     3.22* 4.16** 1.17         
Sources of information 
(base: from                 
friends/relatives/neighbours 
and/or other sources)                 
From 
friends/relatives/neighbours 
only         0.35* 0.92 0.83     
Likelihood of community 
cooperation (base:                  
not at all likely or very 
unlikely)                 
Likely               3.17* 1.42 1.65 
Highly likely                   2.64* 1.87 1.85 
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Odds ratios 
  S N W S N W S N W S N W 
c-statistic 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.67 0.66 0.57 0.67 0.61 0.56 0.67 0.63 0.57 
Age years (base: <36)               
36 - 45 0.40** 1.14 0.98 0.47* 1.19 1.08 0.44* 0.98 1.12 0.38** 1 1 
46 - 55 0.37** 1.44 1.02 0.44* 1.54 1.08 0.37** 1.23 1.14 0.33** 1.26 1.13 
56 - 65 0.17*** 0.98 0.72 0.19*** 1.07 0.65 0.16*** 0.91 0.87 0.13*** 0.86 0.78 
>65 0.22*** 1.73 0.75 0.21*** 1.61 0.71 0.17*** 1.43 1.01 0.18*** 1.21 0.86 
Gender (base: female)               
Male 1.57 0.36*** 1.24 1.35 0.42*** 1.11 1.38 0.40*** 0.99 1.54 0.41*** 1.15 
Borrowed money in last 12 
months (base: none)               
From friends/relatives only 1.53 1.3 2.33*           
From friends/relatives 
and/or other sources 3.90*** 3.66*** 2.41***           
Trust               
Principal component 1     0.98 1.07 1.11       
Principal component 2     1.15 1.06 1.02       
Principal component 3     1.17 0.98 
0.74
**       
Control over community 
decisions affecting daily 
life (base: none)               
Very few decisions         1.68 2.17* 1.46   
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Odds ratios 
  S N W S N W S N W S N W 
Some decisions         1.44 3.01** 2.39**   
Most decisions         1.59 2.29** 2.62**   
All decisions         2.44* 3.71** 3.29**   
Voted in last local elections 
(base: no)               
Voted                     0.76 1.71* 1.34 
c-statistic 0.69 0.70 0.63 0.66 0.63 0.60 0.67 0.65 0.62 0.66 0.65 0.56 
Notes: *P<0.10; **P<0.05; ***P<0.01. 
Dependent variable: individual enrolment in CBHI (yes = 1; no = 0). 
S = Soppante, N = Ndondol, W = WAW 
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Table 3.6: Determinants of enrolment in CBHI (logistic regression results), Model 2 
Independent variables Odds ratios 
  S N W S N W S N W S N W 
Age years (base: <36)               
36 - 45 0.53 1.59 0.85 0.42 1.55 0.64 0.46 1.81 0.99 0.58 1.76 0.9 
46 - 55 0.21*** 1.6 1.24 0.19*** 1.53 1.28 0.19*** 1.95 1.17 0.18*** 1.93 1.17 
56 - 65 0.17*** 0.84 1.02 0.14*** 0.96 0.55 0.14*** 1.05 0.99 0.15*** 1.12 1.02 
>65 0.21** 1.96 0.59 0.15*** 2.53 0.55 0.18*** 2.53 1.03 0.19** 2.36 0.68 
Gender (base: female)               
Male 1.43 0.26*** 1.33 1.71 0.23*** 1.22 1.47 0.25*** 1.26 1.39 0.24*** 1.23 
Education (base: none)                
Literate 1.53 0.68 0.55 1.24 0.74 0.54 1.26 0.81 0.6 1.34 0.81 0.58 
Primary 0.47 0.84 0.91 0.41 0.9 0.74 0.42* 1.13 0.95 0.47 1.13 0.86 
Secondary or higher 1.09 2.26 1.29 0.47 4.11 1.31 1.02 6.07 1.15 1.25 5.27 1.09 
Expenditure quintile (base: 
lowest)               
q2 1.9 1.83 1.14 1.69 1.36 0.88 1.9 1.58 1.03 2.06 1.62 1.17 
q3 1.77 0.36* 1.04 2.01 0.31** 0.88 1.6 0.33** 1.15 1.5 0.34** 1.17 
q4 3.86** 0.88 0.98 3.77** 0.7 1.41 4.06** 0.78 1.19 3.73** 0.75 1.28 
q5 (highest) 4.17** 0.83 1.91 5.32** 0.9 1.87 4.08** 0.87 2.61** 4.04** 0.86 2.75** 
Asset quintile (base: lowest)               
q2 2.43 0.73 0.91 2.47 0.77 0.85 2.24 0.93 1.02 1.92 0.9 0.99 
q3 3.56*** 3.68*** 0.40* 5.22*** 3.54*** 0.41* 3.28** 3.91*** 0.49* 3.87*** 3.47*** 0.45* 
q4 1.88 1.27 1.09 2.49* 1.7 1.57 1.95 1.27 1.15 2.2 1.17 1.21 
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Independent variables Odds ratios 
  S N W S N W S N W S N W 
q5 (highest) 2.61* 3.42** 0.57 3.34** 2.74** 1.36 2.62* 3.37** 0.93 3.30** 2.91** 0.92 
Ill health               
Handicapped (base: no) 1.64 2.2 0.39 1.81 2.33 0.45 2.13 2.62 0.71 2.14 2.41 0.64 
Chronic illness (base: no) 0.55 0.72 0.59 0.54 0.73 0.73 0.64 0.73 0.71 0.72 0.77 0.63 
Recent illness (base: no) 1.68 1.3 2.6 2.75* 1.05 2.57 1.77 1.33 2.01 1.71 1.23 2.24 
SAH (base: very good or 
good)               
Fair 0.67 0.9 1.07 0.54 0.7 1.09 0.6 0.78 0.97 0.64 0.84 1.07 
Bad or very bad 2.08 2.64 1.3 1.27 2.52 0.98 1.89 2.63 1.02 2.15 2.78 1.5 
Ethnicity and religion               
Muslim (base: yes) 0.34 0.11***   0.32 0.15***   0.29 0.15***   0.35 0.14***   
Wolof (base: yes) 0.72 1.01 1.31 0.63 1.06 1.6 0.84 0.96 1.46 0.6 1 1.47 
Member of associations 
other than CBHI (base: 
none)               
1 or more 3.04               
1 0.78 3.33**             
2 0.87 9.05***             
3 2.78 3.56**             
>3  1.07 6.37***             
Privileged relationships 
(base: none)               
Privileged relationships   1.41 5.68** 0.96         
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Independent variables Odds ratios 
  S N W S N W S N W S N W 
Sources of information 
(base: from               
friends/relatives/neighbours 
and/or other sources)               
From 
friends/relatives/neighbours 
only       0.51 1.7 0.8     
Likelihood of community 
cooperation (base: not at all 
likely or very unlikely)               
Likely           1.49 1.57 2.23* 
Highly likely                   3.66* 1.81 2.09* 
Likelihood-ratio test statistic 33.3 40.66 16.61 35.37 32.35 19.85 34.54 40.7 16.17 33.6 25.94 25.14 
P value 0.02 0.00 0.48 0.01 0.02 0.28 0.01 0.00 0.51 0.01 0.26 0.28 
c-statistic 0.76 0.78 0.73 0.79 0.77 0.70 0.76 0.76 0.66 0.77 0.70 0.70 
Age years (base: <36)               
36 - 45 0.36* 1.65 0.95 0.52 1.92 1.12 0.43 1.82 1.13 0.42 1.76 0.97 
46 - 55 0.16*** 1.72 1.09 0.19*** 2.22 1.22 0.14*** 1.69 1.15 0.16*** 1.95 1.23 
56 - 65 0.11*** 0.99 0.79 0.14*** 1.26 0.86 0.12*** 0.95 1.02 0.10*** 1.09 0.92 
>65 0.17** 2.53 0.63 0.18** 2.69 0.72 0.12*** 2.29 0.81 0.18** 2.32 0.74 
Gender (base: female)               
Male 1.89 0.22*** 1.43 1.41 0.24*** 1.49 1.74 0.23*** 1.1 1.54 0.21*** 1.35 
Education (base: none)                
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Independent variables Odds ratios 
  S N W S N W S N W S N W 
Literate 1.18 0.71 0.53 1.35 1 0.42 1.13 0.7 0.56 1.22 0.86 0.6 
Primary 0.34* 0.96 0.86 0.44 1.13 0.95 0.42 1.03 0.83 0.43 1.14 0.92 
Secondary or higher 0.82 4.11 1.14 1.34 6.49 1.07 0.88 7.82* 0.82 0.73 5.66 1.1 
Expenditure quintile (base: 
lowest)               
q2 1.47 1.46 1.06 2 1.61 0.85 2.2 1.3 0.89 1.6 1.43 0.98 
q3 1.66 0.29** 1.08 1.7 0.32** 1.14 1.63 0.28** 1.24 1.51 0.31** 1.13 
q4 4.00** 0.64 1.1 4.48*** 0.81 1.18 4.22** 0.71 0.97 4.48** 0.74 1.15 
q5 (highest) 3.67** 0.67 2.05 5.64*** 0.89 2.26 4.18** 0.79 2.40* 3.46** 0.81 2.34* 
Asset quintile (base: lowest)               
q2 1.64 0.85 0.89 2.07 1.18 0.82 2.64 0.86 0.82 2.11 1.12 0.91 
q3 2.95** 2.91** 0.49 2.98** 3.81*** 0.49 3.75*** 3.90*** 0.40** 3.61*** 3.76*** 0.46* 
q4 1.75 0.95 1.18 2.01 1.21 1.33 1.94 1.58 1.14 2.25 1.11 1.07 
q5 (highest) 2.81* 2.83** 0.95 2.08 2.93** 0.95 2.69* 3.99*** 0.91 3.01** 3.12** 0.92 
Ill health               
Handicapped (base: no) 2.2 2.59 0.88 1.77 2.4 0.68 2.35 4.44 0.71 2.21 2.32 0.7 
Chronic illness (base: no) 0.51 0.83 0.73 0.78 0.81 0.64 0.73 0.67 0.65 0.68 0.79 0.67 
Recent illness (base: no) 1.95 0.99 1.8 2.3 1.18 2.13 1.71 1.44 1.62 1.98 1.25 2.06 
SAH (base: very good or 
good)               
Fair 0.53 0.8 0.98 0.46 0.81 0.83 0.52 0.77 0.97 0.53 0.83 0.99 
Bad or very bad 2.31 2.34 1.26 1.35 2.66 1.01 1.75 4.11 1.15 1.68 1.75 1.2 
Ethnicity and religion               
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Independent variables Odds ratios 
  S N W S N W S N W S N W 
Muslim (base: yes) 0.26 0.19***   0.3 0.17***   0.25 0.13***   0.28 0.15*** 
Wolof (base: yes) 0.86 1.24 1.57 0.78 0.94 1.56 0.63 1.16 1.4 0.78 1 1.48 
Borrowed money in last 12 
months (base: none)               
From friends/relatives only 1.17 1.5 2.02           
From friends/relatives and/or 
other sources 4.27*** 2.82** 2.33***           
Trust               
Principal component 1     1.01 1.09 1.13*       
Principal component 2     1 1.05 0.91       
Principal component 3     1.21 1.03 0.78       
Control over community 
decisions affecting daily life 
(base: none)               
Very few decisions         0.78 3.55** 1.27   
Some decisions         0.67 5.24*** 2.22*   
Most decisions         1.03 2.21 3.27**   
All decisions         2.02 3.26* 3.82**   
Voted in last local elections 
(base: no)               
Voted                     1.17 1.51 1.32 
Likelihood-ratio test statistic 34.69 33.39 14.01 33.87 37 16.77 35.39 41.19 15.14 32.69 38.09 16.05 
P value 0.01 0.02 0.67 0.01 0.01 0.47 0.01 0.00 0.59 0.02 0.00 0.52 
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Independent variables Odds ratios 
  S N W S N W S N W S N W 
c-statistic 0.78 0.77 0.69 0.77 0.76 0.69 0.78 0.78 0.69 0.76 0.77 0.67 
Notes: *P<0.10; **P<0.05; ***P<0.01. 
Dependent variable: individual enrolment in CBHI (yes = 1; no = 0). 
S = Soppante, N = Ndondol, W = WAW 
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Views on what CBHI and other associations have in common may help understand 
these results. In all three case studies members said that both types of organisation 
aim to improve community development through solidarity and democracy: 
“what I see as similarities is primarily... social mobilization with the 
same objectives… solidarity among members… in addition to 
democracy…. All (CBHI) members are treated in the same way, they are 
on an equal footing... In the other associations... there is also 
democracy”. (WAW member household) 
In terms of bonding social capital, across the three case studies, over 80 per cent of 
respondents had privileged relationships. In Soppante and Ndondol, members were 
three or more times as likely to have privileged relationships as compared to non-
members in Model 1 and for Ndondol the relationship remained significant in Model 
2. The qualitative results suggest that kinship and privileged relations were a medium 
for instrumental financial support, both in general and specifically in the context of 
CBHI, as illustrated by the practice of members enrolling their extended kin: 
“We have a second CBHI policy which is held by my younger brother 
and on that policy we enrolled my other brothers, their children and my 
homonyms (namesakes)” (Soppante member household) 
Similarly, several non-members said they had not enrolled in CBHI because they 
could not afford to pay the premium for their extended kin.   
A minority of respondents (around 8 to 12 per cent) reported receiving information 
on community matters or politics from relatives, friends and neighbours only. 
Members were less likely to report this than the non-members, although this was 
(weakly) statistically significant only in one case study. The qualitative interviews 
help to explain why diversified access to information was a determinant of 
enrolment, as all types of interviewees complained that information about the CBHI 
schemes was scarce.  
In Soppante and WAW, members were more than two times as likely to perceive 
their community to have solidarity (measured by the belief that everyone would 
cooperate to solve a common problem) than non-members and this was statistically 
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significant in Model 2. Solidarity in CBHI was seen by members to derive from 
contributing to CBHI even when healthy, thereby allowing risk pooling to take place: 
“If you enrol and pay premiums (into the CBHI scheme), you benefit, but 
you also help others.” (Soppante member household) 
Between 50 and 60 per cent of respondents had borrowed money in the last 12 
months. CBHI members were at least twice as likely to have borrowed money from a 
source other than, or in addition to, family, relatives, or friends, as compared to non-
members. This result was strongly significant in Model 2 for all three cases. The 
qualitative interviews reveal that associations were an important source of financial 
credit. 
The results of the principal component analysis of the trust variables were in general 
not statistically significant. Similarly, in the qualitative research, a lack of trust in 
CBHI managers was not cited as a reason for non-enrolment.  
Around a fifth of all respondents reported having control over no decisions made in 
the community or by their neighbours which affected their daily life. CBHI members 
were more than two times as likely to report having control over such decisions 
compared to non-members. The correlation was statistically significant for all three 
cases in Model 1 and remained significant for Ndondol and WAW in Model 2. The 
types of people who were thought to have influence over community decisions were 
those with cultural, human and social capital: 
“Traditional leaders, retired teachers and leaders of women’s associations 
are among the people who influence important decisions in our 
community” (WAW, member household) 
More than 60 per cent of respondents reported voting in the last local elections. 
There was a weakly statistically significant difference between members (more likely 
to vote) and non-members in Ndondol in Model 1. As mentioned, the qualitative 
results suggest that members believed CBHI schemes were managed in a democratic 
manner, perhaps helping to explain why voting was correlated with enrolment.  
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The other independent variables generally support the findings of previous studies on 
CBHI. In all three cases, members were likely to be better educated, but the results 
were not statistically significant. In Soppante and WAW, CBHI households had 
significantly higher levels of expenditure than non-member households. In Ndondol, 
CBHI member households were wealthier.  In Soppante, members reported worse 
health for every indicator, possibly indicating adverse selection, although this was 
not statistically significant. In terms of the other independent variables, in some cases 
there were significant differences in age (Soppante) and gender and religion 
(Ndondol) across members and non-members. The differences in gender, religion 
and ethnicity can mostly be explained by specific characteristics of the three schemes 
(Table 3.1).     
The likelihood-ratio tests (Table 3.6) suggest that Model 2 had a better fit than Model 
1 in Soppante and Ndondol. However, this was not the case for WAW.  For Soppante 
and Ndondol, the c-statistics were all between 0.6 and 0.7 in Model 1 and between 
0.75 and 0.8 in Model 2. For WAW, the c statistics were between 0.55 and 0.7 in 
Model 1 and between 0.65 and 0.8 in Model 2.  This suggests all the regressions 
(except for four in Model 1 in WAW) pass the goodness of fit test (Hosmer and 
Lemeshow 2000).   
3.4 Discussion 
The social capital variables provide an insight into previously unexplored 
determinants of CBHI enrolment by explicitly distinguishing between bonding and 
bridging social capital and exploring social power differentials. The result that ceteris 
paribus members of CBHI were more likely to also be members of other associations 
supports the hypothesis that members of CBHI have higher bridging social capital. 
This echoes previous studies on CBHI (Jütting 2003) and the wider development 
literature which finds that an existing social network is a precondition of 
participation in community organizations (Weinberger and Jutting 2001). The c-
statistics and likelihood-ratio test results, which suggest that Model 1 is the stronger 
model in the case of WAW, underline the primacy of bridging social capital as a 
determinant of urban CBHI. The data suggest that in rural contexts (Soppante and 
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Ndondol) members of CBHI are also more likely than non-members to have bonding 
social capital, as measured by having privileged social relationships.  
The “negative” effect of having only bonding social capital is indicated by the 
consistent finding that members were more likely than non-members to have 
borrowed money from sources other than friends and relatives.  Caution is needed in 
interpreting these results for Ndondol and WAW, since these schemes were 
connected to a microcredit mechanism. However, the result is strongest for Soppante 
which was not connected to any source of financial credit. The result is also 
supported by the aforementioned Vietnamese study (Jowett 2003). The negative 
effect of having only bonding social capital is also indicated by the result that 
members were more likely to receive information from sources other than friends, 
relatives and neighbours (though statistically significant only for Soppante in Model 
1).  
Taken with the strong finding that CBHI members had higher levels of perceived 
community-wide solidarity and the results on voting and perceived democratic nature 
of CBHI, it seems that CBHI members had greater bridging social capital which they 
had developed by broadening their social networks via democratic social structures 
which provided them with information, solidarity, risk pooling, financial protection 
and financial credit. Non-members, on the other hand, seem to be characterised by 
bonding social capital only, receiving financial credit and information from a narrow 
social network characterised by affective relationships. Enrolment in CBHI could 
therefore be interpreted as indicative of a transition from what has been described by 
Durkheim (1984) as “mechanical solidarity” (characteristic of traditional societies 
and typically organized around kinship affiliations) to “organic solidarity” 
(characteristic of complex industrialised societies and based on integration of 
specialized economic and political organizations). The result that the associational 
dynamic and role of generalised trust were the strongest and the effect of privileged 
relationships weakest in the urban context of WAW supports this interpretation.  
The finding that bridging social capital is positively correlated with enrolment in 
CBHI, while bonding social capital alone is not, ostensibly suggests that CBHI 
schemes should build on existing bridging social capital to increase population 
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coverage, for example by enrolling households through associations. However, given 
Bourdieu’s theory that interlinked forms of capital are a source of social power, it is 
likely that the current exclusion of less powerful individuals from CBHI (indicated 
by the result that CBHI members are more likely to have influence over community 
decisions) would be exacerbated by such enrolment strategies. A complementary, or 
alternative, strategy could be subsidies for CBHI premiums which target not only 
poorer households but also those with low bridging social capital and low social 
power. However, research from West Africa (Porter and Lyon 2006) finds that 
channelling external development funds through groups and associations (such as 
CBHI) often fails to include the poorest and most vulnerable and incurs social costs 
such as peer pressure and loss of trust, suggesting that overturning established social 
hierarchies through CBHI subsidies could be difficult to achieve in practice. 
Therefore, echoing previous analyses of market-oriented health sector reforms 
(Bennett, McPake, and Mills 1997) and consumer-led  financing (Ensor 2004), it is 
likely that alternative or complementary public sector and/or supply-side financing 
policies are needed. These may include direct and indirect tax-based funding (Mills 
et al. 2012) and broader social protection policies integrated into government 
systems of social welfare (Devereux and White 2010).   
Limitations  
The study has several limitations. Firstly, as an exploratory study, the sample size is 
small. Secondly, the “random route” methodology may mean that differences 
between members and non-members are either over- or under-estimated. Thirdly, 
because different forms of capital may be fungible (Bourdieu 1986), it is possible 
that some of the variables included in the study measure factors other than social 
capital. It is also possible that the social capital variables are picking up the effect of 
other omitted variables. Another limitation is that due to the cross-sectional and non-
experimental study design, it is difficult to attribute the direction of causality. 
However, it is likely that the social capital variables are a determinant of membership 
and not vice versa, since social structures such as associations and privileged 
relations are antecedent to CBHI schemes which were established relatively recently 
(Niang 2000). Furthermore, the policy implications do not depend on the direction of 
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the relationship between social capital and CBHI enrolment. Finally, more case 
studies would be needed to increase generalizability.  
3.5 Conclusions 
Several indicators relating to social capital seem to be strongly, consistently and 
positively associated with CBHI enrolment. The quantitative results are strengthened 
by the qualitative interviews. These results have policy relevance, given that CBHI is 
at the heart of Senegal’s strategy for universal coverage. One implication is that 
CBHI should build on bridging social capital, for example by increasing enrolment 
through existing associations. However, this strategy may be unadvisable from an 
equity perspective. A second implication is that subsidies for premiums should target 
not only indigent households but also those with low bridging social capital and low 
social power, in order to overcome social barriers to enrolment. However, such 
reforms are likely to require overturning established social hierarchies and may be 
difficult to implement through CBHI. Alternative or complementary public sector 
financing policies are needed. The study also demonstrates that despite controversy 
about the concept (Fine 2001), by drawing on Bourdieu, social capital can be 
defined, measured and used to identify strategies for improved developmental 
outcomes.   
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Chapter 4 Why do people drop out of community-based health 
insurance? Findings from an exploratory household 
survey in Senegal19 
Abstract 
Although a high level of drop-out from community-based health insurance (CBHI) is 
frequently reported, it has rarely been analysed in depth. This study explores whether 
never having actively participated in CBHI is a determinant of drop-out. A 
conceptual framework of passive and active community participation in CBHI is 
developed to inform quantitative data analysis. Fieldwork comprising a household 
survey was conducted in Senegal in 2009. Levels of active participation among 382 
members and ex-members of CBHI across three case study schemes are compared 
using logistic regression. Results suggest that, controlling for a range of 
socioeconomic variables, the more active the mode of participation in the CBHI 
scheme, the stronger the statistically significant positive correlation with remaining 
enrolled.  Training is the most highly correlated, followed by voting, participating in 
a general assembly, awareness raising / information dissemination and informal 
discussions / spontaneously helping. Possible intermediary outcomes of active 
participation such as perceived trustworthiness of the scheme management / 
president; accountability and being informed of mechanisms of controlling 
abuse/fraud are also significantly positively correlated with remaining in the scheme. 
Perception of poor quality of health services is identified as the most important 
determinant of drop-out. Financial factors do not seem to determine drop-out. The 
results suggest that schemes may be able to reduce drop-out and increase quality of 
care by creating more opportunities for more active participation. Caution is needed 
though, since if CBHI schemes uncritically fund and promote participation activities, 
individuals who are already more empowered or who already have higher levels of 
social capital may be more likely to access these resources, thereby indirectly further 
increasing social inequalities in health coverage.  
                                                 
19
 A version of this chapter was published in Social Science and Medicine (Mladovsky 2014) 
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4.1 Introduction 
Community-based health insurance (CBHI) aims to provide financial protection from 
the cost of seeking health care through voluntary prepayment by community 
members; typically it is not-for-profit and community owned and controlled (Hsiao 
2001, Atim 1998). The Senegalese government elected in 2012 views CBHI as a key 
mechanism for achieving universal coverage (Ministère de la Santé 2012), a policy 
initiated by the previous government (Ministère de la Santé 2004). Senegal has 
witnessed a rapid increase in the number of CBHI schemes, reaching around 139 
between 1997 and 2004 (Hygea 2004). Yet as in most low- and middle-income 
countries (LMIC), overall population coverage remains low, with 4% or less of the 
Senegalese population enrolled in CBHI (Soors et al. 2010). Another problem for 
CBHI schemes is retaining enrolees; it is estimated that in Senegal in 2004, 47% of 
people who had ever enrolled in CBHI had ceased paying the premium and therefore 
lost access to the benefits of CBHI (Hygea 2004). In order to explore why people 
drop-out of CBHI schemes, this paper develops a conceptual framework of 
community participation in CBHI and draws on data collected in a household survey 
on the relationship between CBHI membership, active community participation and 
social capital. 
Background 
Drop-out from CBHI 
While drop-out from CBHI is frequently reported as a problem it has rarely been 
analysed in depth (De Allegri et al. 2009). Two exceptions come from West Africa. 
One is a quantitative study of a CBHI scheme in Burkina Faso which had been 
operational for three years and had a drop-out rate of 30.9 to 45.7% (Dong et al. 
2009). The study focuses entirely on demographic, economic and health-related 
indicators and finds that female household head, increased age, lower education, 
fewer illness episodes, fewer children or elderly in a household, poor health care 
quality, less seeking care, higher household expenditure and shorter distance to the 
contracted health facility were correlated with increased drop-out. The other paper is 
a qualitative study from Guinea-Conakry (Criel and Waelkens 2003) where CBHI 
population coverage fell from 8% of the target population to about 6% in the 
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following year. The main reasons for non-enrolment and drop-out were poor quality 
of care and reported inability to pay the premium.  
Understanding of the concept of insurance, information flow, mistrust of 
institutionalised associative movements, confidence in the management of CBHI and 
integration of CBHI with existing systems of mutual aid were found not to be 
underlying causes, possibly because CBHI promoters discussed the scheme with 
community members from the start (Criel and Waelkens 2003). However, as with the 
Burkina Faso study, the Guinea-Conakry study was conducted only two years after 
the commencement of the scheme. This makes it difficult to assess the longer-term 
determinants of drop-out and the sustainability of the participatory dynamic of the 
scheme.  
Community participation in CBHI 
Community participation, ownership and control in scheme design and management 
are in principle key defining features of CBHI (Hsiao 2001, Atim 1998, Soors et al. 
2010). Smallness of CBHI schemes has been seen as a drawback in terms of risk 
pooling, but an advantage in terms of community focus (Davies and Carrin 2001). As 
CBHI was rolled out in LMIC, policymakers and researchers hoped that the 
community-oriented approach would promote a set of important benefits: trust in 
CBHI management, solidarity and acceptance of cross-subsidisation, the flow of 
information, the quality of health services; and reduced fraud, moral hazard and 
adverse selection (Pauly 2004, Pauly et al. 2006, Davies and Carrin 2001, Hsiao 
2001, Zweifel 2004). Implicit in this view was the idea that CBHI would benefit 
from existing social capital (Mladovsky and Mossialos 2008), defined as “the 
information, trust and norms of reciprocity inhering in one’s social network” 
(Woolcock 1998, p. 153). It was hypothesised that the community-oriented dynamic 
would in turn promote high levels of enrolment in CBHI. However, this hypothesis 
has hardly been studied and the various possible modes of community participation 
in CBHI have never been rigorously conceptualised in the form of an overarching 
theoretical framework.   
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In contrast, community participation has been extensively conceptualised and 
analysed in the broader literature on health (Rifkin 1986, Morgan 2001, Zakus and 
Lysack 1998, Rifkin 2009). Rifkin (1986), points to three main approaches to 
community participation in health programmes: medical; health services; and 
community development. The latter approach defines participation as “community 
members being actively involved in decisions about how to improve [health]”, where 
health is seen as a “human condition which is a result of social, economic and 
political development” (Rifkin 1986, p. 241). Key factors are “people's perceptions 
of health and their motivation to change health care” as well as the importance of 
communities “learning how to decide the ways in which change can best be 
achieved” (Rifkin 1986, p. 241). This approach seems to best match the goals of 
CBHI as described by policymakers and researchers and is the definition adopted in 
this study. Rifkin further distinguishes between different modes of community 
participation. The most passive mode is participating in benefits of the programme: 
in CBHI this accords with becoming a member of the scheme by paying the 
premium. More active modes in ascending order of range and depth of participation 
are: activities, management, monitoring and evaluating, and planning (Table 4.1) 
(Rifkin 1986).  
It is not clear whether low CBHI enrolment in sub-Saharan Africa could be linked to 
a lack of active participation, as there is little evidence on this topic. The few studies 
on community participation in CBHI present contradictory results. Two qualitative 
studies (Ridde et al. 2010, De Allegri, Sanon, and Sauerborn 2006) compare the 
views of members of CBHI to non-members and find that although levels of active 
community participation in CBHI were generally low, people did not point to this as 
a reason for not enrolling. In contrast, two other qualitative studies (Basaza, Criel, 
and Van der Stuyft 2007, Atim 1999) compare schemes in which the level of active 
community participation was high with schemes with low active participation and 
suggest that higher active participation may be one of the factors accounting for 
higher levels of enrolment. A further qualitative study (Schneider 2005) suggests that 
active participation may have positively influenced enrolment by building trust, 
transparency, solidarity and honesty.  
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Objectives of the study 
This study brings together the two aforementioned under-explored themes in CBHI: 
drop-out and active community participation. It is hypothesised that active 
participation in CBHI and its potential intermediary benefits, such as trust, 
information and solidarity are negatively correlated with drop-out. This hypothesis is 
explored by comparing levels of active participation among members and ex-
members of three CBHI schemes in Senegal. 
To provide a conceptual framework to guide the analysis, examples of active 
community participation in CBHI identified in the literature on sub-Saharan Africa 
(De Allegri, Sanon, and Sauerborn 2006, Atim 1999, Basaza, Criel, and Van der 
Stuyft 2007, Criel et al. 2005, Criel and Waelkens 2003, Ridde et al. 2010, Schneider 
2005, Waelkens and Criel 2007) are categorised according to Rifkin’s (1986) 
framework (Table 4.1).  
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Table 4.1: Mode, definition and examples of community participation in CBHI in  
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Mode of participation (in 
ascending order ranging 
from passive to active) 
Definition Examples of active 
community participation 
in CBHI in Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
1. Benefits Passive: community 
members are recipients of 
services 
Enrolment / paying the 
premium 
2. Activities Active: community 
members contribute to 
health programmes but do 
not participate in the choice 
of what activities are to be 
undertaken or how they will 
be carried out 
Disseminating 
information, attending 
meetings and general 
assemblies, voting in 
elections, receiving 
training 
3. Management Active: those involved in 
activities have some 
managerial responsibilities. 
They make decisions about 
how these activities are to 
be run, but do not decide 
which activities are 
undertaken  
Managing the day-to-day 
operation of the scheme 
(e.g. enrolling members, 
collecting premiums, 
managing finances, 
holding meetings and 
general assemblies) 
4. Monitoring and 
evaluating 
Active: community 
members are involved in 
measuring objectives and in 
monitoring activities, but 
not involved in developing 
programme objectives 
Collecting information, 
reporting and reviewing  
5. Planning Active: community 
members (usually key 
individuals such as leaders 
and teachers) decide what 
programmes they wish to 
undertake and ask health 
staff, agencies and/or 
government to provide the 
expertise and/or resources to 
enable the activities to be 
pursued 
Identifying the need for 
the scheme; deciding on 
the scheme design and 
objectives (e.g. benefits 
package, premium price, 
mode of collection, target 
population); leading the 
scheme (e.g. contracting 
providers, hiring and 
training staff, setting the 
agenda for general 
assemblies, attracting 
funding, research and 
technical assistance); 
coordinating CBHI on a 
regional level; developing 
CBHI policy. 
Source: Adapted from (Rifkin 1986) and literature on community participation in CBHI in  
Sub-Saharan Africa 
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4.2 Methods 
Case study selection 
Fieldwork was conducted in Senegal from March to August 2009. Case study 
selection criteria were the following: 
 (a) The CBHI schemes had enrolled a greater than average number of households 
(the average was 329 (Hygea, 2004)). Enrolment in Senegal is typically on a 
household basis. A representative of the household enrols in the CBHI scheme 
("adhérent" in French) and purchases a membership card on which a certain number 
(typically up to 12) household members may be registered. The premium is paid 
monthly (per household member). In this paper, "households" refers to the number of 
membership cards purchased. 
(b) The schemes had been established for a minimum of eight years.  
(c) The schemes had a relatively high drop-out rate compared to the national average 
(47% in 2004 (Hygea, 2004)). The rationale for selecting schemes with high drop-out 
was to focus on contexts where there was potentially the most to gain from a policy 
intervention.  
(d) The CBHI schemes had achieved a basic measure of success (criteria (a) and (b)); 
this was in order to control for the possibility that drop-out was mainly due to 
fundamental supply-side failures ending in the suspension of the scheme. 
In order to obtain a range of contextual factors, additional considerations were: 
region and geographic zone; economic sector of the target population; and the type of 
contracted health facility (primary care or hospital).  
On basis of local documentation and information provided by Senegalese CBHI 
experts, three CBHI schemes which met these criteria were selected (Table 4.2). 
Ethical approval for the research was obtained from the Senegalese Ministry of 
Health. 
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CBHI schemes in Senegal (including those selected for the study) typically aimed to 
promote community participation through a model of democratic governance 
promoted by the International Labour Organization (ILO 2000). A President, 
Treasurer, Secretary and Board of Directors are elected by scheme members. 
Schemes are expected to organise training sessions, annual general assemblies and 
regular meetings through which members of the scheme and the local community 
can participate in implementation and decision-making and hold scheme staff 
accountable.   
Table 4.2: Characteristics of the CBHI schemes included in the study 
Name of 
scheme 
Year of scheme 
commencement 
Tier of 
services 
contracted 
by the 
scheme 
Region Geographic 
zone 
Characteristics 
of the 
population 
targeted by the 
scheme 
Soppante 
 
1997 Health 
post 
(public 
sector)  
Hospital 
(private 
and public 
sectors) 
Thies Rural, peri-
urban and 
urban 
Formal and 
informal sectors 
Ndondol 
 
2001 Health 
post and 
health hut 
(public 
sector) 
Maternal 
and child 
health 
centre 
(private 
sector) 
Diourbel Rural Informal 
agricultural 
sector 
Wer Ak 
Werle 
(WAW) 
 
2000 Health 
post 
Health 
centre 
Pharmacy 
(all public 
sector) 
Dakar Peri-urban Predominantly 
informal sector, 
female petty 
traders 
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Sampling design 
Lists of members (households that were up-to-date with premium payments) and ex-
members (households that had not paid the monthly premium – see details below) 
were obtained for each CBHI scheme and used as sampling frames. Each scheme 
was sampled separately and members and ex-members were sampled separately 
using disproportionate stratified random sampling (Table 4.3), in order to ensure the 
inclusion of sufficient numbers of current members in the study. The analysis was 
conducted on merged data from all three schemes.  
The household questionnaire was administered to the named member / ex-member 
(i.e. the “adhérent”) in each household.   
Table 4.3: Household survey sample design 
Scheme Total 
number of 
ever-
members  
(members + 
ex-
members)  
Scheme 
drop-out 
rate 
Number of 
members 
selected  
(% of total 
members) 
Number of 
ex-members 
selected  
(% of total 
ex-
members) 
Total number 
of members 
and ex-
members 
sampled 
1. 
Soppante 
985 (166 + 
819) 
83% 70 (42%) 91 (11%) 161 
2. 
Ndondol 
463 (136 + 
327) 
71% 58 (42%) 98 (30%) 156 
3. Wer ak 
Werle 
(WAW) 
678 (281 + 
397) 
58% 85 (30%) 85 (21%) 170 
Totals 2,126 (583 + 
1,543) 
72% 213 (36%) 274 (17%) 487 
Questionnaire design 
A questionnaire was developed with six components: socioeconomic and 
demographic characteristics; a household roster; economic characteristics; social 
capital; membership of CBHI; and health and utilisation of health services (the 
questionnaire for the WAW case study is provided in Appendix 2). The full list of 
variables included in the study is presented in Table 4.4.   
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Table 4.4: Variables included in the study  
Variable Description 
Dependent variable  
Member 1 = current member of the scheme. 0 = ex-member (i.e. dropped out) 
Independent variables  
 Demographic and socioeconomic characteristics 
Age quintiles  1 = age quintile, otherwise 0. Age1 is the lowest quintile (baseline) 
Gender   
Male 1 = male, 0 = female 
Education    
None  1 = no education, otherwise 0 (baseline) 
Literate 1 = highest educational attainment is literacy, otherwise 0 
Primary 1 = highest educational attainment is primary education, otherwise 0 
Secondary or 
higher 
1 = highest educational attainment is secondary education or higher, 
otherwise 0 
Household 
expenditure 
quintile (%) 
1 = expenditure quintile, otherwise 0. Ex q1 is the lowest quintile 
(baseline)  
Household asset 
quintile (%) 1 = asset quintile, otherwise 0. Ass q1 is the lowest quintile (baseline) 
Ethnicity and religion   
Wolof 1 = wolof, otherwise 0 
Muslim 1 = muslim, otherwise 0 
HH size tertile 1 = HH size tertile, otherwise 0. HH size1 is the lowest tertile (baseline)  
 Health and health service access 
Health of HH   
Disability 1 = one or more members of the household has a disability, otherwise 0 
Chronic illness  1 = one or more members of the household has a chronic illness, 
otherwise 0 
Recent illness  1 = one or more members of the household had an illness, accident or injury in the last 15 days, otherwise 0 
Health care access is advantage of scheme membership 
Advantage 1 = when asked "what are / were the advantages of scheme membership for your household?" selected "health care access", otherwise 0 
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Variable Description 
Quality of health service providers contracted by the scheme 
No providers 
satisfactory 
1 =  when asked "are / were you satisifed with the quality of the health 
service providers contracted by the scheme" selected "no" for all 
providers, otherwise 0 (baseline) 
Some providers 
satisfactory 1 = "yes" for some but not all providers, otherwise 0 
All providers 
satisfactory 1 = "yes" for all providers, otherwise 0 
Household use of traditional medicine 
Traditional 
medicine 
1 = at least one member of the household used traditional medicine in 
the last month, otherwise 0 
Nearest health care provider   
<= 2km  1 = nearest health care provider is located 2km or less from the household, otherwise 0 
 Social capital  
Privileged social relationships 
Yes 1 = has a “privileged social relationship” with at least one other person, 
otherwise 0 
Household membership of community associations other than the CBHI scheme 
0 associations 1 = nobody in the household is a member of a community association, 
otherwise 0 (baseline) 
1-5 associations 1 = household is member of 1 to 5 community associations, otherwise 0 
>6 associations 1 = household is member of more than 6 community associations, 
otherwise 0 
 Active participation in the scheme 
Informal 
participation 
1 = has ever participated in informal discussions about / spontaneously 
helped the scheme, otherwise 0 
Raising 
awareness / 
information 
1 = has ever participated in raising awareness  /disseminating 
information about the scheme, otherwise 0 
General assembly 1 = has ever participated in the scheme's general assembly, otherwise 0 
Voting 1 = has ever elected a leader of the scheme, otherwise 0 
Training 1 = has ever received training under the scheme, otherwise 0 
 Intermediary outcomes of active participation 
Source of information on existence of the scheme 
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Variable Description 
Friend or family 
1 = learnt of CBHI scheme from a friend or family member, 0 = learnt 
of CBHI scheme from a health service provider, CBHI staff, CBHI 
members, a community association, community leader, media, or other 
source 
Mechanisms of controlling abuse/fraud by scheme staff/members/health  providers 
Informed 
1 = when asked "do/did you know of mechanisms of controlling 
abuse/fraud by people in the scheme?" selected "yes" for at least one of 
the following categories: staff; other members; health providers. 0 = 
selected "no" for all categories 
Believes can influence scheme operation  
Influence 1 = when asked "do/did you think you are able to influence the functioning of the scheme?" selected "yes". 0 = "no" 
Trustworthiness of scheme staff / leaders 
Satisfied 
1 = when asked "what aspects of the scheme are/were satisfactory?" 
selected "scheme leader is/was trustworthy" and/or "scheme staff 
are/were trustworthy", otherwise 0 
Vision on values / solidarity   
Shared vision 
with other 
members 
1 = when asked "what do you think you have in common with the other 
members of the scheme?" selected "same vision on values / solidarity". 
0 = neighbours, village, family, relatives, religion, gender, age group, 
ethnicity, language, caste, level of education, occupation, political 
affiliation, economic status, nothing, members of another association, or 
other 
Solidarity is advantage of scheme membership 
Advantage 1 = when asked "what are / were the advantages of scheme membership for your household?" selected "solidarity", otherwise 0 
Types of cross-subsidisation that should occur in the scheme 
Principal 
component 1 
Respondents were asked whether they agreed with 7 statements about 
solidarity in the scheme, providing answers on a likert scale, with 1 
representing "strongly disagree" (lowest level of solidarity) and 5 
representing "strongly agree" (highest level of solidarity) 
Principal 
component 2 As above 
Scheme should accept diverse members 
Principal 
component 3 
Respondents were presented with the statement "should the scheme 
accept people from diverse..." and were asked about the following 
categories: neighbourhood or village, family or relatives, religion, 
gender, age group, ethnicity or language, caste, education, profession, 
political affiliation, economic status. They provided answers on a likert 
scale, with 1 representing "strongly disagree" (lowest level of solidarity) 
and 5 representing "strongly agree" (highest level of solidarity) 
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Variable Description 
Some people excluded from the scheme 
Yes 1 = when asked "do you think some members of the community are 
excluded from the scheme" replied "yes". 0 = "no" 
Scheme President/Secretary/Manager/other staff 
Knows   
1 = when asked "do/did you know the people who work in the scheme" 
selected "yes" for at least one of the following categories: President; 
Secretary; Manager; other staff. 0 = selected "no" for all categories 
Knows other members of the scheme 
None  1 = knows no other members of the scheme, otherwise 0 (baseline) 
Few 1 = knows few other members of the scheme, otherwise 0  
Half or nearly all 1 = knows half or nearly all the other members of the scheme, otherwise 0  
Has characteristics in common with other scheme members 
None  
1 = when asked "what do you think you have in common with the other 
members of the scheme?" selected "nothing". 0 = neighbours, village, 
family, relatives, religion, gender, age group, ethnicity, language, caste, 
level of education, occupation, political affiliation, economic status, 
same vision on values / solidarity, members of another association, or 
other 
 Other CBHI variables 
Scheme of which household is / was a member 
Scheme1 1 = scheme 1 (Soppante), otherwise 0 (baseline) 
Scheme2 1 = scheme 2 (Ndondol), otherwise 0 
Scheme3 1 = scheme 3 (WAW), otherwise 0 
Scheme operation  
Excellent or 
satisfactory 
1 = when asked "how well do / did you feel the CBHI scheme 
functions?" selected "excellently or satisfactorily". 0 = replied "average, 
badly or very badly" 
Source of money for paying the premium 
Salary 
1 = source of money for paying the premium is salary or regular income 
generated by the household. 0 = sale of harvest, savings, one-off sale of 
goods, remittances, other 
Premium price accessibility  
Satisfied 1 = when asked "what aspects of the scheme are/were satisfactory?" 
selected "premium price is accessible", otherwise 0 
 Note: all variables are individual level unless the household (HH) level is specified 
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Model 
A logit model was used to analyse the probability of dropping out of CBHI. Several 
regressions were run. The first was a restricted regression which contained a basic set 
of socioeconomic variables. In each subsequent regression, an extra independent 
variable or set of variables was analysed separately, in order to test various 
hypotheses regarding the determinants of drop-out. All models include all 
observations from all three schemes and were estimated using STATA 10.0. 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable was CBHI membership status (member = 1, ex-member = 0). 
The design of the dependent variable was not straightforward.  Two sources of 
information were available for defining membership status. The first was information 
provided by the scheme administration which was used to create the sampling frame 
for the study. However, some of the households that had not paid the monthly 
premium may not have considered themselves to have dropped-out of the scheme 
and may have intended to pay the outstanding payments and a penalty charge 
(mandated by the schemes’ rules) in order to re-gain membership. The second source 
of information on membership status was self-reported (the respondent was asked 
whether they were a current member or an ex-member, the latter being defined as 
having decided to permanently drop out of the scheme); this information was 
collected in the questionnaire. The latter source (i.e. self-reported status) is used in 
the analysis.  
Independent variables 
Variables in the restricted regression 
The variables included in the restricted regression are described in Table 4.4 
(sections a and f). Scheme dummies were included to account for the fixed effect of 
which scheme the members/ex-members (had) belonged to. Demographic variables 
control for differences in age and gender. Socioeconomic variables control for the 
possibility that wealthier and more educated people are more likely to remain 
enrolled. An expenditure variable was based on reported monthly household 
expenditure on 14 different categories and adjusted (providing a weight of 1 for the 
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first adult, 0.7 for other adults and 0.5 for each child) (OECD , Forster 1994). To 
proxy household wealth, an asset index was constructed by performing a principal 
component analysis using household possession of goods (Howe et al. 2009).  
Variables measuring active participation 
Five variables measure modes of active participation in CBHI (Table 4.4, section d). 
Four of these are formal modes, measuring participation in: raising awareness of / 
disseminating information on the scheme; a general assembly; electing leaders of the 
scheme; and training. The fifth variable measures informal active participation: 
having ever had informal discussions about and/or spontaneously helped the scheme. 
All five variables can be categorised as “activities” in Table 4.1. 
Another set of variables measures the potential intermediary outcomes of active 
participation (Table 4.4, section e): information flow, measured using two variables 
(being informed of mechanisms of controlling abuse/fraud by scheme 
staff/members/health providers; and source of information on the existence of the 
scheme); accountability (perceptions of influence over scheme operation; trust 
(perceptions of trustworthiness of scheme management / president); solidarity, 
measured using three variables (perception of shared values / solidarity; belief that 
solidarity is advantage of CBHI; and opinions about cross-subsidisation); perceptions 
of inclusiveness of the scheme measured by two variables (opinions about the 
diversity of members of the scheme; and perception of whether people are excluded 
from the scheme); interpersonal relationships within the scheme, measured using 
three variables (knowing the scheme President/Secretary/Manager/other staff; 
knowing other members of the scheme; and perception of having something in 
common with other scheme members).  
Other independent variables 
The remaining independent variables test competing hypotheses (Table 4.4, sections 
a to c and f). Two variables measure religion and ethnicity respectively, to account 
for the possibility that drop-out was related to socio-cultural factors. The household 
size variable measures whether larger households may have dropped out due to the 
increased financial burden of premium payments. Variables focusing on satisfaction 
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with premium price and source of premium payments also measure whether drop-out 
is related to financial barriers.  The health and health services variables account for 
the possibility that adverse selection, geographic access to health service providers, 
and reliance on traditional medicine explain drop-out from CBHI. The two social 
capital variables measure the structure of people’s social networks, in order to test 
the hypothesis that CBHI benefits from existing social capital (Mladovsky and 
Mossialos 2008), discussed above. The first variable measures having privileged 
social relationships (with people who may or may not also be members of the CBHI 
scheme). In Senegal “privileged social relationships” such as being a godfather or 
godmother constitute emotional and affective ties but can also be a medium for 
reciprocal instrumental support. The second social capital variable measures 
membership of community associations other than CBHI. Having privileged 
relations and membership of other community associations are assumed to be 
antecedent to membership CBHI, since CBHI was established relatively recently in 
Senegal compared to these other social structures. The “satisfaction with scheme 
functioning” variable measures whether negative experiences of CBHI functioning 
(such as premium collection) affect drop-out.  
4.3 Results 
The total sample size is 382 households, corresponding to a response rate of 78%. 
The sample contains 227 members and 155 ex-members (60 households defined as 
ex-members by the scheme’s administration defined themselves as members in the 
questionnaire, while 14 households defined by the scheme administration as 
members defined themselves as ex-members).   
The results of the logistic regression (Tables 4.5 to 4.7) indicate that although 
members of the CBHI schemes were wealthier and had higher expenditure levels 
than ex-members the difference was not statistically significant. Satisfaction with the 
accessibility of premium price was quite low in the sample, at 38.68% (see Table 4.8 
for descriptive statistics) but the odds ratio for this variable was not significant. The 
odds ratios for the demographic, education, ethnicity and religion variables were also 
not significant.   
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Table 4.5: Odds ratios for insurance drop out, part 1  
Scheme  
Scheme2: Ndondol 0.42*** 0.53* 0.40*** 0.41*** 0.47** 0.39*** 1.16 0.42** 0.41*** 
Scheme3: WAW 0.68 0.69 0.67 0.65 0.68 0.62 0.99 0.66 0.56 
Demographic characteristics 
Age2 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.64 0.67 0.44* 0.66 0.67 
Age3 0.96 0.98 0.95 0.97 0.98 0.98 1.03 0.96 1.01 
Age4 0.51* 0.56 0.53* 0.53* 0.51* 0.54 0.26*** 0.52* 0.56 
Age5 (highest) 0.31*** 0.32*** 0.31*** 0.32*** 0.31*** 0.29*** 0.38* 0.31*** 0.34*** 
Male 0.81 0.79 0.78 0.82 0.76 0.86 1.48 0.78 0.8 
Education 
Literate 0.88 0.87 0.93 0.86 0.72 0.78 1.09 0.86 0.9 
Primary 1.12 1.16 1.07 1.1 1.1 1.06 1 1.11 1.02 
Secondary or higher 0.94 1.02 0.92 0.89 0.95 0.88 0.64 0.93 0.91 
Household expenditure quintile 
Ex q2 0.93 0.91 0.98 0.9 1.11 0.91 1.24 0.99 1.09 
Ex q3 0.68 0.63 0.67 0.67 0.73 0.67 0.65 0.68 0.8 
Ex q4 0.59 0.56 0.57 0.54 0.71 0.6 0.63 0.6 0.75 
Ex q5 (highest) 1.34 1.29 1.31 1.19 1.75 1.24 2.77* 1.38 1.64 
Household asset quintile 
Ass q2 0.93 0.95 0.93 0.93 0.88 0.86 1.01 0.95 1 
Ass q3 1.1 1.12 1.11 1.09 0.98 0.92 0.9 1.09 1.09 
Ass q4 1.49 1.49 1.52 1.51 1.45 1.3 1.28 1.5 1.34 
Ass q5 (highest) 1.62 1.74 1.69 1.72 1.39 1.49 2.55* 1.62 1.35 
Ethnicity and religion  
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Scheme  
Wolof 1.57 
Muslim 0.82 
HH size tertile 
HH size2  0.93 
HH size3 (highest) 0.79 
Health of HH 
Disability       1.74* 
Chronic illness  1.01 
Recent illness        2.00** 
Health care access is advantage 
of scheme membership       
Advantage 3.05*** 
Quality of health service providers  
contracted by the scheme       
Some providers satisfactory 5.54*** 
All providers satisfactory 13.92*** 
Household use of traditional medicine in last month 
Traditional medicine 1.21 
Nearest health care provider  
<= 2km  2.25** 
Notes: *P<0.10; **P<0.05; ***P<0.01. 
Dependent variable: membership of CBHI (member = 1; ex-member = 0) 
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Table 4.6: Odds ratios for insurance drop out, part 2 
Scheme 
        
Scheme2: Ndondol 0.26*** 0.41*** 0.38** 0.23*** 0.42** 0.42** 0.45** 0.44** 0.41*** 0.40** 0.53 
Scheme3: WAW 0.57 0.68 0.48* 0.41** 0.59 0.64 0.69 0.73 0.67 0.6 0.52 
Demographic characteristics 
       
Age2 0.82 0.76 0.51* 0.51 0.72 0.69 0.66 0.68 0.71 0.66 0.87 
Age3 1.1 0.98 1.04 1.08 0.9 0.87 0.88 0.95 1 1.09 1.08 
Age4 0.41** 0.50* 0.48* 0.39** 0.48* 0.42** 0.45** 0.50* 0.51* 0.48* 0.83 
Age5 (highest) 0.28*** 0.31*** 0.29*** 0.25*** 0.31*** 0.34*** 0.31*** 0.33*** 0.30*** 0.31*** 0.42* 
Male 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.8 0.74 0.74 0.84 0.8 0.8 0.67 0.64 
Education 
           
Literate 0.8 0.83 0.7 0.55 0.76 0.84 0.82 0.91 0.81 0.78 1.05 
Primary 0.77 1.18 1.43 1.17 1.15 1.12 1.09 1.19 1.09 1.16 0.87 
Secondary or higher 1.04 0.83 0.75 0.78 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.92 0.77 0.65 0.81 
Household expenditure quintile 
       
Ex q2 1.03 1 0.91 0.79 1.11 1.02 1.04 0.91 0.95 0.86 1.33 
Ex q3 0.57 0.66 0.72 0.58 0.79 0.74 0.78 0.7 0.76 0.6 0.97 
Ex q4 0.41* 0.64 0.69 0.58 0.76 0.61 0.61 0.58 0.62 0.55 1.06 
Ex q5 (highest) 1.13 1.38 1.41 1.06 1.90 1.47 1.51 1.37 1.35 1.26 1.96 
Household asset quintile 
         
Ass q2 0.94 1.02 1.26 1.41 1.04 0.99 0.95 0.97 0.86 0.98 1.11 
Ass q3 1.24 1.03 1.11 0.83 1 1.03 1.15 1.15 0.96 1.13 1.01 
Ass q4 2 1.33 1.37 1.2 1.29 1.32 1.34 1.51 1.31 1.43 1.49 
Ass q5 (highest) 1.5 1.52 1.46 1.47 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.69 1.6 1.66 1.48 
Privileged social relationships 
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Scheme 
        
Yes 1.9 
          
Household membership of community associations 
     
1-5 associations 
 
2.22 
         
>6 associations 
 
7.84*** 
         
Active participation in the scheme 
       
Informal discussions/spontaneously helped (frequently/sometimes/rarely) 2.04**         
Raising awareness / information   2.08**        
General assembly     2.45***       
Voting 
     
2.96*** 
     
Training 
      
3.00*** 
    
Source of information on existence of the scheme 
     
Friend or family 
       
1.70* 
   
Mechanisms of controlling abuse/fraud by scheme staff/members/health  providers 
 
Informed 
        
2.04** 
  
Believe can influence scheme operation 
      
Influence 
         
2.32*** 
 
Trustworthiness of scheme staff / leaders          
Satisfied           4.01*** 
Notes: *P<0.10; **P<0.05; ***P<0.01. 
Dependent variable: membership of CBHI (member = 1; ex-member = 0) 
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Table 4.7: Odds ratios for insurance drop out, part 3 
Scheme  
Scheme2: Ndondol 0.48** 0.40*** 0.41*** 0.39*** 0.41*** 0.45** 0.35*** 0.50** 0.48** 0.41*** 0.46* 
Scheme3: WAW 0.65 0.7 0.65 0.57 0.67 0.58 0.50* 0.68 0.51* 0.6 0.6 
Demographic charactersitcs 
Age2 0.69 0.69 0.64 0.66 0.72 0.76 0.65 0.71 0.59 0.73 0.87 
Age3 1.01 0.99 0.9 1.01 0.98 1.18 0.92 1.05 0.95 1.05 1.07 
Age4 0.50* 0.53* 0.48* 0.54* 0.53* 0.54 0.51* 0.51* 0.55 0.53* 0.69 
Age5 (highest) 0.37** 0.30*** 0.31*** 0.36*** 0.30*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.37** 0.35** 0.38** 0.44* 
Male 0.75 0.81 0.81 0.8 0.78 0.71 0.64 0.77 0.71 0.78 0.68 
Education 
Literate 0.75 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.95 0.71 0.73 0.76 0.87 0.83 0.98 
Primary 1.39 1.12 1.06 1.19 1.12 1.23 1.02 1.36 1.05 1.26 0.87 
Secondary or higher 0.88 0.92 0.88 0.9 0.95 0.76 0.57 0.85 0.97 0.86 0.98 
Household expenditure quintile 
Ex q2 1.01 0.89 0.9 0.97 1.01 1.03 0.89 1 1.22 0.86 1.23 
Ex q3 0.67 0.63 0.64 0.66 0.71 0.8 0.66 0.64 0.82 0.65 0.76 
Ex q4 0.54 0.55 0.56 0.6 0.61 0.86 0.69 0.53 0.89 0.57 0.79 
Ex q5 (highest) 1.47 1.22 1.27 1.47 1.37 1.72 1.51 1.43 2 1.34 1.54 
Household asset quintile 
Ass q2 0.99 0.91 0.94 0.87 0.88 1 0.94 0.94 1.16 0.97 1.35 
Ass q3 0.93 1.1 1.06 1.1 1.06 0.99 1 0.97 1.14 1.1 1.19 
Ass q4 1.29 1.49 1.48 1.43 1.33 1.3 1.21 1.3 1.82 1.64 1.47 
Ass q5 (highest) 1.48 1.62 1.58 1.65 1.5 1.58 1.66 1.55 1.87 1.88 1.67 
Vision on values / solidarity  
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Scheme  
Shared vision with other members 1.05 
Solidarity is advantage of scheme membership 
Advantage 1.4 
Types of cross-subsidisation that should occur in the scheme 
Principal component 1 1.12* 
Principal component 2 1.1 
Scheme should accept diverse members 
Principal component 3 1.06 
Some people excluded from the scheme 
Yes 1.03 
Scheme President/Secretary/Manager/other staff 
Knows   3.53*** 
Knows other members of the scheme 
Few 2.05 
Half or nearly all 7.68*** 
Has characteristics in common with other scheme members 
None  0.38* 
Scheme operation 
Excellent or satisfactory 2.80*** 
Source of money for paying the premium 
Salary / revenue 1.27 
Premium price accessibility 
Satisfied 1.4 
Notes: *P<0.10; **P<0.05; ***P<0.01. 
Dependent variable: membership of CBHI (member = 1; ex-member = 0)
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Table 4.8: Descriptive statistics of study sample 
Variable 
Members 
(%*) 
Ex 
members 
(%*)  
All 
(%*) 
a. Demographic and socioeconomic characteristics 
Age quintile  
Age1 (lowest) 27.52 17.53 23.39 
Age2 23.39 18.83 21.51 
Age3 22.94 18.18 20.97 
Age4 14.68 20.78 17.20 
Age5 (highest) 11.47 24.68 16.94 
Gender 
Male 39.64 50.00 43.88 
Education (%) 
None  49.78 58.44 53.32 
Literate 17.94 16.88 17.51 
Primary 17.94 13.64 16.18 
Secondary or higher 14.35 11.04 13.00 
Household expenditure quintile (%) 
Ex q1 (lowest) 17.70 22.58 19.69 
Ex q2 15.49 14.84 15.22 
Ex q3 18.14 22.58 19.95 
Ex q4 20.80 25.16 22.57 
Ex q5 (highest) 27.88 14.84 22.57 
Household asset quintile (%) 
Ass q1 (lowest) 16.51 18.12 17.17 
Ass q2 15.60 22.15 18.26 
Ass q3 20.64 26.85 23.16 
Ass q4 19.27 15.44 17.71 
Ass q5 (highest) 27.98 17.45 23.71 
Ethnicity and religion  
Wolof 55.95 38.96 49.08 
Muslim 92.95 92.21 92.65 
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Variable 
Members 
(%*) 
Ex 
members 
(%*)  
All 
(%*) 
HH size tertile 
HH size1 (lowest) 34.96 28.39 32.28 
HH size2  29.65 31.61 30.45 
HH size3 (highest) 35.40 40.00 37.27 
b. Health and health service access 
Ill health of HH 
Disability 18.50 16.13 17.54 
Chronic illness  45.37 40.91 43.57 
Recent illness  39.21 24.52 33.25 
Health care access is advantage of scheme membership 
Advantage 93.83 84.52 90.05 
Quality of health service providers contracted by the scheme 
No providers satisfactory 4.52 21.59 9.76 
Some providers satisfactory 19.10 27.27 21.60 
All providers satisfactory 76.38 51.14 68.64 
Household use of traditional medicine in last month 
Traditional medicine 54.63 51.30 53.28 
Nearest health care provider  
<= 2km  86.30 71.43 80.16 
c. Social capital  
Privileged social relations 
Yes 95.31 90.91 93.52 
Household membership of community associations 
0 associations 3.52 9.09 5.77 
1-5 associations 83.26 86.36 84.51 
>6 associations 13.33 4.55 9.71 
d. Active participation in the scheme 
Informal discussions/spontaneously helped 
(frequently/sometimes/rarely)  64.12 47.50 57.24 
Raising awareness / information 61.88 46.61 55.40 
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Variable 
Members 
(%*) 
Ex 
members 
(%*)  
All 
(%*) 
General assembly 48.85 32.24 42.00 
Voting 26.76 14.00 21.49 
Training 20.28 8.05 15.24 
e. Intermediary outcomes of active participation 
Source of information on existence of the scheme 
Friend or family 22.83 13.07 18.82 
Mechanisms of controlling abuse/fraud by scheme staff/members/health  providers 
Informed 30.67 21.29 26.84 
Believe can influence scheme operation 
Influence 46.85 28.77 39.67 
Trustworthiness of scheme staff / leaders 
Satisfied 68.21 36.96 58.19 
Vision on values / solidarity  
Shared vision with other members 43.44 43.18 43.34 
Solidarity is advantage of scheme membership 
Advantage 35.68 31.61 34.03 
Types of cross-subsidisation that should occur in the scheme 
Principal component 1 0.29 -0.18 0.00 
Principal component 2 0.08 0.01 0.00 
Scheme should accept diverse members 
Principal component 3 0.17 0.04 0.00 
Some people excluded from the scheme 
Yes 9.82 11.04 10.32 
Scheme President/Secretary/Manager/other staff 
Knows   82.06 59.87 73.07 
Knows other members of the scheme 
None  5.29 14.84 9.16 
Few 54.63 67.10 59.69 
Half or nearly all 40.09 18.06 31.15 
Has characteristics in common with other scheme members 
  139 
Variable 
Members 
(%*) 
Ex 
members 
(%*)  
All 
(%*) 
None  3.62 7.58 5.10 
f. Other CBHI variables 
Scheme  
Scheme1: Soppante 40.53 29.68 36.13 
Scheme2: Ndondol 23.79 41.29 30.89 
Scheme3: WAW 35.68 29.03 32.98 
Scheme operation 
Excellent or satisfactory 79.82 60.14 72.13 
Source of money for paying the premium 
Salary / revenue 78.32 65.97 73.51 
Premium price accessibility 
Satisfied 40.51 34.78 38.68 
Totals 227 155 382 
The correlation between the health and health service variables and scheme 
membership was more pronounced. Member households were twice as likely to have 
had an illness, accident or injury, and nearly twice as likely to have a disability, than 
ex-member households, pointing to adverse selection. They were more than twice as 
likely to be situated closer to a health service provider. They were three times more 
likely to report that health care access is an advantage of membership and had a 
much higher probability of reporting that the quality of health service providers was 
satisfactory. All these variables have significant odds ratios, with quality of care 
being the strongest in the study. Three quarters of members felt that the quality of 
care of all the providers contracted by the scheme was satisfactory, compared to half 
of ex-members.   
Rates of active participation ranged between 8% and 48% for ex-members and 20% 
and 65% for members.  Members were statistically significantly twice as likely or 
more to: have had informal discussions about and/or ever spontaneously helped the 
scheme; participated in raising awareness and/or information dissemination; voted in 
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scheme elections; attended a general assembly; and received training. The latter 
variable had the highest odds ratio.  
Source of information on existence of the scheme was significantly correlated with 
scheme status, with members being more likely than ex-members to have heard of 
the scheme from a family member or friend compared to another source. 
All the odds ratios for the following variables measuring perceptions or knowledge 
of scheme management were greater than two and significant, with members being 
more likely than ex-members to: rate the operation of the scheme as excellent or 
satisfactory; be satisfied with the trustworthiness of scheme management and/or 
president; think they could influence scheme operation; be informed of mechanisms 
of controlling abuse and/or fraud by scheme staff, members and/or health providers; 
and know the scheme President, Secretary, Manager and/or another staff member. 
The biggest difference was in the trust variable; while nearly 70% of scheme 
members reported that the scheme managers or leaders were trustworthy, only 
around one third of ex-members did so.  
Less than half of the sample reported that they share a vision on values and/or 
solidarity with other members of the scheme, and only one third believed that 
solidarity is advantage of CBHI membership. The odds ratios for these two variables 
were not statistically significant. Principal component 1 was statistically significant, 
with members being more likely to have more solidarity than ex-members. The 
highest scores (0.45 - 0.40) in the PCA (principal component analysis) were for 
agreement with the following three statements (in order of their scores): members of 
the scheme should sponsor families who are very poor; members should support 
families who are very poor by increasing the amount of their contribution; and 
families who are very poor should be members of the scheme without paying. The 
next highest scores (0.35 - 0.31) were for: the scheme should merge with other CBHI 
schemes in the region; families who do not have the means to contribute must be 
supported by the government; it is acceptable that the beneficiaries of the scheme 
who become ill benefit more from the services of the scheme. The lowest score 
(0.29) was for: it is acceptable for someone to pay the CBHI premium even though 
s/he has not yet benefited from the services offered by the scheme. Only around 10% 
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of the sample reported believing that some people are excluded from the scheme; 
there was almost no difference between members and ex-members. Members were 
nearly seven times more likely to know half or nearly all the other members of the 
scheme than ex-members. Furthermore, they were less likely than ex-members to 
report having nothing in common with the other members of the scheme.  
The results suggest that members may have higher levels of social capital than ex-
members, as ceteris paribus their households were nearly eight times more likely to 
belong to six or more community associations other than CBHI than ex-members.  
The scheme 2 dummy variable is significant in almost all of the regressions. 
However, this is an artefact of the sampling procedure (the proportion of ex-members 
sampled in scheme 2 is much higher than in the other two schemes) and does not 
reflect the real level of drop-out which is lower in scheme 2 than in scheme 1 (Table 
4.2).  
4.4 Discussion 
All five variables measuring active community participation are negatively correlated 
with drop-out. Interestingly, the more active the mode of participation, the stronger 
was the correlation.  As discussed, researchers and policymakers have hypothesised 
that information, accountability, trust and solidarity would increase enrolment in 
CBHI. The results to some extent support this view as perceived trustworthiness of 
scheme management / president; accountability and being informed of mechanisms 
of controlling abuse/fraud are all correlated with remaining in the scheme. The result 
that members were more likely than non-members to hear about the CBHI scheme 
from a family member or friend also seems to support the hypothesis that high levels 
of trust promote population coverage, presuming that family and friends were the 
most trusted source of information. However solidarity does not, on the whole, seem 
to affect drop-out.  
These results suggest that schemes may be able to reduce drop-out by creating more 
opportunities for more active participation. Caution is needed, however, in attributing 
the direction of causality; it is possible that people never actively participated in the 
CBHI schemes because they had dropped out of the schemes rather than vice versa. 
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The significance of the results for the possible intermediary outcomes of active 
participation such as trust, information and accountability suggest this is not the case. 
It would make little sense, for example, that a person did not trust the scheme leaders 
when they were a member of the scheme, because they had dropped out of the 
scheme. 
Arguably, the two variables which conceptually link all the active participation 
variables are knowing the scheme leaders/staff and knowing other scheme members. 
It is possible that through active participation, members of CBHI developed personal 
relationships with the scheme leaders, staff and with each other, thereby increasing 
their access to information and trust in the scheme and ultimately reducing the 
likelihood of dropping out. As such, it could be argued that active community 
participation in CBHI may increase levels of social capital of CBHI members and 
that this may in-turn reduce the likelihood of drop-out.  
Quality of health services was identified as the most important determinant of drop-
out, as in previous studies (Dong et al. 2009, Criel and Waelkens 2003). It is possible 
that the participatory dynamic in CBHI empowered members to successfully demand 
good quality care, as proposed in other literature on CBHI  (Michielsen et al. 2011, 
Criel et al. 2005, Schneider 2005, Waelkens and Criel 2007).  
Overall, the results suggest that active community participation does take place in 
CBHI and that it may reduce drop out. This may be because active participation 
increases (a) trust, information and accountability, through increased social capital 
and (b) quality of care through increased empowerment. However, more research is 
needed to explore these causal pathways. While this is ostensibly good news for 
proponents of active community participation in CBHI it also raises concerns. The 
majority of people who dropped out of CBHI did not take up opportunities to 
actively participate, did not trust the scheme staff or leaders, felt they were not able 
to hold the CBHI scheme to account, did not know many other members and did not 
believe that CBHI promotes solidarity. Given the high drop-out rates from CBHI 
(Table 4.3), this suggests that active participation only benefited a small minority of 
people who enrolled in CBHI.  
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It is not clear why ex-members of CBHI did not actively participate in CBHI when 
they were members; further research would be needed to understand this. One 
possible explanation comes from the community participation literature which argues 
that participatory development may obscure local power differences by uncritically 
celebrating “the community” (Williams 2004). It is argued that projects promoting 
community participation are often initiated by international development agencies 
which fail to take into account local power relationships and instead accept 
inequalities as social norms. Because of this, if uncritically applied, participatory 
community programmes can inadvertently exacerbate disadvantage (Kothari 2001). 
This critique may be relevant to CBHI which has typically been introduced with the 
support of international development agencies (Criel and Van Dormael 1999). It is 
possible that CBHI has been uncritically introduced in the Senegalese context in a 
manner which inadvertently prevents some less empowered social groups from 
actively participating. While there do not seem to be inequalities in wealth between 
members and ex-members, the results on social capital (measured by membership of 
other community associations) suggest that there may be other social inequalities at 
play. A possible explanation may be that if CBHI schemes have very limited funds to 
support active community participation, only some members of CBHI are likely to be 
successful in accessing these resources. These individuals are likely to be those who 
already have higher levels of social capital or who are already more empowered. 
This interpretation is supported by Bourdieu’s theory (Bourdieu 1986) that people 
who already hold forms of capital (economic, social, cultural and/or symbolic) are 
strategically adept at accumulating and transforming it (he argued that these types of 
capital are fungible). It also echoes the findings of an extensive literature review of 
studies on participatory development and decentralization which finds that 
participants in civic activities tend to be wealthier, more educated, of higher social 
status (by caste and ethnicity), male, and more politically connected than 
nonparticipants (Mansuri and Rao 2013). The authors suggest the reason for this may 
be that resource allocation processes of organisations inducing participation typically 
reflect the preferences of elite groups.  
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Limitations  
The study has important limitations. Firstly, as it is an exploratory study, it covers a 
small number of schemes and the sample size is small. The study would merit from 
being repeated on a larger scale. Furthermore, the study is limited to schemes with 
high levels of drop-out. Further comparative research analysing schemes with low 
levels of drop-out would be useful for drawing lessons at the scheme level. Another 
limitation is that due to the cross-sectional and non-experimental study design, it is 
difficult to attribute causality. It is also difficult to attribute the direction of causality, 
as already discussed. These issues could be addressed with further qualitative 
research investigating members’ and ex-members’ views of participation and drop-
out. Qualitative research could also have been useful for informing the content of the 
questionnaire. Indeed, because intended beneficiaries were not involved in 
developing the questionnaire, it is possible there is a researchers' bias. Finally, 
because of the sampling procedure, it is not possible to determine the rate of active 
participation in the schemes.  
4.5 Conclusions 
This study contributes to the literature on CBHI by providing a conceptual 
framework of passive and active community participation which is relevant to 
understanding drop out from CBHI. The results suggest that there may be many 
potential benefits of active community participation in CBHI. These include 
increased trust, information flow and accountability, increased population coverage 
due to fewer households dropping out of CBHI, increased social capital of CBHI 
members and increased empowerment of CBHI patients when accessing health care. 
However, it is also possible that people with already high levels of social capital 
benefit more from the participatory dynamic, meaning that CBHI inadvertently 
exacerbates inequalities in communities and in health coverage. One possible way of 
addressing this would be to target participatory activities to members with less social 
capital, although this is likely to be a challenging task as it implies overturning 
established social inequalities and hierarchies.  This in turn suggests that alternative 
or complementary financing policies are needed to target vulnerable groups. 
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Chapter 5 The impact of stakeholder values and power relations on 
community-based health insurance coverage: qualitative 
evidence from three Senegalese case studies20  
Abstract  
Continued low rates of enrolment in community based health insurance (CBHI) 
suggest that in many countries strategies proposed for scaling up are unsuccessfully 
implemented or inadequately address underlying limitations of CBHI. One reason 
may be a lack of systematic incorporation of social and political context into CBHI 
policy. In this study, the hypothesis is proposed that values and power relations 
inherent in social networks of CBHI stakeholders can explain levels of CBHI 
coverage. To test this, three case studies constituting Senegalese CBHI schemes were 
selected using specific criteria and studied. Transcripts of interviews with 64 CBHI 
stakeholders were analysed using inductive coding. The five most important themes 
pertaining to social values and power relations were voluntarism, trust, solidarity, 
political engagement and social movements. Analysis of these themes raises a 
number of policy and implementation challenges for expanding CBHI coverage, 
several of which have previously been overlooked. First is the need for subsidies to 
remunerate CBHI scheme staff while retaining the potential benefits of voluntarism 
and avoiding pitfalls such as inadequacy of the salary and lack of sustainability of the 
source of funding. Second, there is also a need to develop more sustainable internal 
and external governance structures through CBHI and NGO federations. Third is 
reforming CBHI so that it becomes a coherent solidarity mechanism which both 
provides financial protection and resonates with local values concerning four 
dimensions of solidarity (health risk, vertical equity, scale and source). Fourth is the 
need for increased transparency in policy. Fifth is the need for CBHI schemes to 
increase their negotiating power vis-à-vis more powerful stakeholders who control 
the resources needed for expanding CBHI coverage through, for example, 
engagement of CBHI scheme leaders in local politics; federation of CBHI schemes 
                                                 
20
 A version of this paper is currently under review in the peer-reviewed journal Health Policy and 
Planning (“revise and resubmit” stage) as: Mladovsky, P. Ndiaye, P. Ndiaye A., and Criel., B. The 
impact of stakeholder values and power relations on community-based health insurance coverage: 
qualitative evidence from three Senegalese case studies.  
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with political NGOs; and a social movement dynamic based on shared values. 
Systematically addressing all these challenges would represent a fundamental reform 
of the current CBHI model promoted in Senegal and in Africa more widely. From a 
theoretical perspective, the results suggest that studying values and power relations 
among stakeholders in multiple case studies is a useful complement to traditional 
health systems analysis.  
5.1 Introduction 
Community-based health insurance (CBHI) aims to provide financial protection from 
the cost of seeking health care through prepayment by community members.  It is 
typically not-for-profit and aims to be community owned and controlled (Hsiao 
2001). In most low and middle-income countries (LMIC), population coverage of 
CBHI remains low (Soors et al. 2010). Health systems literature (Mills et al. 2012, 
Ndiaye, Soors, and Criel 2007, Soors et al. 2010) identifies inequitable population 
coverage, adverse selection and inadequate supply of health services and insurance 
as the main obstacles to scaling up CBHI. The literature proposes the following 
strategies to address these obstacles: public funding to subsidise premiums for the 
poor; promoting increased revenue collection from the “healthy and wealthy” so as 
to enhance cross-subsidisation and risk pooling; improved CBHI management; and 
improved purchasing to enhance quality of care. Yet continued low rates of CBHI 
enrolment suggest that proposed strategies for scaling up CBHI may not have been 
successfully implemented or may inadequately address the limitations of CBHI. It 
has been argued by Mladovsky and Mossialos (2008) that one underlying reason for 
this may be a lack of systematic incorporation of social and political context into 
CBHI policy analysis. 
CBHI schemes typically have relationships with one or more of the following 
stakeholder institutions: health service providers, governments, international 
organizations, donors and NGOs. A further set of institutional relationships may exist 
among CBHI schemes through reinsurance (the transfer of liability from a primary 
insurer to another insurer (Dror 2001)), federations and umbrella organizations. 
Finally, there are relationships between staff and the population covered by the 
scheme. In the CBHI literature these relationships are typically analysed from a 
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“health systems” perspective which traditionally focuses on financial, regulatory and 
legal arrangements between the various stakeholders (World Health Organization 
2000). For example, relationships between CBHI schemes and health service 
providers are analysed as a set of contractual transactions designed to promote 
efficiency and quality of care through strategic purchasing (Bennett 2004, Criel et al. 
2004, ILO 2002), while relationships among CBHI schemes are seen as a way of 
increasing risk pooling (Davies and Carrin 2001, Dror 2001, Schneider et al. 2001) 
or collectively contracting hospitals (Waelkens and Criel 2007).  
However, a few studies have employed sociological perspectives to analyse the 
impact of stakeholder relationships on CBHI. For example, an overview of CBHI in 
India found that “nesting” CBHI schemes in broader local development programmes 
gives schemes credibility, inspiring trust in the target population (Devadasan et al. 
2006). Other studies point to the potential empowerment of patients through 
membership of CBHI schemes, which is thought to increase choice, accountability 
and negotiation and thereby improve quality of care (Michielsen et al. 2011, Criel et 
al. 2005). Drawing on such examples, a review of the CBHI literature conducted by 
Mladovsky and Mossialos (2008) has analysed CBHI through the lens of social 
capital theory (Woolcock 1998) to develop a conceptual framework for 
understanding  why in most low-income countries CBHI schemes have not achieved 
sustainable and significant levels of coverage. They argue that unlike the traditional 
health systems perspective based on a behavioural model of rational utility 
maximizing homo economicus, analysing health systems through the lens of social 
capital theory permits the systematic incorporation of social context into policy. This 
echoes a wider call for the greater incorporation of social science perspectives into 
health policy and systems research (Gilson et al. 2011). Following Mladovsky and 
Mossialos, in this study the hypothesis is proposed that studying values and power 
relations inherent in the social networks21 of CBHI stakeholders can explain the 
limitations of CBHI  as a mechanism for increasing coverage, in terms of enrolment 
(population coverage) and the benefit package offered (the scope of coverage) 
                                                 
21
 As in the social capital literature, the term “social network” is used here to encompass a broad set of 
social relations at micro and macro-levels including: intra-community ties; extra-community 
networks; relations between community and institutional actors; and relations among actors within 
institutions (Woolcock 1998). 
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(World Health Organization 2010). Specifically, the following research question is 
addressed: can local stakeholder values and power relations help explain low levels 
of CBHI coverage?  
Three Senegalese CBHI schemes are analysed. Senegal’s health system operates 
according to the principle of cost recovery through user charges. Private expenditure 
on health as a percentage of total health expenditure is 41.7 and 78.5% of that is 
spent directly out-of-pocket (World Health Organization 2013). In order to increase 
financial protection from the risk of ill health, a policy of exemptions from user 
charges for certain vulnerable population groups and priority services is in place 
(MSAS 2007), but these initiatives are experiencing difficulties with implementation 
(Soors 2010). Additionally, since 1997 successive governments have viewed CBHI 
as a key mechanism for achieving universal coverage (Ministère de la Santé 2004, 
2012). Senegal has witnessed a rapid increase in the number of CBHI schemes 
(termed “mutuelles de santé” in Francophone countries), reaching around 139 
between 1997 and 2004 (Hygea 2004). However,  coverage in Senegal remains low, 
with 4% or less of the population enrolled in CBHI (Soors et al. 2010). There is 
therefore an urgent need to better understand the barriers to expanding CBHI.  
5.2 Methods 
A multiple case study design was used. Yin, (1994) argues that “replication” across 
multiple case studies can help the researcher to generalise the results of the study. 
Replication occurs when multiple cases produce similar results, or when there are 
contrasting results across more than one case for reasons which are predicted by the 
theory being tested. Three Senegalese regions (out of 12) were selected for inclusion 
in the study: Thiès, Diourbel and Dakar. This ensured the inclusion of a range of 
geographic contexts and three regional federations of CBHI in the study. The three 
regions had a relatively high number of CBHI schemes (Table 5.1), meaning the 
study focused on contexts where CBHI was at a relatively advanced stage and a 
diverse set of social networks between various stakeholders had had the opportunity 
to develop.   
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Table 5.1: Number of CBHI schemes in Senegal by region 
Region CBHI schemes in 2003 
Dakar   44 
Thiès 39 
Kaolack 11 
Diourbel 10 
St Louis 9 
Louga 8 
Ziguinchor 8 
Tambacounda 5 
Fatick 4 
Kolda 1 
Sénégal total 139 
Source: (Ministère de la Santé 2004) 
Note: Figures include complementary voluntary private health insurance companies and CBHI 
schemes 
In each of the three regions, one case study (CBHI scheme) was selected.  Local 
documentation and knowledge of local experts were used to identify the three cases 
according to a set of key criteria (Box 5.1). All three schemes had a high level of 
drop-out. Drop-out from CBHI is not only a major obstacle to increasing population 
coverage in Senegal but also elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa (De Allegri et al. 
2009). Soppante, Ndondol and Wer Ak Werle (WAW) were the three schemes 
selected (Table 5.2). 
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Box 5.1: Case study selection criteria 
CBHI schemes which varied according to the following contextual 
characteristics were selected: 
• Geographic zone 
• The type of economic sector of the target population  
Further selection focused on the level of development of CBHI schemes. Only 
CBHI schemes which met the following core criteria were considered: 
• The CBHI schemes had enrolled a greater than average number of 
households (the average number of households enrolled in a CBHI 
scheme was 329 (Hygea 2004)) (this affected population coverage). In 
Senegal, enrolment in CBHI is typically on a household basis. A 
representative of the household enrols in the CBHI scheme and 
purchases a membership card on which a certain number (typically up to 
12) other household members may be registered. The premium is then 
paid monthly.  
• The schemes had a relatively high proportion of members who had 
ceased paying the monthly premium and whose insurance policy had 
therefore expired (the national average rate was 47% in 2004 (Hygea 
2004)) (this also affected population coverage) 
• The CBHI schemes were currently operational and had been established 
for a minimum of eight years  
• Variation in the tier of the health system contracted by the scheme (the 
affected the scope of coverage, i.e. the benefit package) 
The rationale for selecting schemes with high drop-out was to focus on contexts 
where there was potentially the most to gain from a policy intervention. At the 
same time, only schemes which had achieved a basic measure of success 
(relatively high enrolment and duration) were included, in order to control for 
the possibility that low coverage was mainly due to fundamental supply-side 
failures necessitating closure of the schemes. 
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Table 5.2: Characteristics of the selected cases 
 Scheme characteristics Context 
Name of 
CBHI 
scheme  
Number of 
households 
ever enrolled 
Number of households 
currently enrolled (and 
proportion of members 
whose policy had 
expired) 
Year of scheme 
commencement 
Tier of services 
contracted by 
the scheme 
Region Geographic 
zone 
Characteristics of the 
population targeted 
by the scheme 
Soppante 
 
986 197 (80%) 1997 Health post  
Hospital 
Thiès Mostly rural  Formal and informal 
sectors 
Ndondol 
 
464  135 (71%) 2001 Health post 
Health hut 
Maternal and 
child health 
centre 
Diourbel Rural  
Informal agricultural 
sector 
Wer Ak 
Werle 
(WAW) 
 
678  278 (59%) 2000 Health post 
Health centre 
Pharmacy 
Dakar Urban  
Predominantly 
informal sector, female 
petty traders 
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Fieldwork was conducted from March to August 2009. Stakeholders were identified 
using purposive snowball sampling, an approach where stakeholders help identify 
other stakeholders (Miles and Huberman 1994). In the study, stakeholders were 
defined as individuals who affected or could affect the CBHI scheme.  Sample size 
was determined by the data obtained and data collection continued until saturation. 
The interviews were conducted primarily by two of the authors and were of a 
focused, open-ended type. A short topic guide was used which focused on the 
following themes: personal professional history, knowledge of the scheme, 
relationship with the scheme, participation in the scheme, perceptions of the scheme 
and other stakeholders and relevance of the scheme to local health sector priorities. 
The topic guide is provided in Appendix 4. Sixty-four interviews were conducted in 
total (Table 5.3). Each interview lasted one hour on average.  
The stakeholder interviews were conducted as part of a broader study which 
investigated the relationship between social capital and CBHI coverage and included 
a household survey, semi-structured interviews and focus groups with members and 
non-members of the CBHI schemes.  
Table 5.3: Stakeholders interviewed 
  Number of individuals 
interviewed 
Type of stakeholder Soppante Ndondol WAW 
Health service providers 8 4 3 
Staff of the CBHI scheme 4 6 4 
Local leaders (religious, traditional, political, 
associations, local NGOS) 
3 10 8 
Donors, international organizations 5 4 5 
Total 20 24 20 
All interviews were recorded and transcribed using verbatim transcription. Inductive 
coding (Glaser 1967) was performed in Nvivo8. Segments of interview text were 
coded by one author. As new codes emerged all transcripts that had been previously 
coded were read again and the new code added where appropriate. Parent and child 
codes were linked using tree nodes. During the coding process, periodic meetings 
were held between all the authors to review codes. Towards the end of the process, 
  153 
no new codes were added, at which point it was concluded that all major themes had 
been identified Stakeholder validation was performed to check the credibility of the 
findings by presenting preliminary results to approximately 50 representatives of 
national and local Senegalese CBHI stakeholders, including representatives of the 
schemes studied and the Ministry of Health (MoH), in Dakar in March 2011. The 
interviews, coding and stakeholder validation were conducted in French. Translation 
of quotations into English was done for the purpose of this paper. Ethical approval 
for the research was obtained from the Senegalese MoH.   
5.3 Results 
A total of 12 parent codes incorporating 84 child codes were identified in the coding 
analysis. A list of the parent and child codes is provided in Appendix 5. Results 
pertaining to the five most important (discussed by the greatest number of 
interviewees and mentioned the most times) codes as regards social values and 
power relations were selected for further analysis in this paper. Three codes pertain 
to social values: voluntarism, trust and solidarity. Two pertain to power relations: 
political engagement and social movements. The selected codes are hereafter termed 
“themes”. Under each theme, results are divided into those which are similar for all 
three schemes (described as “common features”) and those which are different across 
the three schemes (discussed scheme by scheme). Quotations are presented in boxes 
2 to 5. The interviewee identifiers indicate which scheme and stakeholder the 
quotation derives from (S = Soppante, N = Ndondol, W = Wer Ak Werle (WAW)). 
Theme 1: Voluntarism 
Common features  
Each scheme was staffed by a President and Treasurer and two schemes also had a 
Secretary; these individuals are referred to hereafter as the “leaders” of the CBHI 
schemes.  Additionally, all the schemes had field staff who collected premiums 
and/or disseminated information about CBHI. CBHI staff worked on a voluntary 
basis and received no salaries. Field staff received small honoraria, but the leaders 
did not. Voluntarism had the advantage of maintaining low overheads which helped 
prevent increases in the premium price. Voluntarism was therefore seen by many 
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stakeholders as a means of reducing poverty and contributing to local development 
(Box 5.2, W3). There were also acknowledged benefits which accrued to individuals 
who volunteered in CBHI, such as training and per diems.  
A major limitation of voluntarism was that the staff members did not have the time to 
perform essential tasks, since due to their need to generate an income for their 
families they typically held one or more additional paid jobs. Often, they were also 
engaged in other types of voluntary work.  Furthermore, staff were expected to use 
their own resources for transportation to collect premiums, deliver the money to the 
central CBHI fund and conduct marketing. All this resulted in poor scheme 
management, indicated by irregular collection of premiums by field staff leading to 
delays in premium payment, a lack of community participation and a lack of time to 
manage the scheme among the leaders (Box 5.2, S15). This was seen to be a cause of 
high drop-out. However, the staff were difficult to replace due to the lack of other 
people in the community with the necessary skills (Box 5.2, W7). The combination 
of inadequate human and physical resources meant that people in the target 
population often complained that they did not feel the presence of the CBHI scheme 
in their community (Box 5.2, N21).  
Soppante 
Soppante’s scheme leaders were considered local and national experts in CBHI and 
were often called upon to provide technical assistance to other CBHI schemes. This 
left very little time for management of Soppante.  Despite this, no replacement 
leaders had been recruited. This led some stakeholders to comment that the scheme 
was over reliant on the two leaders (Box 5.2, S17). Furthermore, Soppante covered 
the largest geographic zone of the three case studies, making premium collection 
particularly challenging for field staff. No innovative approaches to overcoming the 
limitations of voluntarism had been developed.  
Ndondol 
In Ndondol, the geographic zone covered by the CBHI scheme was highly rural and 
sparsely populated, making premium collection difficult. The leaders had attempted 
to overcome some of the limitations of voluntarism by giving people the option of 
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paying premiums directly to the Treasurer of the scheme in his shop which was 
located in the principal village of the district. However, this meant that in many 
villages field staff no longer collected premiums, resulting in minimal contact 
between the scheme and the community.  
WAW 
WAW, an urban CBHI scheme, had developed the most innovative approach to 
premium collection. The scheme had enrolled a large number of women from a local 
women’s microfinance and income generation association and the collection of 
premiums from these members had been decentralised to groups known as “GMS”. 
Thus, in the GMS groups, field staff collected premiums from women they regularly 
worked and socialised with.  
Box 5.2: Selected stakeholder quotations on voluntarism in CBHI 
W3: In CBHI there are no salaries. The staff believe in what they are doing: 
supporting the development of our community. (Leader of a local dahira 
(Muslim prayer group)) 
S15: People are often late paying their contributions because, they say, the area 
manager (field staff) no longer comes around to collect their money ... Later on 
the area manager told me that the work she did was voluntary and she no 
longer had the time... (Local nurse) 
W7: ... I can’t resign without training another person to continue with the job... 
and the technical management of the scheme is difficult. (CBHI staff member) 
N21: If the leaders of the scheme had done what they are supposed to do, that 
is, come and talk to people, educate them, I could tell you that things had 
started here ... but there has been no action. (Local community leader) 
S17: Unfortunately (Soppante) rests on the shoulders of two people... although 
their shoulders are strong, this creates problems for such a large scheme. There 
is some delegation to management committees… but not much coordination. 
(International donor) 
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Theme 2: Trust 
Common features  
Trust in CBHI staff was seen by most stakeholders as an important prerequisite for 
enrolment into CBHI. Previous negative experiences of theft of communal funds in 
the context of CBHI and other development projects meant that recruiting staff who 
would be trusted by the target population was viewed to be crucial. Several 
stakeholders expressed the view that CBHI schemes and their leaders should be more 
systematic about using the trust inherent in existing social networks to enrol 
members, particularly by integrating CBHI schemes into existing community 
associations. Several stakeholders also highlighted the importance of creating new 
mechanisms to create trust, for example by communicating regularly with the target 
population through local CBHI meetings. 
Linking the themes of trust and voluntarism, a former scheme leader held the view 
that working without a salary in CBHI helped win the trust of the population (Box 
5.3, W11a). Trust between the CBHI scheme leaders and health service providers 
was also often referred to as important to scheme success, particularly in terms of 
contracting (this is explored in more detail in Theme 5). Some health service 
providers were reported to have doubts about the robustness of CBHI management, 
particularly in terms of maintaining solvency and paying bills. This meant that CBHI 
scheme leaders needed to gain the trust of hospital directors and managers who 
ultimately decided whether or not to sign contracts with CBHI schemes (see also 
Theme 5). A trusting relationship was seen by some to promote a degree of 
flexibility in the billing system which meant that delays in payment from the scheme 
to the provider were tolerated (Box 5.3, S7). This was viewed to be crucial so that 
scheme members would not be charged the full fee for their treatment if the scheme 
had an outstanding debt with the provider. This in turn was thought to help increase 
retention of members (i.e. prevent drop-out from the scheme).  
Soppante 
According to some stakeholders, certain individuals characterised by social 
structures such as particular lineages, kinship groups and castes were traditionally 
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considered by local people as being highly trustworthy. According to a stakeholder 
the leaders of Soppante had this trusted social status which helped them to recruit 
members into the CBHI scheme (Box 5.3, S20).  
Soppante was the only scheme studied to have made contracts with hospitals. The 
scheme had achieved a trusting relationship with the managers of the regional public 
hospital, which in turn had assisted in the successful negotiation of a contract (see 
Theme 5 for more details).  
Ndondol 
The Ndondol scheme was launched with the support of local Christian missionaries 
who were trusted by the (mostly Muslim) population (Box 5.3, N15). As mentioned, 
the Treasurer was a shopkeeper; he was well-known and highly trusted by people in 
all the villages in Ndondol district. 
WAW 
Through the development of the women’s GMS groups (see above), the leaders of 
WAW had managed to systematically recruit field staff who were likely to be trusted 
by the population, due to the strong prior bonds of trust between the women (Box 
5.3, W14). The previous President of WAW was also a member of the women’s 
GMS groups. Trust in her leadership had inspired many women to enrol in WAW. 
However, several stakeholders observed that when she retired, many women dropped 
out of the CBHI scheme (Box 5.3, W11b).  
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Box 5.3: Selected stakeholder quotations on trust in CBHI 
W11a: I have volunteered all my life ... you have to sacrifice yourself so that 
people trust you. (Former CBHI scheme leader and leader of local women’s 
groups) 
S7: ...there may be some delay (in payment from the scheme) ... Me, I can 
tolerate that, but others may not. They will immediately say, either you pay by 
such a date, or I leave and any member of the scheme who comes will not be 
treated (at the reduced rate under the contractual agreement) (Head of a nurse-
led primary care post) 
S20: ...there are certain types of people who are trusted. A community that is 
trusted is located in (name of village) ... People from that community have a 
social advantage. That's what makes people trust (the treasurer who comes 
from this community). (Provider of technical assistance to CBHI schemes) 
N15: ... initially it was the Church that managed the money. We told ourselves, 
“these are people of the Church; they will not steal the money”. (Local NGO 
worker) 
W14: There are no thefts because we know each other very well, we live 
together ... you wouldn’t harm your colleague because you know she has the 
same problems as you. (Local female GMS group leader) 
W11b: people trust me… so when I take the lead on something (like CBHI) 
many people enrol and say “…she we will not steal our money”… but they tell 
me that since I retired, the scheme doesn’t work anymore. (Former CBHI 
scheme leader and leader of local women’s groups) 
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Theme 3: Solidarity 
Common features 
Most stakeholders in all three cases viewed the cross-subsidisation of resources from 
healthy to sick people to be not only a form of risk pooling but also an expression of 
solidarity (Box 5.4, S3). Several stakeholders said this solidarity contributed to 
fighting poverty and promoting community development. Many stakeholders viewed 
CBHI to be part of a wider social structure which promoted solidarity through local 
community associations (Box 5.4, N4). As such, a lack of solidarity was viewed by 
some stakeholders as the main reason for households dropping out of or failing to 
enrol in CBHI (Box 5.4, W8a). An alternative explanation that poverty was the main 
reason for drop-out and lack of enrolment, frequently put forward by households in 
the target population, was rejected by several stakeholders. These stakeholders 
argued that the CBHI premium was affordable and noted that poverty did not prevent 
the majority of the population from participating in various regular social events and 
local associations which had far higher fees than CBHI (Box 5.4, W7). Many of 
these stakeholders did, however, concede some very poor households would not be 
able to afford the premium and would need to be subsidised (see Theme 4). 
Soppante 
Soppante was founded by individuals who had previously been leaders of a local 
Catholic CBHI scheme. The Church mandated that only Catholics were eligible for 
membership of the Catholic scheme. The founders of Soppante had objected to the 
Church-based model of CBHI on the grounds that it prevented scaling up solidarity 
in CBHI by incorporating Muslims, who made up the majority of the wider 
population. They therefore left the Catholic scheme in order to create Soppante, 
which was open to all residents of a large geographic zone (Box 5.4, S19).  
Ndondol 
Ndondol did not have a particular strategy for mobilising solidarity in the target 
community. All people residing in the district of Ndondol were eligible for enrolment 
in the scheme.  
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WAW 
As discussed, stakeholders in WAW had mobilised existing solidarity structures by 
integrating the scheme into a women’s association through GMS groups. This was a 
deliberate strategy (Box 5.4, W12). However, a perceived disadvantage of the GMS 
system was that it excluded people who were not in GMS groups from the scheme 
(Box 5.4, W8b). In fact, men and women who were not in GMS groups were eligible 
to enrol in WAW but they had to pay premiums directly to the scheme staff rather 
than through the GMS system. 
Box 5.4: Selected stakeholder quotations on solidarity in CBHI 
S3: You see, it is a symbol of solidarity. Even if you don’t receive health 
services in exchange for your money, somebody else does and that's a huge 
gesture. That's CBHI. (Local field staff member) 
N4: Solidarity is ... rooted in our customs ... There are our women who have 
their groups; we have our dahiras. Now we need to interest people in this other 
form of solidarity, CBHI. (Provider of technical assistance to CBHI schemes) 
W8a: Some people don’t have much solidarity and so they say to themselves, 
“I’m not going to fall ill so why should I continue paying the premium? I am 
just paying for other people” (Local community association leader) 
W7: Some tell me (their lack of enrolment) is because of the (financial) crisis ... 
I don’t follow this, because they often contribute 1000 CFA per week for events, 
ceremonies and other things in the neighbourhood so why not 1000 CFA per 
month (for the CBHI premium)? (CBHI scheme leader) 
S19: The Church CBHI schemes were quite restrictive; they were reserved for 
Catholics… which excludes a large part of the population. This principle is 
contrary to the philosophy CBHI. It is in this context that Soppante was born. 
(Provider of technical assistance to CBHI schemes) 
W12: We experimented with several approaches. We moved from an individual 
prepayment system, to family enrolment in CBHI and over the last four years 
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this has evolved into CBHI based on (women’s’) groups ... When you adopt a 
family model, without realizing it you are breaking solidarity mechanisms at the 
community level. (Provider of technical assistance to CBHI schemes) 
W8b: CBHI...must be there for everyone and not everybody is in a women’s 
group... (Local community association leader) 
Note: 1000 CFA (Central African Franc) is equivalent to around €1.50 
Theme 4: Political engagement 
Common features 
In the three case studies, there were two main types of political engagement in CBHI. 
One type was lobbying local government for subsidies (due to the decentralised 
political system of Senegal, subsidies for CBHI schemes deriving from national 
government were not on the policy agenda). CBHI leaders requested local public 
subsidies to (a) pay salaries to CBHI staff in order to improve scheme management 
and (b) to cover the premiums of the poor in order to prevent drop-out and increase 
enrolment, as some households were perceived to be too poor to pay the CBHI 
premium themselves. In principle, some local politicians were in support of both 
types of subsidies (Box 5.5, W5). However, none of the schemes had been successful 
in obtaining such subsidies. Different stakeholders had different explanations for 
this. A local government official claimed it was because there were insufficient 
funds. However, several (non-governmental) stakeholders believed the real reason 
was rather the lack of political capital to be gained from supporting CBHI (Box 5.5, 
W7). There was also a belief among some stakeholders that the values embodied by 
CBHI (solidarity, trust, voluntarism and poverty alleviation) were not upheld by 
politicians. Another stakeholder expressed the opinion that the government had not 
fully taken responsibility for CBHI (Box 5.5, S22). A few stakeholders argued there 
was a more technical reason for the lack of subsidy, namely the absence of a decree 
to give legal recognition to CBHI schemes.  
In all three case studies, the second type of political engagement constituted CBHI 
leaders running for election as local councillors. They campaigned to raise the 
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priority of health and other development issues on the local political agenda. One 
stakeholder observed that decentralisation of public budgets had led to increased 
competition and interest in these local government posts (Box 5.5, N1). As the local 
elections had not yet taken place at the time of fieldwork, this study cannot report 
whether the CBHI leaders were successful. However, a stakeholder expressed 
concerns about the entry of CBHI leaders into politics, fearing that the CBHI leaders 
would not be strong enough to resist the corrupting influence of political power (Box 
5.5, W12).  
Soppante 
Soppante’s President was running for election as an independent candidate. 
Soppante’s leaders’ rejection of mainstream political parties derived in part from a 
local political power struggle in the early 1990s. At that time, they had been the 
leaders of a Catholic CBHI scheme (see above), which had grown at a rapid rate and 
had attracted the interest of a local politician from a mainstream political party. The 
politician had tried to appropriate control of the scheme in order to use it to mobilise 
popular support in his electoral campaign (Box 5.5, S20). Soppante’s leaders resisted 
the take-over but the experience had left them deeply mistrustful of mainstream 
politics parties.  
Ndondol 
In Ndondol, the CBHI leaders running for elections did so within the structure of 
mainstream political parties.  
WAW 
In WAW there was also a rejection of mainstream parties and the leaders ran for 
office under a new alternative grassroots political party. They said the rationale for 
creating a new party was that local politicians had failed to promote the development 
of their community (Box 5.5, W8). 
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Box 5.5: Selected stakeholder quotations on political engagement in CBHI 
W5: …if there was a partnership (between local government and CBHI schemes), 
these (disadvantaged) people would join the CBHI scheme and we would subsidize 
them… the support could be in form of an annual subsidy, it could also be support 
for certain needs in relation to the CBHI scheme’s functioning. (Local government 
official) 
W7: (political) support of other (associations) is stronger because other associations 
mobilise more people, and politicians like a crowd... (CBHI scheme leader) 
S22: The Ministry of Health has developed a strategy for health insurance. But is 
this really its mission? The other ministries are not interested... and the Ministry of 
Health does not have the resources to implement the strategic plan. (International 
donor) 
N1: Suddenly it’s interesting to be a… mayor, or a councillor, because suddenly 
there is money in vast sums compared to what there was before. So it has become 
very politicised. 
W12: It's very difficult to find someone who is committed to CBHI and stops there. 
Associations are the way to access resources. So a leader who upholds a common 
cause always ends up being eaten by the political system. (Provider of technical 
assistance to CBHI schemes) 
S20: He (the politician) tried to use the CBHI scheme, going as far as to say that 
he’d had the idea to create it, because he wanted to develop his political platform. 
He wanted to bring in changes and put his men in ... If he controlled the scheme, this 
became another political tool...to attract votes. (Provider of technical assistance to 
CBHI schemes) 
W8: political parties, the largest in the country, have… done nothing tangible; 
people who should embody certain values, do not... In order to do something 
concrete, I have had to enter politics, but not party politics, the politics of 
development. (Local youth leader) 
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Theme 5: Social movements  
Common features 
In Soppante and WAW (but not in Ndondol), many stakeholders frequently 
discussed CBHI in the context of social movements. The movements were perceived 
to be founded on the shared values of voluntarism, trust and solidarity described 
above.  
Soppante 
In Soppante, the discourse around social movements focused around the theme of 
mutualism. Many stakeholders in Soppante described themselves as “mutualists” and 
claimed they were part of a “mutualist movement” (Box 5.6, S19). The movement 
included individuals working for the MoH, international donors and NGOs, 
academics, as well as local CBHI scheme leaders including those of Soppante. In the 
late 1990s, the shared values of the mutualists had provided the momentum and 
inspiration for the establishment of a regional union of the 39 CBHI schemes in 
Thiès and an additional structure, the Groupe de Recherche et d’Appui aux Initiatives 
Mutualistes (GRAIM) which delivered technical assistance to CBHI schemes and 
other projects. The leaders of Soppante had been among the founders of the regional 
CBHI union.  
The regional union collected funds from each CBHI scheme to create a deposit 
which was used to guarantee a contract with the regional hospital. An important 
individual in the negotiation of the contract had been a hospital manager who had 
become a member of the mutualist movement and had passionately advocated on 
behalf of the CBHI schemes to the hospital Director (Box 6, S4). However, despite 
these successes, by the time of the fieldwork, several stakeholders were concerned 
that the mutualists’ insularity threatened to stifle CBHI (Box 5.6, S17).  
Ndondol 
In contrast, in Ndondol, only one stakeholder spoke of social movements and the 
term “mutualist” was used infrequently. There was a regional union of CBHI 
schemes in Diourbel but it was deemed ineffective. A stakeholder expressed concern 
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that a repercussion of this was a lack of training and technical assistance for the 
Ndondol CBHI scheme staff. The lack of technical assistance resulted in poor 
management and governance of the CBHI scheme, indicated for example by the 
failure to hold an annual general meeting for over two years; this in turn contributed 
to perceptions of a lack of connection between the scheme staff and members. The 
CBHI scheme leaders themselves voiced these concerns (Box 5.6, N2). Another 
repercussion of the lack of coordination by the regional union was the absence of a 
contract with the regional hospital.  Furthermore, as Ndondol was in a poor rural area 
where very few NGOs operated, there was little opportunity for the scheme to 
collaborate with other types of NGOs. 
WAW 
Through the women’s GMS groups, WAW was part of a powerful local movement 
of women who held local political influence (Box 5.6, W11). In addition, many 
WAW leaders were members of the local branch of the national sports and cultural 
association (ASC) and through this, belonged to the “navetane” movement. The 
“navetane” movement organised activities such as sports, theatre and community 
development projects for young people during school holidays. The women’s and 
youth “movements” were brought together under the roof of the Centre de 
Coordination pour le Développement de Guinaw Rail (CCDGR), a federation which 
was supported by international NGOs and regrouped 93 local NGOs and 
associations, including WAW. Membership of CCDGR brought many benefits to the 
management of WAW. For example, by providing an umbrella governance structure 
and opportunities for sharing best practices with other NGOs, it had led WAW to 
adopt a formal governance structure which provided opportunities for members to 
actively participate in the scheme through, for example, election of leaders, regular 
committee meetings and annual general meetings. It also provided a collective 
platform for negotiations on subsidies and the formation of the new alternative 
political party described above.  
A union of CBHI schemes had been established in the Dakar region, but it was 
perceived to be weak, with insufficient funding and technical expertise. The union 
had been unable to make a contract with a hospital.  
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Box 5.6: Selected stakeholder quotations on social movements in CBHI 
S19: ...there are even people who call themselves ‘the mutualist group.’ It's a 
nickname that has stuck. Through being on the ground, being constantly 
involved with mutualists, having been there at the various stages of evolution of 
the movement, they were converted. They are constantly looking to try to 
improve things, to detect faults and take corrective action. (Provider of 
technical assistance to CBHI schemes) 
S4: ...because of frequently visiting (GRAIM), going to meetings, to seminars ... 
because they often invited me to come to the seminars.... I attended, I 
participated in the debates, the discussions, so when I came to meetings here (in 
the hospital), I spoke (about CBHI). I said to the Director (of the hospital) “we 
must integrate the mutuals (CBHI schemes)”! So eventually he called me “Mr. 
Mutuality”! (Hospital manager) 
S17: You mustn’t lock yourself up and ignore your environment. If you do, you 
will kill CBHI. The development of CBHI cannot be based solely on 
mutualists… for the development of CBHI you also need other actors… local 
authorities … the regional development agency ... medical authorities... not to 
mention the many actors in civil society. (International donor) 
N2: as (CBHI) leaders, we complain about our lack of training and proficiency 
to communicate with the population. (CBHI scheme leader) 
W11: ... politicians are afraid of strong movements, there are many people and 
many voices speaking together at the same time which could tarnish their 
image. If a mayor is against me... he risks having serious problems because I 
can mobilise half the women (in the community)... (Former CBHI scheme leader 
and leader of local women’s groups) 
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5.4 Discussion 
The results suggest that diverse stakeholders held or promoted similar values 
(voluntarism, trust, solidarity) across all three cases of CBHI. In all three schemes, 
CBHI scheme leaders were engaged in local politics which constituted an attempt to 
contest local power relations or to access existing local political power structures. In 
two cases CBHI was linked to “social movements”. The following discussion 
explains how analysis of the five themes sheds light on the underlying causes of 
drop-out and low enrolment (low population coverage) and  limitations of the benefit 
package (low scope of coverage) in CBHI.   
Voluntarism and enrolment 
There were two ways in which voluntarism was said by stakeholders to prevent drop-
out and promote enrolment in CBHI. The first is that by not paying salaries to staff, 
CBHI schemes were able to reduce administrative costs in order to keep premium 
prices low. This principle is supported by the wider literature on private health 
insurance in LMIC which argues that reduced loading is needed to increase demand 
(Preker 2007). The second was the assertion that volunteering by CBHI staff built 
trust in CBHI among the target population. This idea is supported by studies from 
other contexts which find that the act of volunteering increases the perceived 
trustworthiness of people who volunteer (Wilson and Musick 1999). However, there 
were serious perceived disadvantages of voluntarism for scheme management (lack 
of time for collecting premiums, marketing and community outreach) which in turn 
were thought to cause low enrolment and high drop-out. The finding that voluntarism 
was unsustainable is supported by the literature which identifies virtually no 
evidence that volunteering by community health workers (CHWs) in low and 
middle-income countries can be sustained for long periods (Lehmann and Roth 
1993). The recognition that on balance voluntarism was detrimental to enrolment led 
scheme leaders to lobby local government for subsidies to pay salaries to volunteers 
(see below). However some literature suggests that introducing salaries could also 
bring risks to CBHI. A review of international studies on motivation suggests that 
introducing extrinsic motivators (generated from external rewards such as money or 
training) may risk “crowding out” intrinsic motivators (aligned with personal 
motives and values) (Frey and Jegen 2001). However, studies of CHW in LMIC have 
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found that financial incentives enhance intrinsic motivation by allowing CHWs to 
increase commitment to their work (Greenspan et al. 2013, Bhattacharyya et al. 
2001). Numerous other difficulties associated with introducing salaries for volunteers 
were identified though, including: inadequacy of the salary; lack of sustainability of 
the source of funding for the salary; inequity if volunteers are paid less than others 
doing similar work; and a shift in the source of volunteers’ accountability, from the 
community to the government (if salaries are funded by the government). Thus while 
it seems CBHI schemes could benefit from enhancing extrinsic motivators for CBHI 
scheme staff, such an intervention would not be straightforward to implement. Taken 
together with the difficulty of obtaining subsidies to fund salaries (see below), the 
issue of shifting from voluntarism to remuneration presented a complex challenge for 
CBHI. Yet neither the Senegalese stakeholders nor the international literature have 
seriously addressed the pros and cons of voluntarism in CBHI in order to develop 
effective strategies to overcome its limitations. More research in this area is needed. 
Trust and enrolment 
Many stakeholders asserted that trust in CBHI schemes was a central mechanism for 
mitigating the target population’s fear of fraud and that increased population trust in 
CBHI was therefore likely to increase enrolment and prevent drop-out.  This 
principle has been put forward in the theoretical literature on CBHI (Pauly et al. 
2006) and is supported by empirical studies of CBHI (Criel and Waelkens 2003, 
Ozawa and Walker 2009, Schneider 2005). Another dimension of trust analysed in 
the CBHI literature (but not in this paper) is the impact of generalised trust (i.e. trust 
which is not related specifically to CBHI schemes) on enrolment (Zhang et al. 2006). 
In the management literature, consumers’ trust in organizations has been linked to 
stronger purchase intentions and better customer satisfaction (Fulmer and Gelfand 
2012). Trust has also been argued to underpin co-operation within health systems 
that is necessary to health production (Gilson 2003).  
Yet the analysis of trust presented in this study suggests that perhaps surprisingly, 
high levels of trust in CBHI may at times have a counter-productive effect on 
population coverage by reducing enrolment and increasing drop-out. The main type 
of trust which linked all three CBHI schemes to the population was informal, 
  169 
comprising interpersonal trust between friends and acquaintances and reputational 
trust based on social structures. However, relying on interpersonal and reputational 
trust to increase enrolment was unsustainable, as illustrated by drop-out from WAW 
thought to be caused by the retirement of the trusted scheme President. These results 
echo the literature on social capital, which finds that a high level of interpersonal 
trust based on affective relationships (a component of so-called “bonding social 
capital”) can constrain economic action if it is not accompanied by trust based on 
formal rules or fair market competition (a component of so-called “bridging social 
capital”) (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993) (social capital is defined here as “the 
information, trust and norms of reciprocity inhering in one’s social network” 
(Woolcock 1998, p. 153). This suggests that increased investment in formal 
structures to generate more sustainable levels of trust in CBHI may have been needed 
to increase enrolment and reduce drop out in the longer term. In NGO management, 
important mechanisms for developing this kind of formal trust are considered to be 
governance, accountability and user participation (Lewis 2007). A large Latin 
American study of NGOs conducted by Bebbington and Carroll (2000) points to 
possible mechanism for the CBHI schemes to develop these mechanisms. This study 
found that federations (defined as supra-communal organizations of the poor 
constituting a manifestation of social capital at the macro level) allow organisations 
to replace interpersonal trust with surrogate formal accountability mechanisms such 
as a professionalized bureaucracy inside the federation, relationships with external 
actors, and/or horizontal relationships between organizations. Trust built through 
these surrogate mechanisms could substitute inadequate trust between organizations 
and communities/households. At the same time, federations existed close enough to 
the community level to foster participatory processes of change. In the Senegalese 
cases, regional CBHI unions, GRAIM and the CCDGR can be seen a types of 
federations. Supporting the interpretation that federations had the potential to 
strengthen internal governance of individual CBHI schemes is the fact that Ndondol 
was a member of a weak federation and had no participatory elements in its internal 
governance structure at all, while Soppante and WAW were members of strong 
federations which had helped them to foster some participatory elements in their 
internal governance structures, such as annual general meetings. Yet at the time of 
fieldwork neither the federations nor the schemes had developed governance 
structures robust enough to replace interpersonal trust. It is therefore possible that 
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adopting a more nuanced understanding of the role of trust in CBHI which calls for 
less effort to build on existing interpersonal and reputational trust and more effort to 
develop formalised trust in CBHI through federations could serve to increase 
enrolment and reduce drop-out in Senegal. However, aside from the aforementioned 
Indian study of CBHI (Devadasan et al. 2006), these issues have hardly been 
addressed in the CBHI literature which in general does not distinguish between 
different types of trust (e.g. informal versus formal) and different mechanisms for 
generating trust at different levels of CBHI (e.g. scheme versus federation level), and 
the impact of this on CBHI population coverage. 
Solidarity and enrolment 
The CBHI literature rarely addresses the issue of solidarity. One study found that 
CBHI scheme members understand and approve of the re-distributive effects of 
CBHI (Criel and Waelkens 2003). It has also been suggested that emphasizing the 
solidarity benefits of health insurance in information disseminated to communities 
may help to increase coverage (Desmet, Chowdhury, and Islam 1999, Schneider 
2005).  
The idea that solidarity increases enrolment and reduces drop-out by motivating 
relatively healthier people to cross-subsidise those who are sicker, put forward by 
many CBHI stakeholders,  ostensibly echoes the ethos of solidarity that is deeply 
rooted in social health insurance in western Europe (Saltman 2004) and its nineteenth 
century antecedent, mutual aid societies, on which the model of CBHI in West Africa 
is based (Criel and Van Dormael 1999). Indeed, international development agencies 
as well as Catholic missionaries were crucial to the transfer of the European model to 
CBHI in Senegal (and elsewhere) and it is likely that the Senegalese discourse 
around solidarity in CBHI partly has its roots in this process. The Senegalese 
discourse on solidarity in CBHI also appears to reflect the current broader 
international policy focus on strengthening solidarity in African health financing 
systems through social health protection (ILO 2007).  
Yet there are various interpretations of the meaning of “solidarity” at play in the 
Senegalese case studies and the international health financing literature. These can be 
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divided into four dimensions of solidarity. A closer look at each dimension reveals 
that the idea that CBHI represents or promotes solidarity was not necessarily born 
out in practice. The first dimension constitutes Senegalese stakeholders’ focus on 
cross-subsidisation of the sick by the healthy. This “health risk” dimension presents 
solidarity as a potential mechanism for overcoming a classic market failure in private 
health insurance, adverse selection (where high-risk sick individuals are more likely 
to buy health insurance than low-risk healthy individuals). Quantitative studies of 
CBHI in sub-Saharan Africa confirm that adverse selection is an issue in some 
contexts (Parmar et al. 2012, Noterman et al. 1995), although not in others (De 
Allegri, Kouyate, et al. 2006, Jütting 2004). Several stakeholders expressed concern 
that this type of solidarity was not present in the target population, as they observed 
that CBHI members often gave not falling sick as a reason for dropping out of CBHI. 
The second dimension of solidarity is the cross-subsidisation from wealthy to poor, 
termed “vertical equity” in the health financing literature (Oliver and Mossialos 
2004). This type of solidarity is achieved in SHI and mutualities in Europe where 
contributions are either proportionate (people pay the same proportion of their 
income) or progressive (the proportion of income paid increases as income 
increases). In contrast, flat rate premiums in CBHI meant that the very design of 
CBHI was regressive (Mills et al. 2012). However, in general, increasing the 
progressivity of CBHI was not explicitly identified as an objective by the 
stakeholders, although it could be argued that those who sought government 
subsidies to cover the premiums of the poor did implicitly support the notion of 
vertical equity. It is important to note that studies from other sub-Saharan African 
countries have found that while progressive health financing has widespread support, 
large segments of the population (particularly the relatively wealthy) are not in 
favour of this principle (Goudge et al. 2012, McIntyre et al. 2009), suggesting that 
this type of solidarity in CBHI may be difficult to achieve in practice. Furthermore, 
crucially, as in many other LMIC the difficulty of identifying poor households was 
likely to pose a further challenge to achieving vertical equity through progressive 
premiums or subsidies (Mills et al. 2012). Also, evidence from other contexts 
suggests that the same level of access for the poor can be achieved with a lower 
subsidy if the subsidy is used as a direct reimbursement of user charges to the 
provider rather than through the CBHI scheme (Annear, Bigdeli, and Jacobs 2011). 
This raises the question of whether subsidising premiums of CBHI is advisable. The 
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third dimension of solidarity is the scale of risk pools. By design, CBHI promoted 
cross-subsidies within small groups. However, stakeholders in Senegal, echoing the 
international literature (Davies and Carrin 2001), recognised that small risk pools can 
be unappealing from the perspective of solidarity as larger and more diversified risk 
pools allow more effective cross-subsidisation of risk. This “scale” dimension 
undermined the ability of CBHI to promote solidarity. The fourth dimension relates 
to the source of solidarity. The sociological literature identifies the following main 
sources of solidarity: cultural similarity, concrete social networks, functional 
integration, and mutual engagement in the public sphere (Calhoun 2002). Risk 
pooling within separate communities defined by gender, religion, and/or geographic 
location, as per CBHI in Senegal, drew mainly on the first two sources of solidarity 
(cultural similarity and concrete social networks). However, these sources of 
solidarity in CBHI were seen by some stakeholders and community members to be 
unappealing, as they excluded people who did not fall into these categories. As such, 
in terms of the “source” dimension, the idea that CBHI promotes or constitutes 
solidarity was again problematized.  
Given the ambiguity of CBHI as a mechanism for implementing solidarity, it is 
possible that CBHI schemes could decrease drop-out and increase enrolment by 
bringing CBHI more in line with local values. Government subsidies were an 
important and popular potential reform (discussed in more detail below), but others 
could also be considered. For example, it is possible that other informal mechanisms 
or social structures prevalent in Senegalese society such as religious community 
associations already provided the target population with a solidarity mechanism for 
giving support to the sick, suggesting that a marketing strategy which highlights the 
individual/household level benefits of CBHI for access to health care and financial 
protection may have resonated more with the target population than the focus on 
solidarity.   
Power relations and coverage 
The results point to two main ways in which power relations affected CBHI 
coverage. The first was through the attempt of CBHI schemes to access government 
subsidies. Many stakeholders argued that low enrolment was caused mainly by 
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poverty and that subsidies would therefore reduce drop-out and increase enrolment 
by funding premiums. It was also hoped that subsidies would reduce drop-out and 
increase enrolment indirectly, by funding salaries of CBHI staff and thereby 
improving scheme management. Due to political decentralisation in Senegal, 
subsidies for CBHI were the responsibility of local government. In order to obtain 
government subsidies CBHI scheme leaders needed to influence the allocation of 
local budgets; in practice this meant gaining access to local political power. This was 
attempted through lobbying and/or running as a candidate in local elections. In two 
cases (Soppante and WAW) this involved running as an independent candidate or 
under an alternative political party. In one case (WAW) this process was supported 
by a local social movement. However, at the time of fieldwork no CBHI leaders had 
won local government posts and no CBHI scheme had managed to gain subsidies. 
Various and conflicting reasons for the lack of subsidies were given by stakeholders, 
with no clear consensus emerging within or between case studies.   
The second way in which power relations affected CBHI coverage was through the 
attempt of CBHI schemes to gain contracts with hospitals in order to expand the 
benefit package (the scope of coverage). However, many stakeholders observed that 
hospital directors were reluctant to sign contracts with CBHI schemes due to 
concerns that bills would not be paid in a timely manner. Underlying this explanation 
was arguably a more fundamental cause of the lack of contracts, an imbalance in 
power between CBHI schemes and hospitals. The wider literature suggests that in the 
hospital / insurer contracting process, power derives from the dependency one 
organization has on the resources controlled by the other, in terms its ability to attain 
key goals such as survival, growth, or increased margins (Devers et al. 2003). CBHI 
schemes were dependent on hospitals in terms of their goal of increasing coverage by 
expanding the benefit package, but hospitals were not dependent on CBHI schemes. 
This gave CBHI schemes very little negotiating power.  Only one scheme (Soppante) 
had overcome this power imbalance by negotiating as part of the regional union of 
CBHI schemes supported by a social movement dynamic22. The federation increased 
                                                 
22
 A social movement has broadly been defined as organised collective action which is not 
normatively sanctioned and takes place outside of mainstream institutions with the purpose of 
achieving change over a period of time (Snow, Soule, and Kriesi 2004). The “social movements” 
described by stakeholders in this study partially fit this definition; although the social movements 
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the CBHI schemes’ financial viability (by pooling their financial resources), while 
the social movement dynamic engaged senior individuals in the hospital with the 
values promoted by CBHI, such as voluntarism, trust and solidarity. 
Steven Lukes’ classic political sociological theory of the three dimensions of power 
(Lukes 2005) is useful for interpreting the implications of these results for CBHI 
policy. Lukes’ first and second dimensions of power feature observable overt or 
covert conflict between persons or groups over either concrete policy issues, or over 
nondecision-making about potential policy issues. These dimensions of power are 
typically demonstrated through political participation or grievances. Taking this 
perspective, CBHI represented a struggle for empowerment of CBHI leaders 
standing in opposition to other local stakeholders; CBHI leaders sought to implement 
CBHI policy through lobbying, electioneering and social movements, while the other 
local stakeholders with control over the resources needed to expand CBHI coverage 
(funding and health services) either overtly or covertly blocked the expansion of 
CBHI by withholding these resources. Where the conflict was overt, CBHI schemes 
could potentially address the objections of the more powerful stakeholders by 
making reforms. For example, Ndondol and WAW needed to increase efforts to 
strengthen their regional unions and social movements which promoted key values in 
CBHI such as trust and solidarity, in order to facilitate contracts with hospitals. This 
suggestion is supported by the tentative findings of a previous study (Atim 1999) that 
a social movement component in CBHI (defined as participation, accountability and 
social control) could improve negotiations with health service providers. However, 
this also suggests that in contexts where there was a less enabling environment (i.e. 
there were few other CBHI schemes to federate with), CBHI schemes were at a 
disadvantage in hospital contracting. 
Where conflict was covert, or where it was over nondecisions, one policy implication 
is the need for increased transparency in the policymaking process. For example, the 
confusion over the reasons for the lack of subsidies suggests that greater national 
                                                                                                                                          
were normatively sanctioned by national policy, at the local level they engendered opposition to 
mainstream political parties and (in the case of Soppante) the Catholic Church. They also appeared to 
be a form of collective action, bringing together the members of CBHI schemes and in some cases 
also other NGOs. 
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level government intervention was needed to clarify legal and policy parameters. In 
the absence of such an intervention, CBHI leaders’ response was to persevere with or 
escalate their struggle to overcome local power imbalances. The strategies employed 
by some of the CBHI schemes are supported by the wider literature. Bebbington and 
Carroll (2000) found that in low-income countries, federations which encompassed 
links between different types of organizations had the potential to foster more 
strategic forms of collective action than isolated NGOs, with political organizations 
being more adept at lobbying and mobilization while economic organizations (which 
would include CBHI schemes) facilitated service delivery. The CCDGR was a form 
of strategic collective political and economic action, as it provided WAW and the 
other NGOs in the federation with a platform for political engagement aimed at 
obtaining subsidies. This tentatively suggests the other CBHI schemes may have 
increased their chances of gaining subsidies by also participating in federations 
which integrated political action with service delivery. Indeed, in the broader 
development literature it has been proposed that the idea that NGOs can function as 
apolitical development actors is unrealistic (Lewis 2010).  
However, Steven Lukes’ third dimension of power points to an alternative 
interpretation of the results. The third dimension is more radical than the previous 
two dimensions; it focuses on latent conflict where there are unobserved interests 
held by those excluded by the political and policy process. Analysis of this 
dimension of power calls for the researcher to look beyond people’s subjective 
explanations of conflict and to seek a more objective perspective to reveal processes 
of domination. Lukes illustrates that a full critique of power should include both 
subjective and objective interests. Arguably, in the case of CBHI, those who were 
most excluded by political processes were CBHI members and non-members – i.e. 
the target population. Although CBHI leaders were ostensibly representing the target 
population via their engagement in local politics, several stakeholders pointed to a 
lack of community participation in scheme management. This raises doubt over 
whether, objectively, the target population’s interests were in fact represented by 
CBHI leaders. Another indication of the target population’s potential exclusion from 
the political process is one stakeholder’s observation that even if CBHI leaders 
managed to gain political office, benefits for CBHI and other development projects 
were far from guaranteed, due to the danger of the CBHI leaders being “eaten” by 
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the political system. This observation resonates with Bayart’s analysis of African 
“politics of the belly” (Bayart 2009) (the CBHI stakeholder even uses the same 
metaphor as Bayart). Through his wide-ranging and detailed analysis of African 
politics, Bayart finds that in Africa, as in many other societies, it is a person’s 
position in the state apparatus that determines their social and economic status as 
well as their material power. He argues that interactions between political and civil 
society have typically tended to fuse a dominant class which straddles both spheres; 
those who have risen to this dominant class have typically refused to enhance 
popular movements. Following this line of argument, it is possible that by becoming 
involved with local politics by running for election, CBHI leaders were consciously 
or subconsciously participating in this kind of a hegemonic process. However, 
further research into power dynamics in CBHI, possibly involving a return to the 
field in order to study the outcomes of CBHI leaders’ efforts to win elections, would 
be needed to evaluate whether this (perhaps controversial) interpretation is correct. 
Inspiration could be taken from Bent Flyvbjerg’s phronetic research methodology 
(Flyvbjerg 2001) which seeks to employ social science to provide in-depth narratives 
of how power works and to suggest how power might be changed in specific 
domains of social action. If CBHI leaders were found to be subject to such 
hegemonic processes at the local level, stronger national governance structures may 
be needed to protect CBHI schemes and other NGOs from the negative repercussions 
of porous civil society / political boundaries at the local level. Or, if the power 
imbalance preventing expansion of CBHI is found to be insurmountable, revised 
national policy may be needed to develop an alternative financing mechanism which 
has the support of powerful stakeholders, in order to ensure financial protection from 
the cost of ill health.   
5.5 Conclusions 
The study suggests that the interconnected social values of voluntarism, trust and 
solidarity motivated many stakeholders to support CBHI schemes to expand 
population coverage (i.e. to reduce drop-out and increase enrolment). The 
stakeholders did this by working without a salary in order to increase trust and 
decrease the price of premiums; building on existing social structures such as social 
status or associations to evoke trust in CBHI; and drawing on notions of solidarity to 
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promote cross-subsidisation. The same social values underpinned CBHI leaders’ 
efforts in political lobbying and electioneering and in their promotion of social 
movements and federations. These were essential mechanisms for overcoming 
conflicts with more powerful stakeholders in the effort to expand coverage, 
specifically in terms of: attempting to gain subsidies for staff salaries in order to 
improve scheme management and premium collection and thereby increase 
enrolment and reduce drop-out; attempting to gain subsidies in order to cover 
premiums and thereby address the concern that the population was too poor to pay 
the premium; and collective action in attempting to make contracts with hospitals to 
expand the benefit package. However, at the same time, in all three schemes there 
were contradictions and inconsistencies in how these values impacted CBHI. In 
practice, the four dimensions of solidarity (health risk, vertical equity, scale and 
source) were insufficiently or only partially mobilised in the context of CBHI, while 
voluntarism and trust seemed to have had unintended negative consequences (i.e. 
they were thought to sometimes decrease population coverage). Furthermore, CBHI 
leaders experienced serious difficulty in overcoming conflicts with more powerful 
stakeholders who controlled the resources needed to expand CBHI coverage. This 
was partly because of the power imbalance itself, but also because some important 
underlying causes of conflict were covert (for example reasons for lack of subsidies 
appeared to be unknown). It may also be because hegemonic political processes 
potentially prevented CBHI leaders from promoting the interests of CBHI’s target 
population in local political fora. These contradictions, inconsistencies and conflicts 
explain the inability of CBHI to expand coverage, but they also explain the survival 
of CBHI schemes despite great adversity. There was considerable variation with 
some successes experienced in some case studies, suggesting the schemes could 
learn from each other.  There was also scope for national government to address 
some of the local power imbalances.  
As such, this study raises a number of previously overlooked policy and 
implementation challenges for expanding CBHI coverage in Senegal, and perhaps 
elsewhere. First is the need for subsidies to remunerate CBHI scheme staff while (a) 
retaining the potential benefits of voluntarism such as trust and (b) avoiding pitfalls 
such as inadequacy of the salary, lack of sustainability of the source of funding and a 
shift in the source of volunteers’ accountability to the government (if salaries are 
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funded by the government). Second, although it seems trust in CBHI can be built by 
collaborating with existing community associations or trusted community leaders, 
there is also a need to develop more sustainable internal and external governance 
structures through CBHI and NGO federations. Third is reforming CBHI so that it 
becomes a coherent solidarity mechanism which both provides financial protection 
and resonates with local values concerning all four dimensions of solidarity (health 
risk, vertical equity, scale and source), by, for example, introducing (a) government 
subsidies to fully or partially cover premiums of all or of parts of the population, and 
(b) marketing strategies which highlight both the collective and the 
individual/household level benefits of CBHI. Fourth is the need for increased 
transparency in policy. For example, clarification from national level government 
was needed on legal and policy parameters for public subsidies for CBHI at the local 
level. Fifth is the need for CBHI schemes to increase their negotiating power vis-à-
vis more powerful stakeholders who controlled the resources needed for expanding 
CBHI coverage. Potential mechanisms for achieving this included: engagement of 
CBHI scheme leaders in local politics in conjunction with national governance to 
protect and promote the interests of the population targeted by CBHI; federation of 
CBHI schemes with political NGOs; and a social movement dynamic based on 
shared values. However, systematically addressing all these challenges would 
represent a fundamental reform of the current CBHI model promoted in Senegal and 
in Africa more widely and could be difficult to achieve in practice. Furthermore, 
government subsidies for CBHI would not necessarily be a cost-effective approach to 
providing health services for the poor. Therefore, echoing previous analyses of 
market-oriented health sector reforms (Bennett, McPake, and Mills 1997) and 
consumer-led  financing (Ensor 2004), alternative or complementary public sector 
and/or supply-side financing policies may be needed in order to ensure financial 
protection from the cost of ill health. These may include health financing 
mechanisms which are more integrated into government systems of social welfare 
(Devereux and White 2010).    
The results suggest that studying values and power relations among stakeholders in 
multiple case studies can greatly enhance research into health financing. Adopting a 
similar methodological approach may be a useful complement to traditional health 
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systems analysis to understand the challenges faced by not only CBHI but other 
forms of health insurance currently being implemented in LMIC.  
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Chapter 6 Conclusions 
6.1 Summary of findings 
This section provides a summary of the main objectives and findings of the PhD. A 
fuller, integrative discussion is presented in the next section.  
The overarching objective of this PhD is to understand the determinants of low 
enrolment and high drop-out in CBHI in Senegal. The PhD builds on the existing 
literature, which employs mainly economic and health system frameworks, by 
critically applying social capital theory to the analysis of CBHI. A mixed-methods 
multiple case study research design is used to investigate the relationship between 
CBHI, bonding and bridging social capital at micro and macro levels, and active 
community participation. The research questions set out for the PhD in chapter 1 are: 
(i) What are the determinants of low enrolment and high drop-out in CBHI?  
(ii) Can a critical engagement with social capital theory contribute to understanding 
why CBHI schemes do not appear on course to develop significant levels of 
population coverage in a sustainable way? 
The overall PhD hypothesis proposed in chapter 1 is:  
Increased bridging social capital at all levels of CBHI helps to increase enrolment in 
CBHI, but the benefits of this dynamic are likely to be unequally distributed and to 
favour individuals and groups who already hold other forms of capital and social 
power. 
Chapters 2-5 seek to address the two research questions using different 
methodological approaches. Chapter 2 addresses the second research question, 
drawing on existing studies to show that a critical engagement with social capital 
theory can potentially contribute to understanding successes and failures of CBHI 
schemes. It outlines a research agenda which is pursued in the subsequent three 
empirical papers. Chapters 3-5 address both the first and second research questions. 
Chapter 3 finds that members of CBHI have higher levels of several variables 
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measuring different facets of micro level bridging social capital and social power, 
compared to non-members. The results point to the need for health financing 
strategies in Senegal to focus on removing social barriers to financial protection from 
the cost of ill health. Chapter 4 finds that those who drop out of CBHI are less likely 
to have actively participated in CBHI than those who remain enrolled in the scheme. 
It argues that active community participation may reduce the likelihood of drop-out 
by increasing CBHI members’ social capital. It also suggests that those who already 
hold social capital may be more likely to actively participate in CBHI. Chapter 5 
shows that values and power relations inherent in social networks of CBHI 
stakeholders (bridging social capital at the macro level) can explain low levels of 
CBHI enrolment and high levels of drop-out, as well as low scope of coverage.  
Taken together, the evidence presented in the PhD suggests that as per the 
hypothesis, bridging social capital does seem to be associated with increased 
enrolment. There appear to be many nuances: different types of social capital play 
different roles; the mechanisms through which social capital increases enrolment are 
varied and complex; the dynamic favours those with increased economic capital and 
social power; and the relationship is not purely unidirectional, since enrolment in 
CBHI may also increase social capital of the few members who are able to access 
participatory activities within the schemes. These and other pertinent issues are 
discussed in the next section. 
6.2 Integrative discussion  
The integrative discussion brings together the findings of all four papers and is 
divided into two parts, reflecting the conceptual framework set out in chapter 2: the 
part first focuses on the micro level (relationships between CBHI members and 
CBHI leaders and staff), while the second focuses on the macro level (relationships 
between CBHI scheme leaders and other key institutional stakeholders such as 
politicians, donors and health care providers).  
In each sub-section, the first part focuses on information, trust and solidarity. This is 
followed by an overview of the extent to which these were transmitted through the 
social networks of the stakeholders. In breaking down the analysis like this, the 
discussion seeks to unpack the ways in which social capital affects CBHI according 
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to the definition of social capital employed in this PhD, “the information, trust and 
norms of reciprocity inhering in one’s social network” (Woolcock 1998, p. 153). 
Policy implications arising from the discussion follow, in section 6.4.  
6.2.1 The role of micro level social capital in determining enrolment and drop 
out in CBHI 
As already mentioned in previous chapters, proponents of CBHI have pointed to the 
advantages of schemes’ smallness and participatory approach which are said to 
provide informal safeguards such as full information, social sanctions, trust and 
increased solidarity (Davies and Carrin 2001, Zweifel 2004, Pauly 2007, Zhang et al. 
2006). This view echoes the argument of Coleman that social capital ‘‘is productive, 
making possible the achievement of certain ends that in its absence would not be 
possible’’ (Coleman 1988, p. S98). Bourdieu’s theory of social capital (Bourdieu 
1986) which informs the PhD via Portes and Woolcock (see chapter 2) provides a 
more nuanced view which takes power differentials into account, namely that 
individuals and families who do not have access to the various types of capital are 
from the outset in a disadvantaged position to accumulate it. Following Bourdieu, it 
can be expected that the benefits of CBHI will accrue only to those who already have 
access to social and other forms of capital and greater social power. In this section, 
evidence provided in the three empirical papers is discussed in light of these various 
theories of social capital.  
The role of information, trust and solidarity at the micro level in CBHI  
Availability of information is necessary for any market to operate, including CBHI. 
The target population may require information on the following issues in order to 
make decisions about enrolment in CBHI: the price of the premium; method and 
timing of paying premium; benefits offered by the scheme; performance of the 
scheme (e.g. financial reserves, number of members, number of claims, degree of 
financial protection offered by the schemes); mechanisms for preventing and 
addressing fraud; health information (information about the causes of ill health and 
the benefits of prevention and treatment); and information about health care 
providers such as levels of user charges and quality of care. Assuming this 
information is conducive to enrolment, one can expect that households with 
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increased access to information will be more likely to enrol and remain enrolled in 
CBHI. This is indeed borne out by the results of the PhD. In chapter 3 diversified 
access to information is a determinant of enrolment; the reason for this is explained 
by the qualitative interviews which suggest that information about the CBHI schemes 
was in general difficult to obtain. Furthermore, chapter 4 found that participation in 
awareness raising / information dissemination and being informed of mechanisms of 
controlling abuse / fraud were determinants of remaining enrolled. In other literature 
(Ridde et al. 2010) a lack of information is given by the target population as a reason 
for not joining the scheme. These results demonstrate that information flows are 
crucial to CBHI enrolment.  
Trust 
A previous Chinese study on CBHI (Zhang et al. 2006) found that willingness to join 
CBHI is positively correlated with increased general trust (i.e. general trust in 
institutions, in neighbours etc.).  The PhD looked at actual enrolment rather than 
willingness to enrol and found that, in contrast to the Chinese study, a lack of general 
trust was not a barrier to enrolment (chapter 3). As well as studying general trust, the 
PhD also measured specific trust in the scheme management and/or scheme 
president.  This was found to be a statistically significant determinant of drop-out: 
while nearly 70% of scheme members reported that the scheme managers or leaders 
were trustworthy, only around one third of ex-members did so (chapter 4). This 
suggests that the stakeholders’ concerns with building trust in order to retain or 
increase CBHI membership levels identified in chapter 5 were well-founded; it also 
suggests that the current mechanisms employed by CBHI leaders were insufficient. 
Solidarity  
Chapter 5 reveals that many of the stakeholders in the three case studies viewed 
CBHI to be a solidarity mechanism, due to the potential cross-subsidisation of 
resources from healthy to sick people. They believed that this solidarity should be an 
important motivating factor for people to enrol in CBHI (chapter 5). A study in 
Guinea-Conarky demonstrating that scheme members understand and approve of the 
re-distributive effects of CBHI (Criel and Waelkens 2003) supports this view. Other 
studies have also suggested emphasizing the solidarity benefits of health insurance in 
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information disseminated to communities in order to increase enrolment (Desmet, 
Chowdhury, and Islam 1999, Schneider 2005). As argued in chapter 5, this 
ostensibly  resonates with the ethos of solidarity that is deeply rooted in social health 
insurance in western Europe (Saltman 2004) and its nineteenth century antecedent, 
mutual aid societies, on which the model of CBHI in West Africa is based (Criel and 
Van Dormael 1999). Chapters 3 and 4 offer the possibility of understanding whether 
the target population subscribed to stakeholders’ perceptions of solidarity. The 
results relating to this question are quite complex. CBHI members were more than 
two times as likely to perceive their community to have solidarity (measured by the 
belief that everyone would cooperate to solve a common problem) than non-
members (chapter 3). Current members also reported having more solidarity than ex-
members in relation to their views on whether the scheme should cover poorer 
households, being more likely to agree that: members of the scheme should sponsor 
families who are very poor; members should support families who are very poor by 
increasing the amount of their contribution; and families who are very poor should be 
members of the scheme without paying (chapter 4). These results suggest that people 
who report having greater levels of solidarity were more likely to enrol in and remain 
enrolled in CBHI.  
As mentioned in chapter 3, the sociologist Durkheim’s (1984) theory of solidarity 
can help interpret these results. Durkheim proposed that while kinship networks are 
the most fundamental and universal solidarity mechanism, solidarity changes as a 
society becomes more complex. In traditional societies, solidarity is based mainly on 
shared identity, social sanctions and authority of the collective and is typically 
organized around kinship affiliations (this is termed “mechanical solidarity” by 
Durkheim). In larger more complex industrialised societies, solidarity is instead 
based on integration of specialized economic and political organizations and 
emphasises equality among individuals, social interdependence and modern legal 
structures such as civil, commercial law (termed “organic solidarity” by Durkheim). 
CBHI has emerged in the context of a general increase in numbers of community 
associations in Senegal (Bernard et al. 2008), a trend which is arguably indicative of 
the social transition described by Durkheim. Indeed, studies of poor urban 
populations in Senegal find that high levels of social and cultural heterogeneity 
caused by large flows of rural to urban migration h
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associations emerging to replace traditional social safety nets (Niang 2000). These 
included ROSCAs (rotating credit associations) (Sorensen 2000) and dahiras (prayer 
groups which formed part of the Muslim brotherhoods) which primarily had a 
spiritual purpose but also bring many economic and political advantages to their 
members (Mbacke and Hunwick 2005, Niang 2000). The PhD results suggest that 
the more individuals experienced and presumably benefited from this type of modern 
associational “organic” solidarity, the more they were willing and able to invest in 
CBHI which was a similar solidarity structure, supporting Bourdieu’s theory that 
people with existing social capital are in a relatively good position to accumulate 
more of it.   
However, there were important limitations to the solidarity represented by CBHI. In 
practice, stakeholders’ fears that the target population lacked solidarity in terms of 
the willingness of healthy people to cross-subsidise the sick seem to have been well-
founded: in chapter 4, current member households were twice as likely to have had 
an illness, accident or injury, and nearly twice as likely to have a disability, than ex-
member households. This supports stakeholders’ observation that if households felt 
they did not sufficiently “benefit” from CBHI (by making an insurance claim), they 
dropped out of the scheme.  
Further undermining the idea that CBHI is a solidarity mechanism is the result in 
chapter 4 that less than half of all current and ex-members of all three schemes state 
they believe “solidarity” is an advantage of the scheme (there are no significant 
differences between current and ex-members in terms of holding this view). A reason 
for this may be that cross subsidisation from wealthy to poor (“vertical equity”) 
(Oliver and Mossialos 2004) was not realised in any of the schemes as there was a 
flat rate premium regardless of the household’s wealth and there were no subsidies to 
cover the poor.  
In sum,  many stakeholders seemed to have expectations of solidarity that were in 
general not met by the target population in terms of the willingness of healthy people 
to cross-subsidise the sick through CBHI. There was general consensus among the 
target population and many stakeholders about the need for subsidies, which is 
arguably broadly commensurate with the desire to enhance vertical equity in CBHI. 
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However, unfortunately this desire had also not been realised in practice, as no 
subsidies had been secured. This suggests that in practice CBHI was not a coherent 
solidarity mechanism. Addressing this deficiency was necessary in order to increase 
enrolment and reduce drop-out.  
The role of social networks at the micro level in CBHI  
This sub-section discusses the channels that had (or had not) been established for the 
transmission of information, trust and solidarity in CBHI at the micro-level. This can 
be thought of as “structural” social capital (Uphoff 1999).  
In the literature, proponents of CBHI recognise that the “smallness” of CBHI is a 
disadvantage in terms of risk pooling, but anticipate that supposed advantages of 
“smallness”, such as full information, trust and solidarity, will compensate for this 
(Davies and Carrin 2001, Zweifel 2004, Pauly 2007, Zhang et al. 2006). The results 
of the PhD, however, suggest that the anticipated advantages of “smallness” are often 
not apparent in practice and where they are apparent, they do not seem to widely 
benefit CBHI in terms of translating into high levels of enrolment and low levels of 
drop-out. There were several reasons for this. Firstly, typically CBHI schemes were 
not “small” in the way that proponents envisage. Despite the fact that all three CBHI 
schemes were small in size, with the number of current members ranging from 130 to 
280 households, only around 40% of current members across all three schemes 
reported knowing more than 50% of the members of their scheme. Even the scheme 
leaders were not widely known by the members of the scheme (chapter 4). As a 
result, the leaders were not in a position to build on bonding and bridging social 
capital by exploiting informal social relationships in order to exchange information 
and mobilise solidarity vis-à-vis the target population. In all three schemes there 
were important barriers to leaders interacting regularly with the target population, 
which were caused by voluntarism (chapter 5) and low levels of active participation 
of the target population in CBHI (chapter 4). It is important to note that these barriers 
were related to a lack of financial resources, suggesting that CBHI leaders needed 
economic capital in order to mobilise social capital in the context of CBHI. This 
supports the argument made by Bourdieu that the different forms of capital are 
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fungible, and that individuals who already possess one type of capital are more adept 
at accumulating another (Bourdieu 1986).  
Secondly, even when the supposed advantages of “smallness” were partially 
achieved, they were unequally distributed in the community. Chapter 3 reveals that 
although there were on aggregate high levels of social capital in the target population 
(illustrated for example by a high proportion of households with associational 
membership or with privileged social relations among both members and non-
members of CBHI), the target population was not socially homogenous, meaning that 
a sizeable minority of households did not have social capital (for example they had 
no associational membership or privileged social relations). Such social inequalities 
seemed to determine enrolment in CBHI, even when controlling for levels of 
household wealth and expenditure. Therefore, members of CBHI were not only 
wealthier than non-members, but they were more likely than non-members to have 
high levels of bonding and bridging social capital. Crucially, members of CBHI also 
seemed to have greater social power than non-members, pointing to serious social 
inequity in CBHI enrolment patterns. The wider development literature on the 
determinants of participation in community organizations in sub-Saharan Africa and 
elsewhere also finds that an existing social network is a precondition of enrolment 
(Weinberger and Jutting 2001). Furthermore, while there do not seem to be 
inequalities in wealth between members and ex-members, the results of chapter 4 
suggest that the benefits of active participation in CBHI such as increased access to 
information about CBHI and trust of CBHI leaders may be skewed towards those 
who already have high levels of social capital. The findings of chapter 3 and 4 
support Bourdieu’s theory of social capital (Bourdieu 1986), as discussed above, 
which argues that those who already hold forms of capital are strategically adept at 
accumulating and transforming it, thereby reinforcing existing power structures in 
society. However, proponents of CBHI have failed to consider issues of power and 
domination at the local level and the implications of this for equity in financial 
protection.  
Thirdly, again when the supposed advantages of “smallness” were partially achieved, 
this was insufficient to increase enrolment and reduce drop-out.  This is illustrated by 
the case of WAW which had built on existing bonding and bridging social capital 
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through integration into an existing network of women’s associations. However, as 
with the other schemes, WAW had not managed to enrol large numbers or to prevent 
drop-out. This might be explained by Woolcock’s (Woolcock 1998, p. 186) 
argument that “all four dimensions (of social capital) must be present for optimal 
developmental outcomes. This successful interaction within and between bottom-up 
and top-down initiatives is the cumulative product of an ongoing process that entails 
“getting the social relations right””. It is possible that the supposed advantages of 
“smallness” (i.e. building on micro level social capital) were not realised in WAW 
due to a lack of social capital at the macro level. In order to investigate this, the next 
sub-section considers whether an analysis of social capital at the macro level may 
further contribute to understanding the determinants of low levels of enrolment and 
high drop-out in CBHI. 
6.2.2 The role of macro level social capital in determining enrolment and drop 
out in CBHI 
This section discusses the relationships between CBHI schemes and other 
organisations / institutions. The main institutional relationships analysed in the PhD 
research (chapter 5) are (a) between CBHI schemes (through regional federations) 
and (b) between CBHI schemes and health care providers and local government. 
Analysing social capital at the macro level brings to light mechanisms needed for 
scaling up CBHI by counteracting the negative implications of “smallness”; these 
have typically been overlooked by economic and traditional health systems analyses. 
As in the previous section, information, trust and solidarity are discussed first; there 
then follows a discussion of structural relationships between the various actors.  
The role of information, trust and solidarity at the macro level in CBHI  
Information 
Chapter 5 points to an important blockage in information flow at the macro level, 
which seemed to prevent the expansion of CBHI coverage. The CBHI schemes 
wanted to subsidise premiums by raising funds from local government. However, no 
local governments had provided subsidies at the time of the research. Different 
stakeholders had different explanations for this. These explanations included: 
insufficient funds held by local government; the lack of political capital to be gained 
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from supporting CBHI; the values embodied by CBHI (solidarity, trust, voluntarism 
and poverty alleviation) were not upheld by politicians; and the absence of a decree 
to give legal recognition to CBHI schemes. It was unclear whether any of these 
explanations was accurate. Certainly, there was a need for information to clarify 
whether (a) CBHI schemes were legally eligible for subsidies and (b) funds were 
available. In the absence of this information, CBHI leaders’ response was to 
persevere with or escalate their struggle to access political power through lobbying 
and electioneering.   
Trust 
Several stakeholders suggested that the reason Ndondol and WAW had not been able 
to contract hospitals was the lack of trust hospital managers and directors had in 
CBHI schemes’ financial sustainability and financial management. In contrast, 
Soppante had managed to secure a contract, by engaging the hospital leadership 
through a social movement dynamic (chapter 5).  
Another important area in which a lack of trust undermined CBHI was scheme 
leaders’ mistrust of local politicians who were the potential source of subsidies but 
were feared to be predatory and corrupt (chapter 5).  
Solidarity 
Many stakeholders in CBHI described themselves as “mutualists” and claimed they 
were part of a “mutualist movement”. This was particularly the case in the Soppante 
scheme (chapter 5). Mutualists said they shared the same values; central among these 
values was solidarity. The mutualists’ shared vision acted as a social glue which held 
together a diverse range of actors representing donors, health care providers and 
others who promoted CBHI schemes through their everyday paid, professional work 
and also through voluntary activities.  
However, as discussed above, chapters 4 and 5 suggest there was a disjuncture in the 
discourse around solidarity in CBHI. Stakeholders expected healthy people who 
rarely or never used health services to remain enrolled in the CBHI scheme as a form 
of solidarity (chapter 5), while in practice this often did not occur and people 
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dropped out of CBHI if they did not need to use health services (chapter 4). 
Furthermore, around 75% of members and ex-members did not agree that solidarity 
was an advantage of CBHI (chapter 4). This disjuncture arguably weakened the 
social movement dynamic in CBHI.   
The role of social networks at the macro level in CBHI  
The networks of relationships between CBHI scheme leaders and other institutional 
stakeholders facilitated the transmission of information and values which 
underpinned formal technical processes such as contracting or financing.  
Federations 
Soppante, Ndondol and WAW respectively were members of three different regional 
federations of CBHI schemes. The Thies regional federation, of which the Soppante 
scheme was a member, was particularly successful and had contracted two hospitals 
(chapter 5). In contrast, the other regional federations were not very active and had 
not managed to attain this important achievement. The relationship between 
federations and hospitals is discussed further below. 
WAW was also a member of the CCDGR, a federation of local NGOs working in a 
variety of development sectors in addition to health (e.g. education, water and 
sanitation and income generation) (chapter 5). Integrating CBHI into a broader local 
developmental agenda strengthened the CBHI scheme; leaders of the different NGOs 
in the federation advised each other on good management practices, lobbied together 
for subsidies, developed joined-up local developmental policies and joined together 
in forming a local political party (see below). The experience of WAW echoes the 
findings of the development literature on federations. Bebbington and Carroll (2000) 
find that federations in various low income countries had the potential to foster 
regional and more strategic forms of collective action and engagement with 
government, civil society, and markets, and to build sustainable bridges between 
different types of organizations.  
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Local government 
In Senegal, political decentralisation made local government a potentially important 
player in the development of CBHI. As discussed, many stakeholders believed that 
segments of the target population were too poor to pay the CBHI premium and hoped 
that CBHI schemes would be able to attract subsidies from local government 
(chapter 5). The social capital literature suggests that an engagement with civil 
society or the private sector in the form of day-to-day interactions of government 
officials can build its own positive norms and loyalties which can be conducive to 
development, a process termed “embeddedness” (Evans 1996) (chapter 2). The 
leaders of all three schemes had started to get actively involved in politics; this could 
be seen as an attempt to achieve this type of “embeddedness”. However, a 
stakeholder expressed concerns about the entry of CBHI leaders into politics, fearing 
that the CBHI leaders would not be strong enough to resist the corrupting influence 
of political power (chapter 5). In Woolcock’s conceptual framework of social capital 
(chapter 3), it is recognised that “embeddedness” can potentially be a vehicle for 
corruption and nepotism; it is argued that a professional ethos committed to pursuing 
collective goals, fostered by social relations between individual representatives of 
institutions, a form of bonding social capital at the macro level, is needed to facilitate 
positive state/civil society bridging relations (Evans 1996). However, critics of this 
theory point out that since coherent robust bureaucracies rarely exist in low-income 
countries, the advocacy for state/civil society bridging social capital is misguided 
(Harriss 2002). The PhD research cannot shed light on this debate, as the fieldwork 
took place at an early stage in the process of CBHI leaders’ engagement with local 
politics: none of the CBHI leaders had gained political office and no subsidies had 
been secured. Also, the PhD research did not include an analysis of the robustness of 
local political institutions (macro level bonding social capital) making it difficult to 
predict the likely impact of corruption in local politics on CBHI. Therefore, it is 
difficult to evaluate whether an engagement with local politics was likely to be 
positive or negative for CBHI.    
Health care providers 
Although the MoH had developed a policy which encouraged hospitals to contract 
with CBHI schemes, many hospitals were reluctant to do so. As mentioned, Soppante 
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was the only CBHI which had managed to contract hospitals. The contract was 
secured via a regional federation of CBHI schemes. Federations were needed for 
contracting as they provided a governance structure, sizeable financial reserves, and 
a social movement dynamic based on shared values of solidarity and voluntarism, all 
of which served to inspire trust in hospital directors and managers and to strengthen 
CBHI schemes’ negotiating power. There was a general perception among 
stakeholders that CBHI schemes acting alone (independently of a federation) were 
unable to achieve hospital contracts. This suggests that social capital may play as 
important a role as the technical aspects of contracting between insurers and 
providers. Contracting is crucial not only to expand the benefit package but also to 
negotiating reduced prices and including clauses regarding the quality of care 
(termed “strategic purchasing”) (Ranson, Sinha, Gandhi, et al. 2006). 
Summary of integrative discussion 
In sum, it seems that bridging social capital was a mechanism by which CBHI 
scheme leaders were potentially able to engage politicians and health service 
providers in order to prepare the ground for and strengthen formal contractual modes 
of engagement. The leaders of the three schemes had different strengths in terms of 
developing bridging social capital, but none of them had been wholly successful; this 
partly accounts for their lack of success in creating the conditions needed to scale up 
CBHI; namely subsidies and coverage of hospital services. Subsidies were needed to 
directly increase enrolment by funding CBHI premiums for the poor. Subsidies were 
also needed to redress the limitations of “smallness” of CBHI at the micro level by 
funding (a) active participation of CBHI members, especially people with low levels 
of social capital, and (b) strong federations which could enhance trust in the 
population through improved governance. These findings suggest that scaling up 
CBHI was only likely to be viable with the development of strong macro level 
institutions which provided or facilitated subsidies and governance.     
6.3 Strengths and limitations of the research and future research directions 
There are several limitations of the research which are already discussed in the 
individual papers.  These include the small sample size and “random route” 
methodology in the household survey; the possibility that the social capital variables 
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are picking up the effect of other omitted variables; the cross-sectional and non-
experimental study design and resulting difficulty of attributing causality and the 
direction of causality; and the small number of case studies.  
There are additional limitations of the PhD which also ought to be mentioned, as well 
as possible future research directions which could be developed to address them. One 
set of limitations relates to the possibility of alternative explanations for low 
enrolment that were not covered by the research. Since the research mostly employed 
a deductive approach (reviewing the literature, developing and testing a hypothesis), 
the research questions focused on a specific topic – social capital. In general, the 
results presented in the PhD support the hypothesis that increased bridging social 
capital at all levels of CBHI helps to increase enrolment in CBHI, but the benefits of 
this dynamic are likely to be unequally distributed and to favour individuals and 
groups who already hold other forms of capital and social power. Studies of social 
capital and community development have presented similar findings (Njuki et al. 
2008, Campbell 2003, Titeca and Vervisch 2008, Weinberger and Jutting 2001, 
Porter and Lyon 2006, Adhikari and Goldey 2010, Cleaver 2005), supporting the 
validity of the study. Furthermore, this study is more robust that previous studies 
since it combines comparative case studies, quantitative and qualitative data, a focus 
on bonding and bridging social capital as well as positive and negative social capital, 
and analysis of the micro and macro level in one study; the previous studies have 
incorporated some, but never all, of these elements in order to understand the 
determinants of enrolment in groups. However, it is possible that using a more 
inductive approach would have brought other topics and themes to light. A 
mitigating factor against the deductive design of the overall research project was the 
use of open-ended interviews with stakeholders and the inductive approach to the 
coding of these interview transcripts. This gave rise to the possibility of issues 
affecting enrolment to emerge that did not relate to the specific hypotheses tested. 
Nevertheless, future research into CBHI would benefit from adopting a more 
inductive approach overall, by employing ethnography for example, in order to allow 
a broader set of determinants to come to light.   
It is worth considering some of the other possible determinants of enrolment that 
were not covered. Among these there may be some determinants which fall within 
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the scope of social capital theory and some which fall outside of that scope. Caste is 
an important topic which could potentially be studied from the perspective of social 
capital but was not included in the research. As discussed in Chapter 1, caste in 
Senegal is a source of discrimination. As such it is possible that caste prevented some 
people from enrolling in the CBHI schemes. However, caste is a highly sensitive and 
taboo topic which has been hardly studied in Senegal. It was not mentioned by the 
interviewees and it was felt that the issue was too complex to tackle in the research. 
The two other main types of capital identified by Bourdieu, cultural and symbolic 
capital, were also not studied. Furthermore, as discussed, the final type of social 
capital in Woolcock’s framework, bonding social capital in political institutions at 
the macro level (defined as horizontal ties within institutions and a professional ethos 
committed to pursuing collective goals, fostered by a social relations between 
individual representatives of institutions) was not studied, although possible 
corruption of politicians was mentioned by stakeholders.  These issues may also have 
affected enrolment, but were beyond the scope of the research. There also may have 
been specific beliefs, values and norms other than trust and solidarity which are 
transmitted through social networks in the specific context studied and may have 
affected CBHI enrolment. For example, one potentially relevant set of beliefs relates 
to the efficacy of allopathic health care. In order to perceive the benefits of CBHI, a 
pre-requisite is that the target population believes in the efficacy of allopathic 
medicine and is in principle willing to access these services. However, traditional 
medicine is widely practised in Senegal (Fassin and Fassin 1988). This issue was 
studied in chapter 4 but not in-depth. The household survey revealed that many 
members of CBHI held a duality of beliefs (i.e. valuing both allopathic and 
traditional medicine), since in all schemes, around 50% of current and ex-members 
of CBHI had used traditional medicine in the last month. These figures suggest that 
beliefs about the lack of efficacy of allopathic health care were not a significant 
determinant of drop-out in the schemes. Similarly, the results of the qualitative 
interviews do not point to this as a barrier to enrolment. Another belief which may 
have affected enrolment is fatalism. It is possible that in a highly religious country 
like Senegal, it may be believed that purchasing insurance to protect oneself from the 
financial risk of future ill health is pointless, since the outcome of ill health is 
ultimately pre-determined and/or in the hands of God. However, the household 
survey did not cover this topic and the qualitative interviews did not find evidence of 
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fatalism in the target population, although there were no specific questions in the 
interview topic guides about this subject.  
There are also potential explanatory factors which fall outside of social capital 
theory. In particular, health systems and economics approaches which are more 
commonly used in CBHI research (as discussed in chapter 2) are needed to evaluate 
the impact of CBHI, such as: whether in practice the schemes were successful in 
improving financial protection from the cost of ill health (i.e. whether CBHI 
members had lower levels of out-of-pocket expenditure than non-members); whether 
CBHI improved people’s access to needed health care; and whether the schemes had 
managed to improve health service quality by purchasing health services 
strategically. Understanding the impact of CBHI is important, since if the CBHI 
schemes provided little or no benefit to their members, this may explain the low 
levels of enrolment.  Furthermore, national level policymaking was not studied 
directly, although stakeholders interviewed at the local level did mention some of its 
limitations. The issue of national level policy is discussed briefly below.   
Another potential limitation of the study relates to Ben Fine’s argument that the 
concept of social capital is flawed due to its underlying methodological 
individualism (Fine 2010). Social capital theory is based on the premise that social 
phenomena are the result of individual action. It adopts a Weberian view of 
institutions which are seen as “collectivities (which) must be treated as solely the 
resultants and modes of organization of the particular acts of individual persons, 
since these alone can be treated as agents in a course of subjectively understandable 
action” (Weber et al. 1968, p. 13). Fine’s main accusation is that Coleman and 
Putnam, as well as the social capital studies inspired by them, employ 
methodological individualism in order to propose rational choice theory as the 
primary explanation for social phenomena, thereby ignoring social structures such as 
hierarchies and class. Measures of “collective” social capital, such as the number of 
social clubs present in a given community, and “individual” social capital, such as 
the number of social clubs an individual belongs to, both take as their foundation the 
principle of methodological individualism and rational choice, as it is assumed that 
this social capital is a product of the actions of individuals consciously seeking to 
attain certain productive goals, and structural social constraints on this individual 
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action are not considered. However, while this PhD does employ methodological 
individualism, it does not adopt rational choice theory as its underlying premise. 
Rather, as discussed (chapter 2), the PhD takes Woolcock’s conceptual framework of 
social capital as its main influence for developing research questions and for 
organising and interpreting the results of the fieldwork. Woolcock’s framework 
draws heavily on the work of Portes, an economic sociologist who does employ 
methodological individualism but is not a rational choice theorist. Portes’ (and 
subsequently Woolcock’s)  interpretation of social capital theory seeks to study the 
impact of social and cultural relations, power and unintended consequences of 
individual rational action on economic outcomes (chapter 2) (Portes 2010). By 
adopting Portes and Woolcock’s view of social capital, the PhD challenges Fine’s 
critique that social capital studies are informed by rational choice theory.  
Portes’ work is greatly influenced by Pierre Bourdieu (Bourdieu also employed 
methodological individualism but not rational choice theory). The PhD, in turn, is 
also informed by Bourdieu, in particular the theory that different types of capital are 
fungible and a source of social power (Bourdieu 1986) (chapter 2). However, the 
PhD research only partially explores Bourdieu’s theory, as it only focuses only two 
of the four types of capital (social and economic capital are studied, but cultural and 
symbolic capital are not) and only tentatively explores fungibility and the 
relationship between capitals and power. The fungibility of social and economic 
capital is explored in chapter 3 which finds that people with increased social capital 
are more likely to purchase a CBHI premium (as a form of financial protection from 
the cost of ill health, CBHI is interpreted to be a potential source of economic 
capital). Additionally, chapter 4 suggests that people with increased social capital are 
more likely to remain enrolled in CBHI and that membership of CBHI may also 
increase peoples’ social capital through active participation (e.g. attending training or 
meetings). However, since the results in chapters 3 and 4 demonstrate correlation 
rather than causal relationships, they only tentatively point to the fungibility of social 
and economic capital and reasons for this fungibility (e.g. it is tentatively argued that 
social capital may increase the likelihood of enrolling and remaining enrolled in 
CBHI by providing people with access to information). Furthermore, while chapter 3 
suggests that social capital determines membership of CBHI, chapter 4 raises the 
possibility that the opposite is also true, as being a member of CBHI may increase 
  197 
social capital, albeit only for the minority of members who actively participate in the 
scheme. Again, the study design did not permit exploration of these cyclical 
processes. The theory that social and economic capital are a source of social power is 
tentatively illustrated by chapter 3 which finds that CBHI members are more likely to 
have increased levels of social power compared to non-members. However, causal 
links between increased social and economic capital and increased social power in 
the contexts studied are not explored. Chapter 5, on the other hand, is able to provide 
some insights into how and why increased social capital potentially translates into 
social power, and how and why this social power potentially increases economic 
capital. The chapter finds that CBHI scheme leaders attempted to mobilise social 
capital (represented as values inherent in social networks) in order to develop social 
power (through participation in social movements and engagement in local politics), 
which in turn was used as a strategy to gain economic capital (i.e. local government 
subsidies). The chapter points to limitations at each of these steps (e.g. inconsistent 
and contradictory values; weak social movements and conflicts in local politics) that 
may explain CBHI leaders’ inability to increase their economic capital (represented 
by the lack of subsidies). However, from the perspective of Bourdieu’s theory, these 
explanations are only partial and tentative. A more comprehensive study of the ways 
in which social, economic, cultural and symbolic capital are transformed into each 
other and how this relates to social power in the context of CBHI in Senegal would 
have required intensive research into local cultural and social life, through 
ethnography or through longitudinal quantitative studies for example, that was 
beyond the scope of the PhD. Future research in this vein would be useful in order to 
better understand how the different types of capital interact with each other and are 
transformed into social power and social class, and how this in turn affects enrolment 
in CBHI.  
In sum, it seems that employing case studies, a household survey and qualitative 
interviews in a cross-sectional deductive research design, as was done in the PhD, 
can produce meaningful results about the relationship between the causes of low 
CBHI enrolment and social capital which resonate with and build on the findings of 
other studies from various areas of research in international development, and 
broader social theory. The results of this study apply to the three schemes studied, 
but it is likely that other CBHI schemes in Senegal, perhaps West Africa and even 
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more widely face similar difficulties. More research is needed to understand if this is 
the case. It is also possible that these findings may be relevant to other types of 
health insurance schemes and other types of groups and associations which are 
currently being implemented by development projects in low income contexts. 
Again, more research is needed to assess whether this might be the case. However, 
any future research in this field would benefit from an inductive research design 
which also includes ethnography and longitudinal surveys to strengthen and enrich 
the results, if sufficient resources are available. 
6.4 Policy implications 
Social capital theory has been critiqued as a rationale for development agencies to 
conduct social engineering (Fine 2001). It is accused of broadening the scope of 
justifiable intervention from the economic to the social, in order to rectify market 
imperfections in order, in turn, to ensure that market-oriented policies are successful, 
whilst obscuring a critique of those policies (Fine 2001). CBHI, as a form of private, 
voluntary health insurance, is a market-oriented policy, but this PhD does not aim to 
build a case for, or against, social interventions to ensure it is successful. Rather, as 
outlined in Chapter 1, the PhD aims to demonstrate the potential utility of social 
capital research in unpacking complex social relationships in CBHI and making their 
importance to policy and programming intelligible. The evidence could be used 
support policies to scale up CBHI; some suggestions are made below. However it 
should be noted that the main objective of the PhD was not to develop CBHI policy, 
but rather to study the role of social capital in CBHI. As such, only specific policy 
recommendations flowing from the research conducted on social capital are 
proposed. Broader policies for operationalising CBHI are not discussed as they fall 
outside of the scope of the PhD.  Broadly, the scenario proposed is one of voluntary 
enrolment of the population into multiple small community-based schemes which are 
staffed by remunerated workers and governed by federations of CBHI schemes 
which pool financial resources, conduct joint purchasing of hospital (but not 
primary) services, provide governance, support social movements which promote 
values underpinning CBHI and engage with local government. Funding would be 
provided both by the population through premiums and by local government through 
subsidies; the government would as a result need to take a stronger regulatory role. 
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However, echoing critical analyses of other market-oriented health sector reforms 
(Bennett, McPake, and Mills 1997), it is recognised that the evidence could also be 
interpreted in such a way so as to conclude that policies to improve CBHI would 
require local institutions to develop new capacities such that the market-oriented 
reforms become more demanding on these local institutions than alternative, public 
sector policies.  
The following sections present policy implications of the PhD at the micro and 
macro level.  These may be of interest to the three CBHI schemes studied, other 
CBHI schemes, federations of CBHI schemes, international organisations providing 
technical assistance to CBHI schemes, and local and national governments seeking to 
promote CBHI, in Senegal and possibly in other countries pursuing a policy of 
CBHI.  
Policy implications at the micro level: build mechanisms to increase bonding and 
bridging social capital between the staff of CBHI schemes and the target 
population 
Given the challenges outlined in section 6.2, the scheme staff needed to achieve the 
following objectives, which together can be thought of as increasing bonding and 
bridging social capital among the scheme staff (both leaders and local staff) and the 
target population: 
• facilitate the flow of information between the target population, local scheme 
staff and scheme leaders,  
• systematically develop a more trusting relationship with the target population, 
• and facilitate an on-going dialogue with the target population on the values 
and norms underpinning the scheme. 
The following mechanisms could be considered for achieving these goals: 
Mechanisms affecting scheme leaders 
• Create a stronger and better resourced central administration of schemes. In 
particular, the leaders needed to be paid a salary. However, there was a need to 
develop a strategy which was reliably financed (see discussion on subsidies 
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below) and would remunerate CBHI scheme staff while retaining the “spirit” of 
voluntarism which was a motivational factor (chapter 5). 
• Encourage members to elect leaders with wide social networks. 
• Introduce incentives to generate increased active participation of members in the 
scheme, particularly among those with low social capital.  
Since the schemes did not generate sufficient revenue to finance any of these 
activities, external sources of funding were needed (see below). 
Mechanisms affecting local scheme staff  
There was a need to develop strategies to mobilise existing social capital at the 
grassroots level through the recruitment of local staff members. There was a need to 
build the capacity of local staff by providing:  
• appropriate financial incentives,  
• resources to hold local meetings and marketing of CBHI, 
• and training in financial management, leadership, social networks, 
communication, community development and community participation. 
In terms of enrolling new members into the CBHI schemes and retaining members, 
local staff needed to: 
• identify ways of systematically enrolling people en mass, for example by 
utilising social networks and associations, 
• at the same time identify ways of enrolling households with low levels of 
economic and social capital, 
• collect premiums by integrating payment into an existing community-level 
payment systems, 
• reduce drop-out by creating more opportunities for more active participation.  
The GMS system of women’s income generation groups in WAW (chapter 5) 
provides an example of such a strategy. A similar model could be explored with 
other community organisations, unions, collectives, Muslim brotherhoods, extended 
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families (these could be very large) and so on, as well as schools and any informal 
professional group that might already collect fees, such as taxi drivers and market 
sellers. However, following this model, CBHI schemes could become vulnerable to 
the internal politics and power struggles of existing associations. Furthermore, 
crucially, as there was already a tendency for households with more economic and 
social capital and social power to have a higher level of enrolment (chapter 3), this 
model was likely to reinforce this tendency, increasing the exclusion of socially 
marginalised groups and inequity in the scheme. Similarly, chapter 5 suggests that if 
CBHI schemes uncritically fund and promote participation activities, individuals 
who are already more empowered or who already have higher levels of social capital 
may be more likely to access these resources and remain enrolled in the scheme, 
while others may be more likely to drop out. Funding this type of active participation 
could thereby indirectly further increase inequity in health coverage. 
It was therefore important to develop a complementary strategy to engage 
households with low levels of economic and social capital in CBHI, in order to 
promote solidarity and equity in the schemes. In order to achieve this, the scheme 
staff needed to work with local communities in order to: identify socially excluded 
households in the community which had not enrolled in CBHI; develop an outreach 
mechanism for engaging these households and understanding the barriers to their 
enrolment in CBHI; and develop a way of implementing strategies to overcome the 
barriers identified, for example by subsidising premiums. Such a process is likely to 
be extremely challenging. Lessons could be learnt from other countries 
experimenting with such approaches, such as Ghana where policymakers and 
researchers are seeking to identify a mechanism for targeting subsidies to cover the 
premium of the National Health Insurance Scheme for indigents. Researchers have 
developed a qualitative participatory wealth ranking tool for the exploration of 
community concepts, identification and ranking of households into socioeconomic 
groups. The tool defines indicators of poverty according to themes related to type of 
employment, educational attainment of children, food availability, physical 
appearance, housing conditions, asset ownership, health seeking behaviour, social 
exclusion and marginalization (Aryeetey et al. 2013). A similar approach which 
incorporates social capital indicators could be developed by CBHI schemes in 
Senegal. However, as already mentioned, the schemes did not generate sufficient 
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revenue to finance such activities and provide subsidies; external sources of funding 
for subsidies were therefore needed.  
On the other hand, as mentioned in chapter 5, government subsidies for CBHI are not 
necessarily a cost-effective approach to providing health services for the poor; it has 
been found in Cambodia and Lao that the same level of access for the poor could 
have been achieved with a lower subsidy if the subsidy was used as a direct 
reimbursement of user charges to the provider rather than through the CBHI scheme 
(Annear, Bigdeli, and Jacobs 2011), raising the question whether subsidising 
premiums of CBHI is advisable from an efficiency perspective. This question is 
however beyond the scope of the PhD.  
Policy implications at the macro level: strengthen mechanisms to increase bridging 
social capital between the staff of CBHI schemes and other stakeholders 
Federations (supra-communal organizations of the poor constituting a special 
manifestation of social capital) in low income countries have been found to have the 
potential to foster strategic forms of collective action and engagement with 
government, civil society, and markets, and to build sustainable bridges between 
different types of organizations (Bebbington and Carroll 2000). By developing 
bridges between political and economic organizations, successful federations were 
able to benefit from each other’s strengths (Bebbington and Carroll 2000) (chapters 2 
and 5). Among the case studies two types of federation were identified: specialist 
federations which brought together CBHI schemes only and intersectoral federations 
which brought together a wide variety of development organisations and projects 
(chapter 5). The results and the wider literature (Bebbington and Carroll 2000) 
suggest that the scaling up of CBHI was enhanced by both types of federations. 
Specialist federations were needed to: 
• analyse common problems and best practices;  
• develop a formal and accountable governance structure; 
• monitor CBHI implementation;  
• engage important stakeholders such as health service providers, local 
government and international donors;  
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• and collectively negotiate contracts with hospitals on behalf of all CBHI 
schemes in the federation.  
CBHI schemes also needed to join federations of local NGOs working in a variety of 
development sectors in order to gain:  
• new perspectives from diverse NGO leaders;  
• strategic direction, such as identifying highly organised and strong social 
networks for enrolment and premium collection en mass, and socially 
excluded groups which may require extra support in terms of enrolment and 
subsidies;  
• a social movement dynamic through collective action which challenges 
established power structures and promotes local social values; 
• collective negotiating power in lobbying for subsidies; 
• a formal and accountable governance structure which oversees the activities 
of the member NGOs; 
• and a platform for NGO (including CBHI) leaders’ political electoral 
campaigns which promote community development. 
Taken together, the proposed reforms represent a formidable challenge for CBHI 
schemes; while each of the schemes studied had managed to build or strengthen 
some of these mechanisms for increasing social capital, much remained to be done 
both at the micro and macro levels. It is difficult to envisage CBHI schemes 
achieving these reforms without support from central government, particularly in 
terms of preventing corruption in local government and promoting transparency in 
CBHI policy. It remains to be seen whether the new government which continues to 
place CBHI at the centre of its health financing policy (Ministère de la Santé 2012) 
would be willing and able to provide this kind of support to the CBHI system. 
Furthermore, even if the schemes managed to successfully build social capital in the 
ways suggested, it is of course not guaranteed that this would result in local 
government subsidies, contracts with hospitals and ultimately increased enrolment 
and reduced drop-out. Again, increased central government intervention could help, 
for example by mandating certain aspects of CBHI policy such as enrolment, hospital 
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contracts or subsidies. Also of concern is the possibility that reforms to strengthen 
CBHI in Senegal by building social capital may not be cost-effective when compared 
to alternative supply-side policies for increasing financial protection. Indeed, it may 
be the case that the needed reforms would require local institutions to develop new 
capacities that are so demanding that alternative public sector policies (such as 
national social health insurance or stepped-up user fee removal) emerge as preferable 
alternatives. Answering questions regarding national level policy alternatives to 
CBHI in Senegal would, however, require further research that is beyond the scope 
of the PhD.  
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Appendix 1. Further details on the role of the MUCAPS project in the relation 
to the PhD 
Details of the PhD author’s role in the MUCAPS project and the relationship 
between the PhD and the project are explained below. 
 
Hypotheses  
The PhD hypothesis, increased bridging social capital at all levels of CBHI helps to 
increase enrolment in CBHI, but the benefits of this dynamic are likely to be 
unequally distributed and to favour individuals and groups who already hold other 
forms of capital and social power, is underpinned by the conceptual framework 
presented in Chapter 2. Chapter 2 was written by the PhD author before the 
MUCAPS project began; as such it was produced entirely independently of the 
project.  
MUCAPS tested the following research hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: The social capital of the community and the individual members of a 
CBHI scheme are major factors in the development of CBHI; 
Hypothesis 2: Beyond its contribution to facilitate access to care, CBHI schemes 
produce social capital for members of CBHI schemes and the communities in which 
the schemes operate. 
There are several important differences between the PhD and MUCAPS hypotheses. 
The MUCAPS hypotheses focus on the development of CBHI in general, while the 
PhD hypothesis is narrower, focusing on enrolment. The MUCAPS hypotheses view 
CBHI as a mechanism for producing social capital which benefits not only the 
scheme but also the wider community. As such, they were influenced by literature 
which argues that social capital might be an outcome of participatory development 
projects and that creating social capital through development is potentially beneficial 
for the sustainability of interventions (Turner 1999).  In contrast, the PhD hypothesis 
focuses on structural barriers to obtaining social capital and the detrimental effects of 
  229 
lacking social capital. In this sense, the PhD takes a more critical perspective than the 
MUCAPS hypotheses. Furthermore, the PhD hypothesis distinguishes between 
bonding and bridging social capital, whereas the MUCAPS hypotheses do not.  
Design of research protocol and tools 
MUCAPS and the PhD both employed the same research protocol (mixed-methods 
multiple case study design), sampling method (random sample of households and 
purposive and snowball samples of individuals for qualitative interviews) and 
research tools (household questionnaire and interview guides). The PhD author led 
on the design of these, with inputs from the project team, and both the MUCAPS 
hypotheses and the PhD hypothesis were incorporated. Details of the research 
methods are presented in the PhD empirical papers in chapters 3-5.  
Data collection 
The PhD draws on the data collected under the MUCAPS project. The following four 
types of data collection were conducted under the project: household survey, semi-
structured interviews and focus groups with members, ex-members and non-
members of CBHI; and stakeholder interviews. Data were collected by the PhD 
author, the project team and a team of 10 Senegalese professional quantitative and 
qualitative interviewers. The PhD author trained the interviewers and managed data 
collection on the ground, in partnership with the project team. The PhD author 
personally conducted 34 of the 64 stakeholder interviews. 
The household survey data and stakeholder interview data are the primary data 
sources for the empirical chapters of the PhD (chapters 3, 4 and 5). Additionally, the 
semi-structured interview data are used as a supplementary data source in Chapter 3. 
The focus group data are not used in the PhD. All data are available on request. 
Data analysis and writing up 
The logistic regression analysis of the household survey data was done by the PhD 
author only and used only for the PhD (not for the MUCAPS project). The results are 
presented in chapters 3 and 4.   
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The stakeholder interview qualitative data were analysed by the PhD author only, 
using inductive coding, and used for the PhD and the MUCAPS project. The author 
received feedback on the coding from the project team in periodic meetings. The 
results are presented in chapter 5.  
Due to the large volume of data, the coding of the member / non-member / ex 
member semi-structured interview and focus group qualitative data was done by a 
team of research assistants based at CREPOS in Senegal. Deductive coding was done 
using a coding frame collaboratively designed by the project team including the PhD 
author, based on the interview guides and the research questions. The results were 
used primarily for the MUCAPS project. However, the author drew on this analysis 
to identify quotations from the semi-structured interview data in order to triangulate 
and interpret the findings of the regressions in chapter 3. Further details on data 
analysis used in the PhD are provided in chapters 3-5. Drafting of the entire PhD was 
done solely by the PhD author. 
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Appendix 2: Household questionnaire (WAW case study) 
ITM, Antwerp                                     CREPOS, Dakar                                   LSE Health, London 
ENQUÊTE SUR LA CAPITAL SOCIAL DES MUTUELLES DE SANTE  
République du Sénégal 
(JUILLET 2009) 
QUESTIONNAIRE MENAGE 
 ** TYPES DE REPONDANT: ADHERENT, EX ADHERENT, NON ADHERENT ** 
IDENTIFICATION 
            
 
NOM  DE  LA  MUTUELLE……………WER-AK-WERLE………………………………. 
            
        
 NUMÉRO  DU MENAGE        
            
 GMS                …………………………………………………… 
            
 Quartier ……………………………………………………       
            
 TYPE  DE  MENAGE ‘OFFICIEL’ : 1= adhérent, 2=  ex adhérent (ne pas a jour), 3= non    
                                                             adhérent 
  
            
            
    
 Statut du répondant   1. chef de ménage 
2. conjoint 
3. autre membre (à 
préciser) 
       
 Nom du répondant   
           
            
 DATE DE L’ENQUETE  Jour     
   Mois     
         
 HEURE DE DEBUT       
         
  
ENQUETEUR 
      
            
 CONTROLEUR SUPERVISEUR   
         
 Numéro     Numéro               
 Paraphe  Paraphe              
 Jour     Jour               
 mois     mois               
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Bonjour, je m’appelle XXX.  
Je mène une enquête sur la vie sociale et la santé dans votre communauté. Cette enquête est commanditée par CREPOS 
(Centre de Recherche sur les Politiques Sociales), Dakar ; ITM (Institut de Médecine Tropicale), Belgique ; et LSE 
(l’Ecole d’Economie Londres) ; en collaboration avec le Ministère de la Santé, La Coordination des Mutuelles de Santé 
de Thiès, et L’Union des Mutuelles de Santé de Dakar. Elle a pour objectif de connaître la vie sociale des populations 
afin d’améliorer l’accessibilité aux soins et santé.       
SECTION 1 : CARACTERISTIQUE DU CHEF DE MENAGE 
 
  
Numéro  
 
 
Libellé de la question 
 
REPONSES 
 
ALLER  
A 
  
Avez-vous fréquenté l’école ou 
participé à un programme 
d’alphabétisation? 
 oui 
 
 non 
 
 
M104 
  
Quel est le plus haut niveau 
d’études que vous avez atteint : 
primaire, secondaire ou supérieur? 
 ALPHABÉTISÉ 
 PRIMAIRE 
 SECONDAIRE 1ER CYCLE 
 SECONDAIRE 2EME CYCLE 
 SUPÉRIEUR 
 AUTRE (PRÉCISER) 
_________________________ 
                  
M103 
 En quels langages êtes-vous été 
alphabétisé ? 
 
Plusieurs réponses possibles 
 
 FRANÇAIS 
 ARABE 
 WOLOF 
 POULAR 
 SERER 
 AUTRES LANGUES 
(PRÉCISER) 
_________________________ 
 
 
  
Quelle est votre religion ? 
 
 MUSULMANS  
 CHRETIENS  
 RELIGION 
TRADITIONNELLE  
 AUTRE RELIGION (PRÉCISER) 
_________________________ 
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Numéro  
 
 
Libellé de la question 
 
REPONSES 
 
ALLER  
A 
  
Quelle est votre confrérie / 
confession ? 
 MOURIDE 
 TIDIANE 
 KHADRE 
 AUTRES MUSULMANS 
 CATHOLIQUE 
 PROTESTANT 
 AUTRES CHRETIENS 
 AUTRE (PRÉCISER) 
_________________________ 
 
 
  
Quelle est votre nationalité ? 
 SÉNÉGALAISE  
 AUTRE (PRÉCISER) 
_________________________ 
 
 
M108 
  
Quelle est votre ethnie ? 
 WOLOF  
 POULAR 
 SÉRER 
 MANDINGUE  
 DIOLA   
 SONINKÉ  
 AUTRE (PRÉCISER) 
________________________   
 
  
Avez-vous actuellement une 
activité  professionnelle ? 
 Oui 
 
 Non 
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Dans quel domaine exercez-vous 
votre activité principale ? 
 Agriculture 
 Elevage 
 Pêche 
 Commerce 
 Industrie 
 Administration 
 Services (transport, restauration    
              etc) 
 AUTRE (PRÉCISER) 
________________________  
  
 
  
Quel est votre statut dans cette 
activité 
 
 Propre compte 
 Pour le compte de la famille   
 Employé 
 Pour un parent 
 Apprenti  
 
 Quelle est la périodicité de votre 
activité ? 
 Permanent 
 Temporaire 
 Occasionnel 
 Autre 
(préciser)………………… 
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Numéro  
 
 
Libellé de la question 
 
REPONSES 
 
ALLER  
A 
 Avez-vous une activité annexe ?  Non  
 Agriculture 
 Elevage 
 Pêche 
 Commerce 
 Industrie 
 Administration 
 Services (transport, restauration    
              etc) 
 Autre (préciser) 
.............................  
 
  
Quelles sont les trois principales 
sources de revenus financiers de 
votre ménage par ordre 
d’importance? 
 
 
 
Il faut ranger les rubriques selon 
l’importance de leur contribution 
dans la formation du revenu du 
ménage.  
 Rang 
(1-3) 
a. Agriculture  
b. Elevage  
c. Pêche/chasse  
d. Commerce  
e. Industrie/artisanat  
f. Administration  
g. Services (transport, 
restauration etc.) 
 
h. Transfert d’argent  
i. Pension  
j. Crédit / emprunts  
k. Autres   
(préciser) 
 
 Quel est en moyenne le montant du 
revenu mensuel du ménage ? 
 Moins de 25.000 F  
 25.000 à 50.000 F  
 50.000 à 75.000 F  
 75.000 à 100.000 F  
 100.000 à 150.000 F  
 Plus de 150.000 F  
 Ne sait pas 
 
 
SECTION 2 : CARACTERISTIQUES DES MEMBRES DU MENAGE 
Inscrire les membres qui habitent ou dorment régulièrement dans le ménage pendant le dernier an, y inclus le répondant. 
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Numéro 
Ordre 
Prénom 
et Nom 
Statut 
dans le 
ménage  
Sexe Age Résidence Situation vis-
à-vis de la 
mutuelle 
Instruction 
(Personnes âgées 
de 10 ans et plus) 
Handicap Maladie 
Chronique 
Maladie 
Récente 
Perception 
  1/Chef de 
ménage 
2/ 
Conjoint/e 
3/Fils ou 
fille 
4/ Autre 
 
1/ 
Masculin 
2/ 
Féminin 
Quel est 
l’âge de.. 
1 Résident 
permanant 
2. Résident 
temporaire 
3. Visiteur 
1. 
Actuellement 
bénéficiaire 
2.  N’est plus 
bénéficiaire 
3.  N’a jamais 
été 
bénéficiaire 
4. Pas 
concerné 
(visiteur) 
0/ Aucun 
1/alphabétisé 
2/Primaire 
3/secondaire 
4/ Supérieur 
Souffre 
d’un 
handicap 
 
1/Oui 
0/ Non 
Souffre 
d’une 
maladie 
chronique 
 
1/Oui 
0/ Non 
A eu maladie, 
accident, 
blessure etc. 
au cours des 
15 derniers 
jours 
 
1//Oui 
0/ Non 
Selon vous, 
quel est  
l’état de 
votre/sa 
santé ? 
1/ Très 
bonne  
2/Bonne 
3/Moyenne 
4/Mauvaise 
5/ Très 
mauvaise 
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Numéro 
Ordre 
Prénom 
et Nom 
Statut 
dans le 
ménage  
Sexe Age Résidence Situation vis-
à-vis de la 
mutuelle 
Instruction 
(Personnes âgées 
de 10 ans et plus) 
Handicap Maladie 
Chronique 
Maladie 
Récente 
Perception 
  1/Chef de 
ménage 
2/ 
Conjoint/e 
3/Fils ou 
fille 
4/ Autre 
 
1/ 
Masculin 
2/ 
Féminin 
Quel est 
l’âge de.. 
1 Résident 
permanant 
2. Résident 
temporaire 
3. Visiteur 
1. 
Actuellement 
bénéficiaire 
2.  N’est plus 
bénéficiaire 
3.  N’a 
jamais été 
bénéficiaire 
4. Pas 
concerné 
(visiteur) 
0/ Aucun 
1/alphabétisé 
2/Primaire 
3/secondaire 
4/ Supérieur 
Souffre 
d’un 
handicap 
 
1/Oui 
0/ Non 
Souffre 
d’une 
maladie 
chronique 
 
1/Oui 
0/ Non 
A eu maladie, 
accident, 
blessure etc. 
au cours des 
15 derniers 
jours 
 
1//Oui 
0/ Non 
Selon vous, 
quel est  
l’état de 
votre/sa 
santé ? 
1/ Très 
bonne  
2/Bonne 
3/Moyenne 
4/Mauvaise 
5/ Très 
mauvaise 
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SECTION 3 : CARACTERISTIQUE DE L’HABITAT 
  
Numéro  
 
Libellé de la question 
 
REPONSES 
 
ALLER  
A 
 Le type d’habitation du ménage est 
principalement : 
 
 Paille 
 Terre  
 Ciment 
Autres (préciser)_____________ 
 
 Quelle est la principale source d’eau 
potable du ménage ? 
 
ROBINET RACCORDÉ  RÉSEAU OU FORAGE 
 Dans la concession 
 Extérieur de la concession 
Puits protégé 
 Dans la concession 
 Extérieur de la concession  
Puits non protégé 
 Dans la concession 
 Extérieur de la concession  
 Rivière, fleuve, pluie 
 Autre 
(préciser)___________________ 
 
 
     
  
Quel mode principal d’éclairage est 
utilisé dans le ménage ? 
 
 Électricité    
 Gaz                                              
 Pétrole  
 Bougie  
 Bois  
 Autre 
(préciser)___________________ 
 
 
  
Quelle énergie utilisez-vous 
principalement pour  la cuisson ? 
 Électricité   
 Gaz                                                
 Pétrole   
 Bois ou charbon  
 Autre 
(préciser)__________________ 
 
 
 Dans votre  ménage  
y-a-t-il : 
                              
 Radio 
 télévision 
 téléphone 
 réfrigérateur 
 cuisinière  
 Aucun 
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Numéro  
 
Libellé de la question 
 
REPONSES 
 
ALLER  
A 
 Votre ménage possède t-il :                      
 Bicyclette 
 mobylette 
 Voiture 
 Charrette 
 Aucun 
 
 
 
De combien dispose votre ménage pour 
chacun des biens suivants : 
Chevaux ? 
Bœufs ? 
ânes ? 
Porcs ? 
Moutons et chèvres ? 
SI AUCUN, ENREGISTRER « 000 ». 
SI NE SAIT PAS LE NOMBRE, 
ENREGISTRER « NSP ». 
  
CHEVAUX    
BŒUFS 
  
 
ANES    
PORCS    
MOUTONS ET CHEVRES    
VOLAILLES    
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Numéro  
 
Libellé de la question 
 
REPONSES 
 
ALLER  
A 
  
 
Quels sont, par mois, les postes de 
dépenses et les montants par poste ?  
 
SI AUCUN, ENREGISTRER « 00 ». SI 
NE SAIT PAS LE MONTANT, 
ENREGISTRER « NSP ».  
 
 Montant 
dépensé 
(CFA) 
Transport 
 
 
Scolarité  
 
 
Energie (électricité, 
gaz, bois, charbon, 
pétrole etc.)  
 
 
Eau 
 
 
Téléphone 
 
 
Habits, cheveux 
 
 
Santé 
 
 
Nourriture  
 
 
Transfert d’argent 
 
 
Loyer 
 
 
Cadeaux pour des 
événements sociaux 
(mariages, baptêmes 
etc.) (sinon par moi, 
dans le dernier mois) 
 
Les groupes, 
associations 
 
 
Taxes 
 
 
Autres 
 
 
 
 
 A combien estimez vous les dépenses 
mensuelles du ménage ? 
 
Montant dépensé (CFA) 
 
_________________________________________________ 
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SECTION 4: LE CAPITAL SOCIAL 
 
Numéro  
 
 
Libellé de la question 
 
REPONSES 
 
ALLER  
A 
 Les membres de votre 
ménage sont … 
 1 2 
 Oui Non 
tous de la même ethnie   
tous de la même religion   
Autres différences   
 
Préciser autres différences _____________________ 
 
 Avez-vous des types de 
relations privilégiées avec 
d’autres personnes  
 Oui 
 Non 
 
 Précisez les formes de 
relations 
 0 1-5 6-10 11-15 16 ou plus 
Parrain / marraine 
     
Homonyme 
     
Njeuké 
     
Ndeye diké 
     
Sani jamra 
     
Autre (préciser) 
 
  
 
 Êtes-vous membre d’une 
association (autre 
association que la 
mutuelle de santé)? 
 
1 oui   
2 non    
 
 
 
M406 
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 De quel type d’association 
êtes-vous membre ? 
 
Plusieurs réponses 
possibles 
 Coopérative de cultivateur, éleveur ou de pêcheur 
 Groupement de promotion féminine (GPF) 
 Groupe de commerçants, entrepreneurs, GIE 
 Association professionnelle (médecins, enseignants, 
artisan, etc.)  
 Syndicats  
 Association de village (ex. tour, ressortissants de 
…) 
 Groupe religieux (dahira, chorale, et autres) 
 Groupe ou mouvement politique  
 Groupe culturel (Arts, musique, théâtre) 
 Groupement d’épargne et de crédit ou tontine 
 Association pour l’éducation (parents d’élèves, 
autres comités scolaires) 
 Association sportive (ex. ASC) 
 Mouvement de jeunesse  
 Association basée sur l’ethnie, la langue ou le lien 
familiale, tour de famille / génération, ndeye diké  
 ONG  
 Service civique  
 Comité de quartier, village … ex. Eau, forage, 
santé, vigilance, etc.  
Autres 
 …………………………………….……
 …………………………………………. 
 ……………………………………….… 
   
 
 Est-ce que les membres de 
votre ménage sont aussi 
membres d’associations 
(autre association que la 
mutuelle de santé)? 
 
1 oui           
2 non              
3 Ne sais pas   
 
 
 
 
    
M408 
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 De quel type d’association 
? 
 
Plusieurs réponses 
possibles 
 Coopérative de cultivateur, éleveur ou de pêcheur 
 Groupement de promotion féminine (GPF) 
 Groupe de commerçants, entrepreneurs, GIE 
 Association professionnelle (médecins, enseignants, 
artisan, etc.)  
 Syndicats  
 Association de village (ex. tour, ressortissants de 
…) 
 Groupe religieux (dahira, chorale, et autres) 
 Groupe ou mouvement politique  
 Groupe culturel (Arts, musique, théâtre) 
 Groupement d’épargne et de crédit ou tontine 
 Association pour l’éducation (parents d’élèves, 
autres comités scolaires) 
 Association sportive (ex. ASC) 
 Mouvement de jeunesse  
 Association basée sur l’ethnie, la langue ou le lien 
familiale, tour de famille / génération, ndeye diké 
 ONG  
 Service civique  
 Comité de quartier, village … ex. Eau, forage, 
santé, vigilance, etc.  
Autres 
 …………………………………….……
 …………………………………………. 
 ……………………………………….… 
 ……………………………………….… 
 ……………………………………….…  
 
 Est-ce que le nombre 
d’associations auxquelles 
vous avez adhéré (vous et 
les membres de votre 
ménage) a augmenté, est 
stable  ou a diminué dans 
les 5 dernières années ? 
 
 Augmenté 
 Stable 
 Diminué 
 
 
    
 Pouvez-vous estimer le 
nombre d’associations 
dans lesquelles vous et 
votre ménage êtes 
membres ?  
 
SI AUCUN, 
ENREGISTRER « 00 » 
ET  
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
M417 
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 De toutes ces associations 
dont vous ou les membres 
de votre ménage êtes 
membres (autre 
association que la 
mutuelle de santé), citez-
en deux qui vous 
paraissent les plus 
bénéfiques pour votre 
ménage ? [Enquêteur: écrire le 
nom des associations] 
 
Association A _____________________ 
 
 
Association B _____________________ 
 
  
 
 
 
Comment votre ménage 
est devenu membre de ces 
deux associations ? 
 
 Associati
on 
Motivation à l’adhésion A B 
Initiateur / membre fondateur   
Natif/ve   
Volontaire   
Sollicité par d’autres personnes   
Invité   
6. Autre (spécifier)  
Association A _____________________ 
Association B _____________________ 
 
 
 
 
 Lorsqu’il y a une décision 
à prendre dans ces deux 
associations, quel est le 
poids de votre ménage 
pour influencer la 
décision ?  
 Associatio
n 
 A B 
Jamais   
Peu    
Beaucoup    
 
 
 Quelle est la fréquence de 
participation des membres 
de votre ménage aux 
activités de ces deux 
associations ?  
 Associatio
n 
 A B 
Rarement ou très occasionnellement   
Parfois (mais au moins une fois par 
semaine)   
Très souvent (plus de deux fois par 
semaine)   
 
 
 Quelle est la contribution 
mensuelle de votre 
ménage dans ces deux 
associations (argent) ? 
 
 Associatio
n 
CFA A B 
≤ 1.000   
>1.000 - ≤5.000   
>5.000- ≤10.000   
>10.000 - ≤15.000   
>15.000 - ≤ 20.000   
Plus de 20.000   
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 Après votre adhésion à ces 
deux associations, quels 
sont les avantages que 
vous y avez trouvés ? 
 
Plusieurs réponses 
possibles 
 Associatio
n 
 A B 
Avantage matériel (argent, 
nourriture, crédit, etc.)    
Accès aux services   
Important dans le futur, en cas 
d’urgence   
Avantage pour toute la 
communauté   
Loisir et activités récréatives   
Spirituel    
Statut social, réputation    
8. Autres (spécifier)  
    Association A _____________________ 
    Association B _____________________ 
 
 
 Qu’est-ce que vous avez 
en commun avec les 
membres de ces 
associations?  
 
Plusieurs réponses 
possibles 
 Associati
on 
 A B 
Voisins ou du même village 
  
Même famille ou parents proches 
  
Religion   
Genre   
Groupe d’âge   
Ethnie ou langue    
Caste   
Niveau d’éducation   
Profession   
Affiliation politique   
Statut économique   
Autres (spécifier) 
Association A _____________________ 
 
Association B _____________________ 
 
 
 
 Lorsqu’il y a un 
problème dans la 
communauté (par 
exemple l’accès à l’eau), 
est-il probable que tout 
le monde coopère pour 
résoudre le problème ?  
 Pas du tout probable 
 Très peu probable 
 Probable 
 Très probable 
 
 Prêteriez-vous de l’argent 
à votre voisin pour aller 
voir le docteur ? 
 oui 
 non 
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 Au cours des 12 derniers 
mois, avez-vous emprunté 
de l’argent ou avez-vous 
une dette en cours ?   
 oui 
 non  
 
  M422 
 Pour quelles raisons 
aviez-vous emprunté cette 
somme ? 
  
Transport   
Scolarité    
Energie (électricité, gaz, bois, 
charbon, pétrole etc.)  
  
Eau   
Téléphone   
Habits   
Santé   
Nourriture    
Transfert d’argent   
Initier ou renforcer une activité 
génératrice de revenus 
 
Autre (préciser) 
 
 
 
  
De qui aviez-vous 
emprunté cette somme ? 
 famille proche 
 parents 
 amis 
 membre d’une association 
 usurier 
 groupe de crédit (épargne/crédit) 
 banque 
 autre ……………………………… 
  ………………………………………. 
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 En général, quel est votre 
degré d’accord avec les 
énoncés suivants ? 
 
1 – PAS DU TOUT 
D’ACCORD 
2 – PAS D’ACCORD 
3 – NE SAIS PAS 
4 – ASSEZ D’ACCORD 
5 – TOUT À FAIT 
D’ACCORD 
 Pas 
d’accord→D’accord 
Enoncés  1 2 3 4 5 
A. On peut faire confiance à des 
personnes d’autres groupes ethniques ou 
linguistiques. 
     
B. On peut faire confiance aux étrangers 
     
C. On peut faire confiance aux 
personnes d’autres religions / confréries 
/ confessions 
     
D. On peut faire confiance aux 
gouvernants locaux. 
     
E. On peut faire confiance aux imams 
et prêtres. 
     
F. On peut faire confiance aux chefs 
traditionnels. 
     
G. On peut faire confiance aux 
enseignants. 
     
H. On peut faire confiance au staff 
médical. 
     
I. On peut faire confiance aux corps de 
sécurité (police, gendarmerie). 
     
J. On peut faire confiance à la justice.      
K. On peut faire confiance à mes amis 
et ma famille. 
     
L. On peut faire confiance à la plupart 
des personnes vivant dans notre 
communauté. 
     
M. On peut faire confiance aux 
personnes d’autres castes      
 
 En général, d’où recevez-
vous les informations sur 
la politique ou la 
communauté ? 
 
Plusieurs réponses 
possibles 
  
Parents, amis et voisins  
Affiches  
Marché local  
Journal de la communauté ou 
local 
 
Journaux nationaux  
Radio  
Télévision  
Dans des groupes (arbre à 
palabres, puits, damier,) ou 
associations 
 
Dans des lieux lies au travail  
Groupes politiques  
Chez les leaders locaux  
Chez un fonctionnaire  
Par les ONGS  
Par Internet  
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 Comment appréciez-
vous votre proximité 
(relations) avec les 
personnes du village  
 Très distant 
 Assez distant 
 Ne sais pas 
 Assez proche 
 Très proche  
 
 
 Combien de temps 
habitez vous dans le 
village / quartier ? 
 0-5 ans 
 6-10 ans 
 11-15 ans 
 16-20 ans 
 Plus que 20 ans / toute la vie 
 
 Y a t-il des activités de la 
communauté auxquelles 
vous ne pouvez pas 
(n’êtes pas autorisé à) 
participer ? 
 oui 
 
 non, je peux participer à toutes 
 
 
 
M428 
 Si oui lesquelles ? 
 
A_______________________________ 
B________________________________ 
C________________________________ 
 
 Comment appréciez-
vous votre contrôle des 
décisions prises dans 
votre communauté ou 
par votre voisin et qui 
affecte votre vie 
quotidienne ?  
 Pas de contrôle 
 Contrôle très peu de décisions 
 Ne sais pas 
 Contrôle la plupart des décisions 
 Contrôle toutes les décisions 
 
 Avez-vous voté aux 
dernières élections 
locales ? 
 oui 
 non 
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SECTION 5: LA MUTUELLE DE SANTE 
Numéro LIBELLÉ DE LA QUESTION REPONSES ALLER  A 
 Quel est votre statut dans la 
mutuelle Wer-Ak-Werle? 
 adhérent a la mutuelle 
 ex- adhérent  
 n’a jamais adhéré 
      M505 
 
M504  
 
 Avez-vous déjà entendu 
parler de la mutuelle de 
santé Wer-Ak-Werle ? 
 oui  
 non 
 
 
SECTION 6 
 Pourquoi n’avez-vous jamais 
adhéré à la mutuelle ?  
 
 
Plusieurs réponses possibles 
 Pas assez d’information         
 Cotisation trop chère 
 Pas assez des ressources financières    
 Services trop réduits   
 Pas confiance de la gestion 
 Pas confiance aux prestataires conventionnés 
  Pas confiance aux autres bénéficiaires 
 Période d’attente longue   
 Pris en charge par ailleurs  
 Autre   
 
 
M518 
 
 Depuis combien de temps 
vous n’êtes-plus adhérent à la 
mutuelle ?  
 
EN MOIS SI MOINS DE 2 ANS ET 
EN ANNÉES SI 2 ANS ET PLUS 
 
mois………………….1   
 
années……………….2   
 
 
 
  M506 
Questions 
en italiques 
 Payez-vous régulièrement les 
cotisations à la mutuelle ? 
 TOUJOURS  
 FRÉQUEMMENT  
 RAREMENT    
M507 
 Pourquoi vous ne payez pas 
régulièrement les 
cotisations ? 
 
Ex-Membre : Pourquoi vous 
avez arrêté de payer la 
cotisation ? 
 
Plusieurs réponses possibles 
 Cotisation trop chère   
 Pas assez des ressources financières    
 Services trop réduits   
 Pas confiance de la gestion 
 Pas confiance aux prestataires conventionnés 
  Pas confiance aux autres bénéficiaires 
 Période d’attente longue   
 Pris en charge par ailleurs  
 Autre 
 
 
 D’où provient l’argent avec 
lequel  vous payez votre 
cotisation ? 
 
Ex-Membre : D’où provenait 
l’argent avec lequel vous 
payiez votre cotisation ? 
1 SALAIRE / SUR LE REVENUE  
2 VENTE RÉCOLTE  
3 EPARGNE  
4 CREDIT / EMPRUNTS  
5 VENTE EXCEPTIONNELLE DE BIENS  
6 TRANSFERT  ARGENT  
7 AUTRE (PRÉCISER) 
............................. 
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Numéro LIBELLÉ DE LA QUESTION REPONSES ALLER  A 
  
Etes-vous satisfait de la 
qualité des services des 
prestataires conventionnés 
par la mutuelle ? 
 
Ex-Membre : Est-ce que vous 
avez été satisfait de la qualité 
des services des prestataires 
conventionnés par la mutuelle 
? 
  OUI NON 
1 CENTRE DE  SANTE    
2 POSTE DE SANTÉ MILITAIRE    
3 POSTE DE SANTÉ PUBLIC   
4 N’A PAS UTILISE DES 
PRESTATAIRES 
  
5 AUTRE (PRÉCISER) 
............................. 
  
 
     SI ‘OUI’ 
POUR 
TOUS ALLEZ 
A M510 
 Quelles sont les raisons de 
non satisfaction ? 
 
Ex-Membre : Quelles étaient 
les raisons de non 
satisfaction ?  
 
 
 
   
1 COMPÉTENCE DU  PERSONNEL  
2 PERSONNEL PEU DISPONIBLE  
3 DISPONIBILITÉ DES MÉDICAMENTS  
4 MAUVAIS PRISE EN CHARGE / 
SERVICES TROP REDUITS 
 
5 MAUVAIS ACCUEIL   
6 HEURES D’OUVERTURE NE 
CONVIENT PAS 
 
7 PRESTATIONS COUTS TROP CHERS  
8 PROBLEMS DE TRANSPORT  
9 AUTRE (PRÉCISER) 
............................. 
 
 
 
 
 Quelles  sont les raisons  de  
satisfaction ?  
 
Ex-Membre : Quelles étaient 
les raisons de satisfaction ?  
 
 
   
1 COMPÉTENCE DU  PERSONNEL  
2 PERSONNEL DISPONIBLE  
3 DISPONIBILITÉ DES MÉDICAMENTS  
4 BON PRISE EN CHARGE   
5 BON ACCUEIL   
6 HEURES D’OUVERTURE 
CONVENABLES 
 
7 PRESTATIONS NE COUTS PAS CHERS  
8 BON EMPLACEMENT   
9 AUTRE (PRÉCISER) 
............................. 
 
 
 
 
 Occupez-vous une fonction 
dans la mutuelle ? 
 
Ex-Membre : Aviez-vous 
occupé une fonction dans la 
mutuelle ? 
 oui 
 
 non 
 
 Avez-vous déjà spontanément 
aidé la mutuelle ? 
 
 
 Fréquemment  
 Quelque fois             
 Rarement 
 Jamais 
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Numéro LIBELLÉ DE LA QUESTION REPONSES ALLER  A 
 Le fonctionnement de la 
mutuelle vous paraît-il :  
 
Ex-Membre : Le 
fonctionnement de la mutuelle 
vous paraissait-il : 
 Excellent 
 Satisfaisant 
 Moyen 
 Mauvais 
 Très mauvais 
M515 
 Quelles sont les raisons de 
non satisfaction ?  
 
Ex-Membre : Quelles étaient 
les raisons de non 
satisfaction ?  
 
 
   
 
PAS CONFIANCE  DE LA GESTION 
 
 
PAS CONFIANCE  DU PRESIDENT 
 
 
PAS SATISFAIT DES PRESTATAIRES 
CONVENTIONNÉS 
 
 
COTISATION TROP CHÈRE 
 
 
SERVICES TROP RÉDUITS 
 
 
MANQUE DE POSSIBILITÉ DE 
PARTICIPER 
 
 
PROCESSUS DE CHOIX DES 
DIRIGEANT PAS SATISFAISANT 
 
 
MANQUE D’INFORMATION 
 
 
AMENDES TROP GRANDES 
 
 AUTRE   (PRÉCISER). ….  
 
 
 
 
 
 Quelles sont les raisons de 
satisfaction ?  
 
Ex-Membre : Quelles étaient 
les raisons de satisfaction ?  
 
 
   
 
CONFIANCE  DE LA GESTION 
 
 
CONFIANCE  DU PRESIDENT 
 
 
SATISFAIT DES PRESTATAIRES 
CONVENTIONNÉS 
 
 
COTISATION ACCESSIBLE 
 
 
SERVICES ADÉQUATS 
 
 
POSSIBILITÉ DE PARTICIPATION 
 
 
PROCESSUS DE CHOIX DES 
DIRIGEANTS SATISFAISANT 
 
 
SATISFAIT D’INFORMATION  
 
 
AMENDES EQUITABLES 
 
 
AUTRE    
(PRÉCISER). ….  
 
 
 
 
 
 Pensez-vous être en mesure 
d’influencer le 
fonctionnement de la 
mutuelle? 
 
 Ex-Membre : Pensez-vous 
que vous étiez en mesure 
d’influencer le 
fonctionnement de la 
mutuelle? 
 
 oui 
 
 non 
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Numéro LIBELLÉ DE LA QUESTION REPONSES ALLER  A 
 Avez-vous participé aux 
activités suivantes de la 
mutuelle ? 
  OUI NON 
 UNE ASSEMBLÉE GÉNÉRALE   
 ÉLECTION DES ORGANES   
 SESSIONS DE FORMATION   
 ACTIVITÉS DE 
SENSIBILISATION 
  
 INFORMATION SUR LE 
FONCTIONNEMENT DE LA 
MUTUELLE 
  
 DISCUSSIONS INFORMELLES 
SUR LA GESTION SUR LE 
FONCTIONNEMENT DE LA 
MUTUELLE  
  
 AUTRE (PRECISER) 
............................. 
 
  
 
 
 
 Comment êtes-vous informé 
de l’existence de la mutuelle? 
 
 
D’un membre de la famille  
D’un ami  
Du prestataire de soins  
Du staff de la mutuelle   
D’une association  
D’un leader de la communauté  
Des media  
D’un autre membre de la mutuelle  
Autre ……………………….……..  
 
 
 Etes-vous informé des 
mécanismes de contrôle 
institués par la mutuelle ? 
(pour des comportements 
abusifs ou de fraude, que ce 
soit des gérants, prestataires 
et bénéficiaires)  
 
 OUI NON 
PRESTATAIRES   
BÉNÉFICIAIRE   
RESPONSABLES   
 
 Connaissez-vous les 
responsables de la mutuelle 
de santé ? 
 
 
OUI NON 
1. PRÉSIDENT   
2. 
SECRÉTAIRE 
  
3. 
GESTIONNAIRE 
  
4. AUTRES   
 
 
 Connaissez-vous plusieurs 
personnes membres de la 
mutuelle ? 
 Je ne connais aucun membre 
 Je connais peu de membres 
 Je connais à peu près la moitié des membres 
 Je connais presque tous les membres  
     M523 
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Numéro LIBELLÉ DE LA QUESTION REPONSES ALLER  A 
 Que pensez-vous avoir en 
commun avec les autres 
membres de la mutuelle ?  
 
Plusieurs réponses possibles 
  
Voisins ou du même village  
Même famille ou parents proches  
Religion  
Genre  
Groupe d’âge  
Ethnie ou langue   
Caste  
Niveau d’éducation  
Profession  
Affiliation politique  
Statut économique  
Même vision sur les valeurs / 
solidarité 
 
Membres d’une autre association  
Rien  
Autres (spécifier)  
 
 
 Pensez-vous que certains 
membres de la communauté 
sont exclus de la mutuelle ? 
 oui 
 non  
 NSP 
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 Pour quelles raisons pensez-
vous qu’ils sont exclus ? 
 
Plusieurs réponses possibles 
  
Voisins ou du même village  
Même famille ou parents 
proches 
 
Religion  
Genre  
Groupe d’âge  
Ethnie ou langue   
Caste  
Niveau d’éducation  
Profession  
Affiliation politique  
Statut économique  
Autres (spécifier) 
 
 
 
 
  
Quels sont les avantages pour 
votre ménage d’être membre 
de la mutuelle?  
 
Plusieurs réponses possibles 
 
  
Avantage matériel (argent, 
nourriture, crédit, etc.)  
 
Accès aux services de santé  
Important dans futur, en cas 
d’urgence 
 
Solidarité avec les autres 
membres de la communauté 
 
Statut Social, réputation   
Aucun   
Autres (spécifier)  
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Numéro LIBELLÉ DE LA QUESTION REPONSES ALLER  A 
 En général, quel est votre 
degré d’accord avec les 
énoncés suivants… 
 
1 – PAS DU TOUT D’ACCORD 
2 – PAS D’ACCORD 
3 – NE SAIS PAS 
4 – ASSEZ D’ACCORD 
5 – TOUT À FAIT D’ACCORD 
 
Pas 
d’accord→D’accord 
 1 2 3 4 5 
A. Il est acceptable 
pour quelqu’un de 
payer la cotisation à la 
mutuelle de santé 
même s’il ne bénéficie 
pas encore des services 
de  la mutuelle. 
     
B. Il est acceptable que 
les bénéficiaires de la 
mutuelle de santé qui 
tombent malade 
bénéficient plus des 
services de la mutuelle 
de santé? 
     
C. Les familles qui sont 
très pauvres devraient 
être membres de la 
mutuelle de santé sans 
payer  
     
D. Les membres de la 
mutuelle devraient 
prendre les familles qui 
sont très pauvres en 
augmentant le montant 
de leur cotisation.  
     
E. Les membres de la 
mutuelle devraient 
parrainer les familles 
qui sont très pauvres.  
     
F. Les familles qui 
n’ont pas les moyens 
de cotiser doivent être 
prises en charge par le 
gouvernement 
     
G. La mutuelle doit 
fusionner avec autres 
mutuelles dans la 
région 
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Numéro LIBELLÉ DE LA QUESTION REPONSES ALLER  A 
 En général, quel est votre 
degré d’accord avec les 
énoncés suivants… 
 
1 – PAS DU TOUT D’ACCORD 
2 – PAS D’ACCORD 
3 – NE SAIS PAS 
4 – ASSEZ D’ACCORD 
5 – TOUT À FAIT D’ACCORD 
 
 
 
La mutuelle doit accepter des membres 
de divers …. 
 Pas 
d’accord→D’accord 
 1 2 3 4 5 
A. Voisinage et 
village      
B. Famille ou 
parents       
C. Religion      
D. Genre      
E. Groupe d’âge 
     
F. Ethnie ou 
langue       
G. Caste      
H. Niveau 
d’éducation      
I. Profession      
J. Affiliation 
politique      
K. Statut 
économique      
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SECTION 6: LA SANTE ET ACCES AUX SOINS 
Numéro LIBELLÉ DE LA QUESTION REPONSES ALLER  
A 
 A quelle distance de la localité se trouve 
la structure sanitaire  la plus proche 
 
Distance en 
Km……………….   
 
 
 Quel moyen de transport utilisez-vous  
pour vous rendre à cette structure 
sanitaire 
  A PIEDS 
 CHARRETTE  
 VOITURE   
  AUTRE    
 
 Y a t-il un membre du ménage qui a reçu 
des médicaments/soins traditionnel au 
cours du mois dernier ? 
 oui 
 non 
 
 Y-a-t-il un membre du ménage qui a  été 
hospitalisé  au  cours des deux  dernières 
années ? 
 oui 
 non  
 
 
 Y a t-il un membre du ménage qui a reçu 
des soins ambulatoires au cours du mois 
dernier ?  
 oui 
 non  
 
 
M614 
 
 
Numéro 
d’ordre 
   
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
 
Type 
d’événement 
1. Hospitalisation      
 
2. Soins 
ambulatoires             
1. 
Hospitalisation      
 
2. Soins 
ambulatoire   
1. 
Hospitalisation      
 
2. Soins 
ambulatoire                            
1. 
Hospitalisation      
 
2. Soins 
ambulatoire                       
 
Quel coût des 
prestations av
ez-vous payé? 
(CFA) 
Montant 
 
     
 
Montant 
 
     
 
Montant 
 
     
 
Montant 
 
     
 
 
Quel coût des 
médicaments 
avez-vous 
payé? (CFA) 
Montant 
 
     
 
Montant 
 
     
 
Montant 
 
     
 
Montant 
 
     
 
 
Quels autres 
coûts avez-
vous 
payé  (transpo
rt, séjour 
accompagnan
t, etc.) ? 
(CFA) 
Montant 
 
     
 
Montant 
 
     
 
Montant 
 
     
 
Montant 
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Provenance 
de l’argent 
Sur le revenu.   
Epargne            
Emprunt           
Vente     
        
exceptionnelle  
Dons                
  
Autre                
Sur le revenu.  
 
Epargne           
 
Emprunt          
 
Vente     
        
exceptionnelle   
Dons                
  
Autre                      
 
Sur le revenu.  
 
Epargne           
 
Emprunt          
 
Vente     
        
exceptionnelle   
Dons                
  
Autre                      
 
Sur le revenu.  
 
Epargne           
 
Emprunt          
 
Vente     
        
exceptionnelle   
Dons                
  
Autre                      
 
 
Est-ce que la 
mutuelle a 
contribué au 
paiement du 
coût global? 
 oui 
 non  
 oui 
 non  
 oui 
 non  
 oui 
 non  
 
Comment 
appréciez-
vous  les 
soins reçus ? 
 Très 
satisfaisant 
 satisfaisant 
 Moyenne 
 Mauvais 
 Très mauvaise 
 Très 
satisfaisant 
 satisfaisant 
 Moyenne 
 Mauvais 
 Très 
mauvaise 
 Très 
satisfaisant 
 satisfaisant 
 Moyenne 
 Mauvais 
 Très 
mauvaise 
 Très 
satisfaisant 
 satisfaisant 
 Moyenne 
 Mauvais 
 Très 
mauvaise 
 
 
Au  cours des deux  dernières années, y-a-t-il un 
membre du ménage qui a votre avis  devrait être 
hospitalisé  mais ne l’a pas été par manque de 
ressources ?  
 oui 
 non  
 
 
Au  cours du mois dernier, y-a-t-il un membre du 
ménage qui a votre avis  devrait bénéficier de 
soins ambulatoires  mais ne l’a pas été par 
manque de ressources ?  
 oui 
 non  
 
FIN INTERVIEW 
 
Merci d’avoir consacré du temps pour répondre aux questions.  
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Nous souhaitons vous contacter ainsi que des membres de votre ménage pour une 
interview sur leurs expériences dans l’utilisation des services de santé ou les inviter à 
participer à un focus groupe. Pourrons-nous vous appeler à ce sujet ? 
Contact du répondant : 
                           Adresse : 
…………………………………………………………………………
……………….. 
                                Tel:     ………………………. 
 
Fin de l'Interview 
Indiquez l'heure de la fin de 
l'interview 
Heure______   
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Appendix 3: Semi-structured interview topic guide  
ENQUÊTE SUR LE CAPITAL SOCIAL DES MUTUELLES DE SANTE  
République du Sénégal 
(MARS – AVRIL 2009) 
Guide d’Entretien semi structuré  
1. Motivations profondes de l’adhésion (capital social et décision d’adhérer / de 
ne plus / de ne pas adhérer) 
 
 Décrivez-moi s’il vous plaît quand et comment votre ménage a pris la ES01
décision D’ADHERER / DE NE PLUS / DE NE PAS ADHERER à la 
mutuelle :  
a. Comment avez-vous entendu parler de la mutuelle de santé la 
première fois / avant votre adhésion ?  
  Spécifiez les contextes – travail, amis, associations, sensibilisations 
etc.  
b. Avez-vous discuté votre décision de (non) adhésion avec la famille, les 
amis, les gestionnaires de la mutuelle, autres membres de la mutuelle, 
ou d’autres personnes ? Si oui, quelles étaient leurs opinions ? 
c. Y a t  il une personne ou un événement qui a été déterminant dans la 
prise de décision (adhésion, non adhésion, démission)  
d. Comment aviez vous décidé qui dans la famille doit / ne doit pas être 
inscrit ? (Dans les ménages polygames - quels femmes doit / ne doit 
pas être inscrites ?) 
   
2. Comparaison entre la mutuelle et les autres structures de capital social 
 
 Selon vous, en quoi la mutuelle de santé ressemblent aux autres types ES02
d’associations dont vous ou votre ménage sont membres, (tontines, tours 
de village, groupements féminins, dahira, etc) En quoi la mutuelle de 
santé est-elle différentes des autres associations ?  
a. Notamment, en termes de : 
i. modalité d’adhésion 
ii. solidarité / réciprocité 
iii. relations entre les membres  
iv. réseaux sociaux 
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v. coûts et bénéfices 
vi. fonctionnement 
vii. gestion 
b. A votre avis, quel type d’association est le plus important (la mutuelle 
ou les autres)? Pourquoi? 
c. Souvent, on trouve que l’adhésion  autres types d’associations est 
plus élevée qu’aux des mutuelles. A votre avis, pourquoi ? 
d. Est-ce que les associations du village/quartier sont liées à la mutuelle 
? Comment ?  
 
3. Effet de l’adhésion à la mutuelle sur le capital social des membres 
(uniquement pour les adhérents, ex-adhérents, bénéficiaires, ex- 
bénéficiaires) 
 
 Parlez-moi de votre participation à la vie de votre mutuelle ? (Par ES03
exemple une assemblée générale, élections des organes, sessions de 
formation, activités de sensibilisation etc.) ? 
a. Quelles sont les justifications de votre participation ou non ? 
b. Pensez vous être (avoir été) en mesure d’influencer le fonctionnement 
de la mutuelle? Comment ? 
c. Est-ce que ces expériences de participation aux activités de la 
mutuelle ont changé votre manière de participer ou de communiquer 
dans d’autres contextes ?  Expliquez   
 
 Comment appréciez-vous le fonctionnement de la mutuelle ?  ES04
a.  Comment appréciez-vous la circulation de l’information dans la 
mutuelle? 
b. Est-ce que le mode de fonctionnement de  la mutuelle peut être un 
exemple pour la communauté? 
c. Les leaders de votre communauté jouent ils un rôle important dans le 
fonctionnement de la mutuelle ? 
d. Dans votre communauté, y a t il des gens qui sont exclus des 
associations et de la mutuelle ? Pourquoi ?  
e. La mutuelle vous a-t-il permis de développer de nouvelles amitiés ? 
 Que pensez vous de l’idée d’une fusion entre les mutuelles ? Expliquez   ES05
 
 Est-ce que les politiciens ont parlé de la mutuelle au cours de leur ES06
campagne électorale ?  
a. Avez-vous plus d’intérêt dans les affaires politique locales depuis 
votre adhésion à la mutuelle ?  
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4. Le recours aux prestations de la mutuelle 
 
 Décrivez s’il vous plaît comment votre ménage prend les décisions ES07
lorsque quelqu’un membre du ménage tombe malade. Parlez nous de ce 
processus avant votre adhésion à la mutuelle ? Et après l’adhésion du 
ménage à la mutuelle ? 
a. Quels étaient les sujets de la discussion ? (Recours, délais de recours, 
préférence sur le prestataire, etc.) 
b. D’où provient l’argent avec lequel vous payez pour les soins / les 
cotisations ? 
c. Comment résolvez-vous les conflits éventuels sur les décisions liées à 
la santé ? 
 
 Est-ce que la provenance de l’argent pour les soins de santé avait une ES08
influence sur le choix du recours ? 
a. Est-ce que cette influence a été modifiée depuis l’avènement de la 
mutuelle ?   
b. Depuis que vous êtes membre de la mutuelle, est-ce que votre rapport 
avec les individus qui donnent l’argent avec lequel vous payez pour le 
soin / les cotisations a changé ? 
 
 Depuis que vous êtes membre de la mutuelle, est-ce que votre rapport ES09
avec les prestataires a changé ? Comment ? 
a. Si oui, est-ce que votre rapport avec des autres prestataires a aussi 
changé (par exemple d’éducation ?) 
b. Est-ce que vous utilisez plus les services de santé depuis que vous êtes 
/ était membre de la mutuelle ?   
c. Est-ce que les soins que vous recevez ont été améliorés depuis votre 
adhésion à la mutuelle ? Comment ? 
 
5. Les effets de la mutuelle 
 Depuis que la mutuelle a démarré qu’est-ce qui a changé sur le plan de la ES10
santé et autres secteurs sociaux de la communauté? 
a. Depuis que vous êtes membre de la mutuelle, quels bénéfices en avez-
vous tirés ?  
b. Est-ce que la mutuelle a créé des divergences / conflits dans la 
communauté ? A quel moment et dans quels domaines ? 
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 Parlez nous des forces et faiblesses de votre mutuelle ? Pensez-vous ES11
qu’elle st viable ?  
 
FIN INTERVIEW 
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Appendix 4: Stakeholder interview guide (Soppante case study) 
1. Gestionnaires du système de santé 
• Es ce que vous connaissez Soppante ? Dans un contexte formel : 
• Es ce que vous etes implique dans la mutuelle / avez-vous un rôle ?  
• Combien d’information avez-vous sur la mutuelle ? 
• Perception : 
o aces au soin  
o management 
o effet sur le system de santé 
o effet sur la performance des prestataires 
o viabilité de la mutuelle 
o effet sur la demande au soin 
• Opinion sur comment aller a l’échelle / créer un plus grand réseaux 
• Avez-vous suivi des réunions de la mutuelle – ex AG ? 
• Avez-vous confiance à la gestion de Soppante ? 
• Es ce que vous conseiller votre collèges / prestataires a soutenir le mouvement 
mutualiste / Soppante ? 
• Quels sont les topiques prioritaires pour la santé a Thies ? 
• Où est la mouvement mutualiste dans cette liste des prioritaires ? – Comparaison 
avec SIDA, paludisme, etc 
• Es ce que vous connaissez Soppante ? Personnellement : 
• Es ce que vous conseiller votre amis a adhérer ? 
• Es ce que vous connaissez les gérants de la mutuelle ? 
• Es ce que vous connaissez des membres de la mutuelle ? 
2. Prestataires 
• Voir section 1 
• Perceptions des membres et non membres – comparaison sur leurs connaissances, 
attitudes, comportement dans le contexte de aces aux soins 
• Perceptions des membres et non membres – les relations entre eux 
• Es ce que vous conseiller non membres a adhérer ? 
• Es ce que ses superieurs soutient le mouvement mutualiste / Soppante? 
3. Responsables 
• Histoire de vie 
• Comment il a commencé les relations avec Soppante ? 
• Perception de Soppante – positif et négatif 
• Relations avec les autres responsables, gérants, membres, prestataires, structures 
d’appui etc 
• Relations avec autres associations, groupes etc 
• A votre avis, quel est l’avenir pour Soppante ?  
 
4. Structures d’appui 
• Voir section 1 
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• Voir section 2 
• Des que vous parler des mutuelles dans les reunions etc, es ce que vous parlez au 
Soppante ? Qu’es que vous dissez ? Pour vous, Soppante est un exemple de… ? 
• Perception du Soppante dans le contexte régional 
• Perception des réseaux du Soppante – comment développer ?  
5. Associations, leaders locaux  
• Voir section 3 
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Appendix 5: Parent and child codes (stakeholder interviews) 
Parent code = Actors 
Child codes Sources23 References24 
History of involvement with CBHI 23 32 
Leaders of Soppante 16 28 
Actors personal membership of CBHI 5 6 
Francois Diop 2 6 
Assane Guèye 5 5 
Mbaye Sene 4 5 
  
Parent code = CBHI scheme operation 
Child codes Sources References 
Human resources of CBHI 48 96 
Information dissemination 38 78 
Types of CBHI 27 53 
Participation in CBHI 28 50 
Scaling up coverage 20 46 
Premiums 28 43 
Training and workshops 18 34 
Rationale for joining CBHI 20 27 
Enrolling new members 19 25 
Dropping out of CBHI 10 17 
Studies on CBHI 12 16 
Competition between CBHI schemes 9 12 
First encounter with Soppante 9 9 
Requests for CBHI 7 9 
                                                 
23
 “Sources” refers to the total number of stakeholders/interviewees who mentioned the child code. 
24
 “References” refers to the aggregate number of times the child code was mentioned by all 
stakeholders/interviewees. 
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Parent code = CBHI scheme operation 
Child codes Sources References 
Guarantee letter 7 8 
Family enrolment 5 6 
CBHI headquarters 5 6 
Solvency 3 5 
Soppante model 4 5 
Record keeping 3 4 
IT 3 3 
Evaluation of CBHI 1 2 
Legal status of CBHI 2 2 
Risk perception 2 2 
 
Parent code = Development 
Child codes Sources References 
Development 22 34 
Microcredit 14 20 
Education 6 7 
Economic & financial activity 5 5 
Civil society groups 3 3 
 
Parent code = Federations 
Child codes Sources References 
GRAIM 13 27 
PROMUSAF 8 11 
Pikine CBHI network 5 8 
National union of CBHI 2 3 
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Parent code = Geography 
Child codes Sources References 
Thies 16 40 
Fandene 17 25 
Dakar 9 14 
Diourbel 7 8 
Flooding 6 6 
Ndondol 3 4 
Urban vs rural 3 4 
 
Parent code = Health system 
Child codes Sources References 
Health care providers 40 86 
Access to health care 32 66 
Contracting 28 53 
Subsidies 25 34 
Hospitals 17 32 
Payment of providers 16 20 
Prevention 14 19 
Pharmaceuticals 11 16 
Comite de sante 9 13 
Quality of care 11 13 
Ambulance 5 5 
Traditional medicine 1 1 
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Parent code = Irregularities 
Child codes Sources References 
Corruption 17 28 
Waiving fees 11 13 
Under the table payments 1 1 
 
Parent code = Non-governmental institutions 
Child codes Sources References 
Donors and technical assistance 40 87 
Catholic Church 21 42 
Islam, marabouts and imams 24 38 
Media 1 1 
 
Parent code = Power 
Child codes Sources References 
Political engagement 39 87 
Social movements  23 42 
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Parent code = Social inclusion / exclusion 
Child codes Sources References 
Financial determinants of membership 20 28 
Women 20 26 
Poverty 13 22 
Ethnicity 6 11 
Social integration 8 10 
Teachers 8 8 
Means testing 3 3 
 
Parent code = Social networks 
Child codes Sources References 
Associations 44 72 
Local leaders 24 37 
Migration & travel 9 11 
Privileged social relations 5 5 
Neighbours 5 5 
Cooperatives 1 1 
 
Parent code = Values 
Child codes Sources References 
Solidarity 30 43 
Voluntarism 25 37 
Trust 20 30 
Altruism 2 2 
 
 
